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Sexual harassment has become a prominent issue in 
American politics and American life. Victims of sexual 
harassment are also showing an increased willingness to take 
their cases to court. In addition, educational institutions 
and their students now realize that sexual harassment also 
occurs at school and can be subject to legal action. In 
this study, these issues were framed in a legal context and 
researched through federal and state legislative statutes 
and court cases in an effort to clarify the elements 
surrounding sexual harassment and to provide guidelines for 
school administrators. Key questions raised during this 
study include how the judicial process defines sexual 
harassment; how history and the current literature have 
addressed sexual harassment; what the analysis of federal 
and state statutes, as researched through court cases, 
reveals regarding sexual harassment; what discernable 
patterns and trends can be gleaned from analysis of 
judicial decisions in sexual harassment cases; and what 
legal guidelines can be established to aid school 
administrators and board members in administrative decisions 
and policy making. 
Based upon an analysis of the data, the following 
conclusions were drawn: Sexual harassment is clearly illegal 
and protected under both Title VII and Title IX; 
a written proactive policy for both employees and students 
is necessary to protect school systems and officials from 
liability; clear communication of the written policy with 
appropriate training should be repeated at set intervals; 
men and women see sexual harassment differently; simple 
procedures for reporting sexual harassment need to be 
outlined; a prompt, adequate, and confidential investigation 
of complaint must be undertaken; complete documentation and 
a prompt and adequate response to the findings of the 
investigation is imperative; and school officials should 
refuse to give recommendations to employees who have been 
removed from employment due to sexual harassment. 
School officials who have a proactive, publicized 
policy in place, complete with clear reporting procedures, 
and prompt and adequate responses to complaints make their 
chances of avoiding or successfully defending a sexual 
harassment suit much better. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The risk of sexual harassment lawsuits has skyrocketed 
in the 1990s due to wide media attention and because ever-
increasing verdicts have encouraged plaintiffs to sue over 
conduct which once would have gone unchallenged. 
The United States Senate confirmation of Judge Clarence 
Thomas to the Supreme Court moved the subject of sexual 
harassment into the day-to-day lives and conversations of 
Americans in a way no prior media treatment or court cases 
have. In addition, headlines concerning the Navy's 
"Tailhook" scandal and changes in the law have further 
intensified the challenge for employers. The Civil Rights 
Act of 19911 has allowed compensatory damages up to 
$3 00,000 and provided for jury trials where favorable 
outcomes for plaintiffs are much more likely. Moreover, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled in Franklin during 
p # 
February of 1992, that compensatory damages were available 
to students suing school systems under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972.3 
1 42 U.S.C. 1981. 
2 Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617 
(11th Cir.1990) 112 S.Ct 1028 (U.S. 1992). 
3 20 U.S.C. 1681. 
What is sexual harassment?4 When are employers 
responsible for the conduct of their employees? Are 
students protected from sexual harassment by teachers and by 
other students? The answers to these and other questions 
are revealed in this study of the legal aspects of sexual 
harassment and the subsequent implications for educational 
administrators. 
Many people assume that sexual harassment is an 
expression of sexuality, but most experts view it as an 
expression of unequal power. It is not a battle of the 
sexes, it is about change.5 Linda Chevez, staff director 
of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission during the Reagan 
administration, says many men still are confused about what 
is not acceptable behavior around female co-workers.6 The 
rules for appropriate behavior are not fixed. As society 
seeks to establish such rules, several issues are likely to 
surface. Three of these issues are discussed in this 
chapter. 
Because the vast majority of reported cases involve 
males harassing females, this study focuses only on sexual 
harassment that involves male perpetrators and female 
victims. 
5 Charles Clark, "Sexual Harassment," CO Researcher 1 
(9 August 1991): 539. 
6 Ibid. 
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The first of these issues asks the question, what 
constitutes sexual harassment? Sexual harassment is a form 
of discrimination based on sex.7 The most frequently cited 
definition of sexual harassment was established in 1980 by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 
Title VII makes such discrimination an unlawful employment 
practice. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any 
individual, or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.9 
While Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex, 
the regulations adopted by the EEOC in 1980 specifically 
identify sexual harassment as an actionable form of 
discrimination under the statute. The regulations state: 
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of 
Section 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
7 Jim Walsh, "The Law of Sexual Harassment and Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson." Sexual Harassment in the Schools: 
Preventing and Defending Against Claims (Alexandria: 
National School Boards Association, 1990): 1. 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
9 Ibid. 
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harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of 
an individual's employment, (2) submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as 
the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or 
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive working environment. 0 
The courts have established two basic types of 
actionable sexual harassment claims. The first claim, quid 
pro quo, exists when a supervisor demands sexual 
consideration in exchange for a tangible job benefit such as 
a salary increase, promotion, or continuance.11 Central 
to this type of harassment is the concept of power, the 
existence of an employment reprisal.12 Directly related 
to quid pro quo sexual harassment is sexual favoritism. It 
occurs when a less-qualified applicant receives employment 
opportunities or benefits as a result of the individual's 
submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for 
sexual favors. This type of sexual harassment has resulted 
in successful law suits brought on behalf of qualified 
persons who were denied employment opportunities or 
10 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1987). 
11 Stacy J. Garvin, "Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment," HR Magazine 36 (June 1991): 101. 
12 Robert J. Shoop, "The Reasonable Woman in a Hostile 
Work Environment," West's Education Law Reporter (April 23, 
1992): 706. 
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benefits. However, the courts have required proof of the 
• • • 1 sexual relationship, not merely rumors or innuendos. J 
The second claim, hostile environment, exists when a 
supervisor or co-worker sexually harasses, intimidates, or 
makes an employee so uncomfortable as to create an offensive 
work environment. The courts have ruled a hostile work 
environment harms the employee psychologically and 
constitutes harm that is as damaging as a denial of a 
tangible benefit.14 In judging whether sexual harassment 
has created a hostile working environment, the courts 
generally use the 'reasonable woman' standard.15 A 
climate that most employees consider harmless may still be 
judged to be hostile depending on the circumstances.16 In 
.  .  #  .  .  * 1 7  addition, in Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital. a 
California Supreme Court ruled that an individual doesn't 
have to be the target of sexual harassment to have a cause 
of action. 
The second issue to be addressed concerns the 
pervasiveness of sexual harassment. Surveys covering 
13 Shoop, 707. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.1991) 
16 Brenda T. Acken, Kent St. Pierre, Peter Veglahan, 
"Limiting Sexual Harassment Liability," Journal of 
Accounting 171 (June 1991): 43. 
17 262 Cal. Rep.842, 1989. 
6 
different sectors of society vary widely. In 1976, Redbook 
magazine surveyed 9 000 women. Eighty-eight percent of those 
responding said they had been victims of harassment and 52 
percent said they had been fired or decided to resign 
because of the harassment.18 A survey conducted in 1980 
among 20,000 federal workers by the U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board, recorded that 42 percent of the females 
and 15 percent of the males responding said they had been 
sexually harassed.19 Another large scale survey of sexual 
harassment was released in September of 1990 by the 
Department of Defense. Of 20,000 United States military 
respondents around the world, 64 percent of the females 
reported having been sexually harassed while 17 percent of 
the males reported being harassed.20 In the corporate 
world, recent surveys indicate that 15 percent of women 
responding have been sexually harassed within the last 
year.21 Surveys on college campuses show the number of 
respondents reportedly having been sexually harassed ranged 
18 Claire Safran, "What Men Do To Women on the Job: A 
Shocking Look At Sexual Harassment," Redbook (November 
1986): 42. 
19 "Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It A 
Problem?" A report of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection 
Board (March 1981): 6. 
20 Defense Manpower Data Center, Sexual Harassment in 
the Military: 1988 (September 1990). 
21 Ronnie Sandruff,"Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 
500," Working Women (December 1988): 8. 
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from 40-70 percent. Ninety-eight percent of the sexual 
harassment that occurs on campus happens between male and 
female students rather than between professors and 
students.22 The steadiest barometer of sexual harassment 
is, of course, the complaints filed with the EEOC offices. 
The number of complaints has risen slightly in recent years, 
reaching 5,557 in 1990. Women's groups generally claim that 
the incidence of sexual harassment is severely under 
reported.23 
The last issue to be addressed is the question of 
whether men and women view sexual harassment differently. 
Because women are disproportionately victims of sexual 
assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned 
with unwanted sexual behavior. Women who are victims of 
mild forms of sexual harassment may worry about whether this 
conduct is a prelude to more serious, perhaps violent sexual 
misconduct.24 Therefore, certain types of sexual behavior 
may be interpreted differently by women and men. This is 
the premise upon which the 'reasonable woman' (rather than 
reasonable person) theory was established in the Ellison v. 
Brady case.25 
22 Clark, 543. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.1991). 
8 
For example, in a survey of 1200 working men and women 
in Los Angeles County in 1980-81, 67 percent of the men but 
only 17 percent of the women said they would be flattered by 
a proposition from a co-worker. Sixty-three percent of the 
women but only 15 percent of the men said they would be 
insulted by it.2® Another survey described a man in an 
office eyeing a women's body up and down. Twenty-four 
percent of the women respondents characterized such behavior 
as harassment while only eight percent of the men did.27 
Naturally, the most divergent views of men and women workers 
concerning sexual harassment occur in the less well defined 
area of hostile environment.28 
Statement of the Problem 
If it is true that the law changes as the values of 
society evolve, then perhaps no area of law is more volatile 
than the law concerning the relationships between the 
sexes.29 In the decades since women first entered the 
26 Barbara A. Gutlek, Sex and the Workplace: The Impact 
of Sexual Behavior and Harassment on Women. Men and 
Organizations (1985): 60 
27 B. Blodgett, "Sexual Harassment... Some See It...Some 
Won't," Harvard Business Review (March-April 1981): 76. 
28 Clark, 540. 
29 Jim Walsh, "The Law of Sexual Harassment and Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson" Sexual Harassment in the Schools: 
Preventing and Defending Against Claims (Alexandria: 
National School Boards Association, 1990): 1. 
9 
American work force, sexual harassment has continued to make 
disturbing headlines.30 In 1991, the Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings placed the issue of sexual harassment 
in the workplace under massive public scrutiny and 
heightened the concerns of employers regarding their 
liability.31 Since then, the Civil Rights Act of 199132 
not only has justified those concerns, but also has set the 
stage for a substantial increase in harassment lawsuits.33 
The New York Times34 recently labeled schools the 
newest arena for sexual harassment. Given that school 
systems are responsible for both employees and students, 
school boards, superintendents, and principals are in double 
jeopardy when facing the possibility of sexual harassment 
A 
litigation. This study of the legal aspects of sexual 
harassment and the subsequent implications for educational 
administrators will attempt to discuss the key issues and 
court decisions that have dealt with the problem of sexual 
30 Clark, 540. 
31 Susan M. Benton-Powers, "Sexual Harassment: Civil 
Rights Act Increases Liability," HR Focus 69 (February, 
1992): 10. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (P.L. 102-166). 
33 Benton-Powers, 11. 
34 Jane Gross, "Schools Are Newest Arena For Sex-
Harassment Cases," The New York Times. March 11, 1992, 
A1(N), B8(L). 
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harassment and provide guidelines for possible protective 
actions. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study was (1) to determine from 
current literature the critical legal issues in sexual 
harassment claims; (2) to review and analyze federal and 
state statutes to determine the status of sexual harassment 
as grounds for litigation; (3) to review and analyze case 
law related to sexual harassment claims; and (4) to provide 
guidelines for policies and procedures for practicing school 
administrators who must deal with sexual harassment 
allegations. This study was developed in a factual manner 
based on the legal issues involved and did not attempt to 
address the moral values inherent in charges of sexual 
harassment. 
Questions To Be Answered 
This study answered the following guestions: 
1. What is sexual harassment as defined by the 
judicial process? 
2. How does the literature analyze sexual harassment? 
3. What does an analysis of federal and state 
statutes reveal regarding sexual harassment? 
11 
4. What are the discernible patterns and trends 
regarding judicial decisions in sexual harassment 
cases? 
5. What legal guidelines can be established as a 
result of this research to aid school 
administrators and board members in administrative 
decisions and policy making? 
Methodology 
The methodology used for this study was that of legal 
research as defined by Hudgins and Vacca.35 This involved 
an analysis of judicial decisions from which legal 
principles were derived. The study of case law was 
supplemented with an analysis of state and federal statutory 
law. 
Legal research begins with framing the problem as a 
legal issue: the legal aspects of sexual harassment in the 
workplace. State and federal statutes which control this 
issue were investigated and a bibliography of court 
decisions was built. Each decision was read and analyzed 
around three major areas: the facts of the case; the 
decision and rationale; and implications of the decision. 
35 H. C. Hudgins and Richard S. Vacca. Law and 
Education (Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1985), 
23-52. 
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Primary sources were state and federal court decisions 
and state and federal statutes. Secondary sources such as 
legal encyclopedias, law reviews, business and education 
articles, and books were utilized to provide supplemental 
information. Included as sources were The Current Index to 
Journals in Education. The Guide to Periodical Literature. 
Index to Legal Periodicals. Current Law Index, and American 
Law Reports. 
Legal cases focusing on sexual harassment were gleaned 
from the literature. The actual cases were then examined 
via the National Reporter System which includes decisions 
rendered by the following courts: the United States Supreme 
Court, the United States District Courts, the United States 
Courts of Appeals, and state appellate courts. Cases were 
read and categorized according to the nature of the sexual 
harassment involved with special emphasis being given to 
those cases that involve educators. 
Legal cases were "shepardized" utilizing Shepard's 
Citations which provide a history of reported court 
decisions and a treatment of that decision. This allowed 
the researcher to rely on the applicable court holding. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited to analysis of state and federal 
court cases based on state and federal statutes as applied 
to sexual harassment using the time frame 1975-1993. Much 
13 
has changed in both the attitudes of society and the courts 
during this time frame. This study was designed to analyze 
both the literature and the legal cases since the middle 
1970s for the purpose of determining the current trends in 
the legal aspects of sexual harassment. 
It was hoped that the "Tailhook" suit brought by four 
alleged harassment victims against the Tailhook Association, 
the United States Navy, and the Las Vegas Hilton would have 
been litigated during this time period, but, at this 
writing, a decision in that case has not been reached. In 
addition, the Supreme Court agreed in March 1993 to hear a 
sexual harassment case from Tennessee to define even more 
clearly hostile environment sexual harassment. However, the 
Court was not expected to set forth a ruling until 1994. 
Design of the Study 
Chapter I included an introduction, the statement of 
the problem, the purpose of the study, the questions to be 
answered, the methodology, the limitations of the study, the 
design of the study, and the definition of terms. 
Chapter II examined current articles from legal and 
educational resources to determine the status of and 
thoughts concerning sexual harassment. Beginning with the 
mass entrance of women into the workplace, the development 
of practices, policies, and legislation to address sexual 
harassment was traced. Attention was then focused on 
14 
current trends in dealing with sexual harassment, as 
revealed in the literature. 
Chapter III examined the legal aspects of sexual 
harassment as they have been decided in the courts. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has been 
instrumental in shaping sexual harassment litigation, many 
of these cases will be from the United States District 
Courts and the Appellate Courts. This chapter focused on 
applicable federal and state statutes. 
Chapter IV studied and analyzed the federal appellate 
court cases from the landmark Supreme Court decision in 1986 
through 1992 to discover the common elements in each case 
which determined the findings of the court, thereby 
compiling a list of essential elements needed for a 
successful case. 
Chapter V summarized the findings of the research and 
provided guidelines for administrators and school board 
members to utilize when faced with sexual harassment 
allegations. Also included in this chapter were 
recommendations for further study. 
15 
Definition of Terms 
The following words and phrases were key terms used in 
this study. Unless otherwise noted, Black's Law 
,  ,  ^  £  . . .  
Dictionary was the source of these definitions. 
Agent - A person authorized by another to act for him, 
one entrusted with another's business. 
Certiorari - A writ from a superior to an inferior 
court requiring the latter to produce a certified record of 
a particular case tried therein. It is most commonly used 
to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States, which 
uses the writ of certiorari as a discretionary device to 
choose the cases it wishes to hear. 
De minimis - The law does not take notice of; very 
small or trifling. 
Gravamen - The material part of a grievance charge. 
The burden or gist of a charge. 
Indecent exposure - Exposure to sight of the private 
parts of the body in a lewd or indecent manner in a public 
place. 
Indecent liberties - Taking such liberties as the 
common sense of society would regard as indecent or 
improper. According to some authorities, it involves an 
assault or attempt at sexual intercourse, but according to 
36 Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. (Centennial Edition 
1981-1991) (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1979). 
16 
others, it is not necessary that the familiarities should 
have related to the private parts of a child. 
Quid pro quo - What for what; something for something. 
Used in law for the giving of one valuable thing for 
another. 
Reasonable woman standard - The standard which one must 
observe to avoid liability for negligence...including the 
foreseeability of harm to one such as the plaintiff. 
Respondeat superior theory - Let the master answer. 
This maxim means that a master is liable in certain cases 
for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for 
those of his agent. As applied to education, this doctrine 
establishes the liability of the school district for the 
actions of its teachers. 
Statute - An act of the legislature declaring, 
commanding, or prohibiting something. A particular law 
enacted by the will of the legislative department of 
government. 
Tangible - Having or possessing physical form. Capable 
of being touched or seen. 
Teacher - As used in this study, the term "teacher" 
encompasses all certified personnel below the rank of 
superintendent. 
Tort - A private or civil wrong calling for 
compensation in damages. 
17 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In reviewing the current literature related to sexual 
harassment, it is important to historically frame the issue 
of sexual harassment. Added to this framework are the 
underlying power dynamics of sexual harassment, the effects 
sexual harassment has on its victims, patriarchy, sexual 
stratification, and the recent heightened public awareness 
of sexual harassment abuses highlighted in the Judge 
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the Navy's 
Tailhook scandal. Finally, legally intertwined in all of 
the literature regarding sexual harassment are the federal 
statutes regarding equal opportunities in employment and 
education, and the employer's responsibilities and possible 
liabilities. 
Historical Overview 
It wasn't until the early 1960s that women began 
entering the work force in numbers large enough to create a 
societal situation which would formalize sexual harassment 
18 
as a problem.1 The seeds of future sexual harassment 
litigation were planted during debate over the 1964 Civil 
Rights Bill. When Title VII, dealing with discrimination in 
employment was expanded to include sex discrimination, the 
impact of the bill was broadened significantly. The 1964 
bill also created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to investigate discrimination complaints against 
individuals, although initially, it was given no enforcement 
powers.2 
The 1970s ushered in an era of efforts to curb 
workplace discrimination of all forms, as government and 
private employers launched affirmative action programs.3 
In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act. It gave the EEOC independent general counsel with the 
authority to bring cease-and-desist orders and bring suit in 
federal court against employers. The same year, Congress 
passed the Education Act Amendments, Title IX of which 
prohibited sex discrimination at schools and universities 
receiving federal funds.4 Sexual harassment victims during 
these years sued under a variety of laws, principally Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs also sued 
1 Charles Clark, "Sexual Harassment," CO Researcher 1 
(9 August 1991): 546. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
19 
under state anti-discrimination laws, state fair employment 
practice laws, and other state tort or contract laws citing 
infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery or 
breach of employment contract.5 In 1975, the first 
reported court case on sexual harassment was litigated.6 
It was in 1977 that the first charge of sexual harassment of 
students was brought under Title IX of the 1972 Education 
Amendments.7 In 1980, the suit was dismissed because the 
plaintiff had graduated and Yale, in the meantime, had 
established a sexual harassment grievance procedure. In 
1977, the Washington D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act if it "adversely affects a 
job condition."8 In 1978, the first of several major 
studies of sexual harassment appeared.9 In 1979, Catherine 
A. McKinnon argued for legal remedies in Sexual Harassment 
of Working Women: A Case of Sexual Discrimination, and 
Margaret Mead wrote a widely noted article calling for a 
5 Ibid. 
6 Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.1977). 
7 Yale v. Alexander, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.1980). 
8 Barnes v. Costle F.2d 983 (1977). 
9 Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown; The Sexual Harassment 
of Women on the Job (1978), as quoted in Clark, 546. 
20 
taboo on sexual relations in the workplace.10 In 1978, 
President Carter signed the Civil Service Reform Act 
prohibiting the perfjonnel practice of discriminating on the 
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
This law also created the Merit Protection Board to be used 
by the government as a board of appeal for grievance 
procedures. In 1979, the EEOC was given even greater power 
when it was assigned the responsibility for enforcing the 
1963 Equal Pay Act and the 1967 Age Discrimination in 
Emp1oyment Act.11 
In 1980, the EEOC issued its first influential 
guidelines on sexual harassment. According to regulations 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in order to 
establish a sexual harassment violation of Title VII, an 
employee must prove the following: 
1. The employee belonged to a protected group. 
2. The employee was subject to unwelcome: sexual 
harassment. 
3. The harassment complained of was based on sex. 
4. The employee's reaction to the sexual harassment 
affected tangible aspects of the employee's 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment. 
5. The employer is a respondeat superior.12 
10 Margaret Mead, "A Proposal: We Need Taboos on Sex at 
Work," Redbook (April 1978): 31. 
11 Clark, 548. 
12 Stacey J. Garvin, "Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment," HR Magazine 36 (June 1991): 101. The 
respondeat superior theory establishes that employers are 
liable for actions of their supervisors, subordinates or co-
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In 1981, during the Reagan administration, Orrin G. 
Hatch, a Republican Senator from Utah, held Labor Committee 
hearings to study the new sexual harassment guidelines of 
the EEOC to determine whether they were too strict, creating 
more antagonism toward women in the workplace, placing too 
great a burden on employers, and potentially infringing upon 
the freedom of expression of others.13 Among those 
testifying at the Hatch hearings was Phyllis Schlafly who 
said that "sexual harassment on the job is not a problem for 
the virtuous women."14 
On June 19, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 
first major ruling on sexual harassment15 making it 
illegal not only when the harassment results in a loss of a 
job or a promotion, but also when it creates an offensive or 
hostile working environment.16 However, defining a 
hostile environment has not been easy. The EEOC guidelines 
state that sexual harassment includes any unwelcome sexual 
advances or requests for sexual favors. Therefore, it is 
workers if those in charge know or should have known of the 
harassment, as found in Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 
211. 
13 Clarke, 548. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 
(1986). 
16 Id. 
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clear that whatever conduct is alleged, to constitute sexual 
harassment, it must be based on activity which is NOT 
welcomed by the victim. Such determination must be gathered 
from the facts surrounding each individual case. While both 
the harasser's and the victim's perspectives will be 
considered, it should be noted that the activity directed 
toward the victim and her response to it appear to carry the 
greatest weight in determining whether the alleged actions 
are unwelcome.17 
It took years of court decisions before the distinction 
was formalized between sexual harassment that involves a 
direct demand for sex in return for job security and hostile 
environment, which can include, but is not limited to, lewd 
and suggestive remarks, displays of obscene or sexually 
oriented pictures or cartoons, name-calling, crude pranks, 
displays of pornography, pornographic notes to or about the 
victim, and graffiti. In addition to the usual uninvited 
comments, propositions, and fondling, other types of conduct 
can include staring, requesting women employees to wear 
short dresses, sexually oriented slide presentations, 
sexually oriented company advertising, and the circulation 
of sexually suggestive articles.18 Further, the victim 
17 Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander, "Hostile Environment 
Sexual Harassment: A Clearer View," Labor Law Journal 42 
(March 1991): 132-33. 
18 Ibid. 
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does not have to be the person toward whom the unwelcome 
conduct is directed.19 That is, sexual activity directed 
toward one employee may create an atmosphere that is 
intimidating and hostile for a second employee who is not 
the direct object of the harassment.20 While most cases 
have involved a combination of sexually oriented actions and 
non-sexual harassment, the courts have held that the 
harassment need not be sexually oriented to constitute 
hostile environment harassment.21 The behavior simply 
needs to be directed toward a specific gender.22 Although 
the EEOC guidelines are fairly explicit in their sexual 
orientation stance, the courts have not limited themselves 
to these guidelines. 
As long as the harassment can be shown to be motivated 
by the plaintiff's gender, assuming all other 
requirements are met, hostile environment sexual 
harassment will be found.23 
19 Broderick v. Ruder, 46 FEP Cases 1272 (D. D.C. 
1988) . 
20 Bennett-Alexander, 133. 
21 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F2d 983 (CA-D of C, 1977) 
0 0 . . .  " Bennett-Alexander, 141, citing Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson. 
23 Ibid, 148. 
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Title VII affords employees the right to work in an 
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule 
and insult.24 Intimidation and hostility toward women 
simply because they are female can result from conduct other 
than that which is sexually oriented, and therefore, 
although the EEOC guidelines are still used as a standard 
against which to measure sexual harassment, the courts have 
gone beyond these regulations and broadened their 
interpretation. 
Although the decade is still young, the 1990s have 
brought a plethora of sexual harassment action. In January 
of 1991, two important sexual harassment cases were 
litigated. In Florida,25 the court upheld a female ship 
welder's complaint about having to look at pinups of nude 
women while on the job. The trial was notable because it 
was the first time expert witnesses were permitted in a 
sexual harassment case. The experts introduced the term 
"sex role spillover" which refers to the intrusion into the 
workplace of the gender-based role of the female as a sex 
object and the male as sexual aggressor. In a verdict that 
has caused many employers to re-examine their policies, the 
"ostrich defense" of the employer was rejected by the 
24 42 U.S.C. 2000e 
25 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 
(M.D. Fla.1991). 
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court.26 That is, the employer should have known an 
environment hostile to women existed in this setting. 
Simultaneously, in California,27 a far-reaching 
sexual harassment ruling altered legal doctrine that goes 
back to the 19th century: the policy of analyzing behavior 
through the eyes of the "reasonable man" or, the gender 
neutral, "reasonable person." In Ellison v. Brady, the 9th 
U.S. Court of Appeals formalized the doctrine of the 
"reasonable women" solidifying the notion that women and 
men see sexual harassment differently. In November of 1991, 
Congress passed Public Law 102-166, known as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which allows punitive damages for 
harassment filed under Title VII to be leveled against an 
employer. Previously, only "make whole relief" was 
available.28 Relief under Title VII included only 
injunctions to restrain offensive practices, reinstatement 
and back pay, nominal damages, and attorney's fees.29 
Therefore, some victims of sexual harassment in the 
workplace chose to pursue state tort law claims rather than 
26 Clark, 550. 
27 Ellison v. Brady. 
28 "Explanation of Civil Rights Act of 1991," Human 
Resources Management extra edition, 6 December 1991, 37. 
29 Jim Walsh, "The Law of Sexual Harassment and Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson," Sexual Harassment in Schools: 
Preventing and Defending Against Claims (Alexandria: National 
School Boards Association, 1990), 4. 
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the Title VII cause of action because additional remedies 
are available under common law tort theories of 
recovery.30 With the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, for the first time, victims of sexual harassment are 
able to win damages for intentional discrimination on the 
job. However, unlike some state laws that have no monetary 
caps,31 maximum verdicts under Title VII are governed by a 
sliding scale, from $50,000 for companies with 15 to 100 
workers to $300,000 for those with more than 500 employees 
on the payroll. Verdicts can include money to punish 
employers for malicious bias and to compensate the victim 
for "emotional pain" or inconvenience.32 
In addition, The 1991 Civil Rights Act contains 
provisions for a Labor Department work force to investigate 
a phenomenon called the "glass ceiling."33 The commission 
is to investigate how executive and management positions are 
filled, how employees are encouraged and trained to advance 
to these positions, and how employees are compensated and 
30 Ibid., 4-5. 
31 "Your New Civil Rights," U.S. News & World Report. 
18 November 1991, 94. 
32 42 U.S.C. 1981. 
33 The term was first used in a report entitled "The 
Corporate Woman" which appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 
March 24, 1986. 
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rewarded.34 The Department of Labor defines the glass 
ceiling as "artificial barriers based on attitudinal or 
organizational bias that prevent qualified minorities and 
women from advancing to mid- and senior-level management 
positions."35 The Department has set forth a four-point 
voluntary program. This program includes: 
1. Education of Labor Department personnel so they 
can work with companies on issues surrounding the 
glass ceiling. 
2. The encouragement of voluntary efforts, starting 
with a broad-based public awareness effort to 
serve as a catalyst to foster voluntary efforts 
within the corporate community to remove any 
barriers which may exist to the advancement of 
minorities and women into management positions. 
The Department will act as a clearinghouse and 
resource for information so that federal 
contractors can receive assistance in their 
efforts. 
3. Corporate management reviews, or the conducting of 
regular compliance reviews of federal contractors. 
4. Public recognition and reward.36 
Employers, including school boards, need to examine 
their policies relative to the glass ceiling issue. 
Specifically, it is important to ask whether the board, for 
34 Mary Moran, "Up Against the Glass Ceiling," The 
American School Board Journal 179 (February, 1992): 38. 
35 "The Glass Ceiling Initiative - Q&A," Office of 
Information and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Washington, D.C. 
36 "The Glass Ceiling: Employers Will Be Asked To 
Address the Problem Voluntarily," Human Resources Management 
Ideas & Trends. 21 August 1991, 129. 
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all of its gender-neutral talk, is indeed practicing what it 
preaches about egual employment opportunity.37 Although 
many school systems have made great strides, the number of 
sex discrimination complaints within school districts has 
risen. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission settled 
more than 100 of these cases in fiscal 1991, about double 
the number of the previous fiscal year.38 Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights, Michael Williams, has reported 
that 3 382 complaints from elementary and secondary schools 
were filed with the U.S. Office of Civil Rights in fiscal 
1990, a 71 percent increase since 1987.39 Office of Civil 
Rights complaints now exceed any previous level in the 
agency's history and sexual harassment is second only to 
minority special education in highest priority for 
compliance reviews.40 
In addition, although women account for more than half 
the students working toward doctorate degrees in educational 
administration, fewer than five percent of the nation's 
15,557 superintendent's are women. Likewise, although more 
than two-thirds of public school teachers are women, nearly 
37 Moran, 38. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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80 percent of principals are men. Clearly, the glass 
ceiling exists for women in education.41 
In February of 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
ruled in a sexual harassment case brought in Georgia42 
that students may sue to collect a compensatory damage 
remedy from school officials for action brought to enforce 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, as 
amended.43 In September 1992, the California legislature 
passed sexual harassment legislation aimed specifically at 
schools. A pupil enrolled in the fourth grade or higher may 
be suspended or expelled from school if it is determined 
that the pupil has committed sexual harassment. This 
legislation requires each educational institution to have a 
written policy on sexual harassment that would include 
information on where to obtain specific rules and reporting 
procedures. This policy is required to be included by each 
institution in its regular policy statement and distributed 
to parents, students, faculty, administrators, and support 
staff. The policy is also required to be prominently 
displayed at the school site.44 
41 Ibid. 
42 Franklin v. Gwinnett, 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir.1990), 
112 S. Ct. 1028 (U.S. 1992). 
43 20 U.S.C. 1681. 
44 California Education Code, section 48980 § 212.6. 
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Finally, in March of 1993, The U.S. Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the sexual harassment case of a Tennessee 
woman in order to clarify what conduct amounts to illegal 
hostile environment sexual harassment. The Court is 
expected to rule on this issue in 1994.45 
Power: The Underlying Dynamic 
Considering the historical evolution of the legal 
aspects of sexual harassment, it is unusual that this type 
of sexual discrimination has proven to be highly resistant 
to change. In part, at least, this may be because sexual 
harassment works.46 "Socially, politically and 
economically, sexual harassment protects male turf, 
intimidating and humiliating those who would threaten it, 
putting them in their place and keeping them there."47 
Further, unwanted sexual behavior may be increasing as 
females increasingly challenge male hegemony, competing with 
men for places in the best schools, the best salaries, and 
the best careers.48 
45 "Supreme Court to Define Illegal Sexual Harassment," 
The Daily News ( Jacksonville, NC), 2 March 1993, 3A. 
46 Karen Bogart and Nan Stein, "Breaking the Silence: 
Sexual Harassment in Education," Peabodv Journal of 
Education 64 (Summer, 1987): 155. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 155-56. 
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Two major motivators for harassment are to obtain 
sexual activity and to abuse or increase one's power.49 
Sex and power are the primary components of sexual 
harassment but the issues are complex. Sociologists have 
developed models of power which, when applied to sexual 
harassment, lead to a better understanding of the issue. 
Types of power which can affect sexual harassment include 
achieved power, ascribed power, and situational power.50 
Achieved power is a form of power one earns through 
some effort. Sources of achieved power in the workplace 
include information, salary or money, and formal power such 
as title or position. Persons who have valued information 
have more power than those who do not. Those who are paid 
higher salaries are generally perceived as having more power 
than those who are paid less and higher status roles carry 
more power than lower status roles.51 
Perhaps the most obvious source of power for people to 
understand as it relates to sexual harassment is formal role 
power which is based on a person's rank or position within 
the organization. The difficulty with achieved power comes 
when someone uses his success in an abusive way to sexually 
A Q , 
Donna M. Stringer et al., "The Power and Reasons 
Behind Sexual Harassment: An Employer's Guide To Solutions," 
Public Personnel Management 19 (Spring 1990): 43. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
32 
harass someone else. Complicating this issue is the fact 
that the power role may be so new that the harasser may not 
see himself as having any power. Further, the power of the 
harasser may be relative only to the victim and not to the 
entire organization, thereby making it easy to deny that he 
has any power at all.52 
Ascribed power is an attributed characteristic, or 
something over which the person has no control and cannot 
change. One source of ascribed power, which is especially 
relevant to sexual harassment, is gender. Gender power is 
fundamental to sexual harassment. According to the Stringer 
article, virtually all research indicates that the Western 
culture attributes more power to men simply because of their 
gender. In work settings, men are viewed as more competent, 
responsible, committed, and valuable than women. In 
harassment situations, it is difficult for the female victim 
to censure the harassment because his word will always be 
given more weight than hers.53 In our society, gender 
power is fostered by our Judaic/Christian heritage. In the 
Bible. God, the omnipotent, omniscient being is male and 
'He' created man in his own image.54 Woman was created 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 45. 
54 Genesis 1:27 
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later, after man had been given dominion over all the world, 
as a helpmate.55 
Gender power makes women with achieved power 
particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment. Even when a 
woman has role, information, or money power in an 
organization, she does not have access to the societal value 
placed on the male gender. It is gender power that allows 
male subordinates to harass the female supervisor with 
impunity. The usual reaction to these women who report 
harassment is to disregard the complaint by saying that they 
have the formal power to stop the harassment if they really 
wanted to. If it is believed that they really were harassed 
and that they were unable to stop it, the validity of the 
women's formal power comes into question.56 Until men and 
women are valued equally, women will continue to be at a 
disadvantage, especially where sexual harassment is 
concerned. 
There are two sources of power of particular interest 
which impact sexual harassment because they combine ascribed 
and achieved powers. These sources of power are sexuality 
and physical size and strength. These emphasize the 
55 Genesis 2:20-23. 
56 Stringer, 187. 
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biological differences between men and women.57 Sexuality 
is a combination of ascribed and achieved power. One's sex 
organs are biologically determined while one's perception of 
sexuality and sexual practices are learned through one's 
family, religion, and culture. Exchange of sex for power 
and vice versa is a common thread in our cultural 
fabric.58 A person with some form of power may demand sex 
from a less powerful person or a person with little power 
may offer sexual favors in exchange for access to power. 
Physical size and strength are sometimes underrated as 
sources of power but they are strong factors in many sexual 
harassment situations. These forms also combine ascribed 
(size) and achieved (strength) powers and must be understood 
in the context of male/female differences. Because most men 
are larger and stronger than most women, some men may 
consciously or unconsciously use their size to intimidate or 
control women whom they are harassing.59 
Finally, situational power is that which may occur in 
one situation but not in another. Numbers and 
territoriality are primary sources of situational power. 
This subtle form of power can be used against a person who 
is the only one, or one of few, of their "kind" within a 
57 Ibid., 46. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 47 
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particular setting. Abuse of this form of power is usually 
motivated by wanting to retain the homogeneous setting, 
wanting the "outsider" to leave. In sexual harassment, this 
takes the form of focusing on the person's gender to define 
her as different, not competent, or not taken seriously. 
While the entire group may not participate in the 
harassment, the mere existence of a "we/they" atmosphere 
based on numbers make it possible for someone to use the 
power of numbers and territoriality to harass the 
outsider.60 This form of power is most generally found in 
male dominated, non-traditional work settings, such as law 
enforcement or construction. 
Given the explanations of power described in the 
previous paragraphs, there are seven reasons for sexual 
harassment which can be discerned. 
1. Abuse of power to obtain sexual favors. Because 
the harasser usually has formal role power 
assigned by the employer, there is a clear legal 
liability to the employer. 
2. Sex used to obtain power. This kind of harassment 
occurs when a person offers sex in exchange for 
status or position. This type of harassment is a 
form of quid pro quo and is called sexual 
favoritism. 
3. Power used to decrease the power of the victim. 
In this case, the harasser rarely expects or 
demands sex. Rather, the intent is to embarrass 
or intimidate the victim in such a way that her 
credibility, competence, or power is decreased. 
60 Ibid. 
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4. Personal crisis in the life of the harasser. 
Problems such as aging or divorce may create self 
doubt about one's value as a "real" man. 
5. Sexual attraction gone wrong. This usually 
happens when the harasser is rebuffed but 
continues to pursue the relationship in such a way 
that it ultimately becomes harassing and affects 
the victim's ability to work. 
6. Genuine deviance. Alcohol or substance abuse, 
character disorders, or other socially deviant 
behavior patterns can lead a person to become a 
harasser. These people usually harass more than 
one person, often successively as victims tend to 
leave the setting. 
7. A genuine attempt to create new rules for new 
roles. This form of harassment can occur when a 
male is genuinely trying to welcome a female into 
a work setting but does not know how. 
Consequently, he may attempt to show acceptance 
through sexual jokes, touching, comments, or other 
sexual behavior and overstep the rules for 
traditional roles.61 
Each of these seven reasons for sexual harassment can 
be viewed as an abuse of power by the harasser in a society 
where females are viewed to be subordinate to males. 
The Patriarchy 
The roles and behavior deemed appropriate to the sexes 
are expressed in values, customs, laws, and social roles. 
The sexuality of women, consisting of their reproductive 
capacities and services, were commodified long before the 
61 Ibid., 48-51. 
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creation of Western civilization.62 The development of 
agriculture in the Neolithic period fostered the utilization 
of women as a resource acquired by men much as land was 
acquired by men. Women were exchanged or bought in 
marriages for the benefit of their families. Later, they 
were conquered and brought into slavery, where their sexual 
services were part of their labor and where their children 
were property of their masters. 63 
Thus, the enslavement of women, combining both racism 
and sexism, preceded the formation of classes and class 
oppression. Class differences were, at their very 
beginnings, expressed and constituted in terms of 
patriarchal relations. Class is not a separate construct 
from gender; rather, class is expressed in genderic 
terms.64 
By the second millennium B.C. in Mesopotamian 
societies, the daughters of the poor were sold into marriage 
or prostitution in order to advance the economic interests 
of their families. The daughters of men of property could 
command a bride price, paid by the family of the groom to 
the family of the bride, which frequently enabled the 
bride's family to secure more financially advantageous 
®2 Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 212. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 213. 
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marriages for their sons, thus improving the family's 
economic position. If a husband or father could not pay his 
debt, his wife and children could be used as pawns, becoming 
debt slaves to the creditor. These conditions were so 
firmly established by 1750 B.C. that Hammurabic law made a 
decisive improvement in the lot of debt pawns by limiting 
their terms of service to three years, where earlier it had 
been for life.65 
Claude Levi-Strauss speaks of the reification of women 
which occurred as a consequence of their commodification. 
However, it is not women who are reified and commodified, it 
is women's sexuality and reproductive capacity which is so 
treated. Since their sexuality, an aspect of their body, 
was controlled by others, women were not only actually 
disadvantaged but psychologically restrained as well.66 
From the second millennium B.C. forward, control over the 
sexual behavior of citizens has been a major means of social 
control in every state society. Conversely, class hierarchy 
is constantly reconstituted in the family through sexual 
dominance. Regardless of the political or economic system, 
the kind of personality which can function in a hierarchial 
system is created and nurtured within the patriarchal 
family. The family not only mirrors the order in the state 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 214. 
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and educates its children to follow it, it also creates and 
constantly reinforces that order.67 
The system of patriarchy can function only with the 
cooperation of women. This cooperation is secured by a 
variety of means: gender indoctrination; educational 
deprivation; the denial to women of knowledge of their 
history; the dividing of women one from another; by 
coercion; by discrimination in access to economic resources 
and political power; and by awarding class privileges to 
conforming women.68 
Reforms and legal changes, while ameliorating the 
condition of women and an essential part of the process of 
emancipating them, will not basically change the patriarchy. 
Such reforms need to be integrated within a type of cultural 
revolution in order to transform patriarchy. 
Sexual Stratification in our Society 
Many theories of sexual inequality pose the wrong 
question. Instead of asking what variables account for 
variation in degree of sex inequality, they address the 
issues of how the subordination of women to men came about 
or why females are subordinate to males.69 These 
67 Ibid., 216-217. 
68 Ibid., 217. 
69 Janet Saltzman Chafetz, Sex and Advantage (Totowa, 
N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld), 1984, 2. 
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questions presuppose an era in history in which females were 
not subordinate to males or assume that females have always 
been subordinated and set up a dichotomy: subordination 
versus non-subordination.70 
Common sense tells us that female status is inferior to 
that of males. Yet when one considers the range of 
different societal types, one notes that the ways In which 
such inequality may be manifested vary enormously. In the 
most general sense, degree of stratification refers to the 
extent to which societal members are unequal in their access 
to the scarce values of their society.71 
The concept sex stratification refers to a comparison 
of access levels by the two sexes within a given society at 
a given time. The dimensions of sex inequality include but 
are not limited to: 
1. degree of access to material goods available in 
society; 
2. degree of access to services provided by others; 
3. degree of access to educational and/or training 
opportunities; 
4. degree of access to public decision-making (formal 
power and authority); 
5. degree of access to interpersonal, including 
familial, decision-making (informal power and 
authority); 
70 Ibid., 
71 Ibid., 4. 
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6. degree of access to prestige-conferring roles; 
7. degree of access to opportunities for psychic 
enrichment and gratification; 
8. degree of access to discretionary time; 
9. degree of freedom from behavioral constraints, 
including physically constraining clothing and norms 
concerning "proper" behavior; 
10. degree of formal rights granted by the society to 
its members; and 
11. degree of access to life sustaining requisites, 
including food and medical care, and freedom from 
physical coercion (assault and homicide).72 
Societies differ on the extent and degree to which 
males and females are expected to differ, on traits of 
behavior, personality, interests and intellect. Gender 
stereotypes have been loosely placed under the term gender 
roles. At one extreme a society may assume very few 
categorical differences between the sexes, for example, the 
Arapesh studied by Mead in 1935, while at the other extreme 
the sexes are considered opposites as in Victorian 
England.73 
Societies also differ in the extent to which dominant 
and/or secular ideologies explicitly support extensive 
gender differentiation and sex stratification. Virtually 
all of the world's great religious systems (Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) explicitly 
72 Ibid., 5-6. 
73 Ibid., 12. 
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support a system of sexual inequity and substantial gender 
differentiation. Many societies today have secular, often 
political, ideologies that explicitly support sex equality. 
Such ideologies are often codified in a constitution and 
other legal statements of the society. These secular 
ideologies may sometimes contradict dominant religious views 
pertaining to sex and gender.74 
The way in which a society structures its productive 
activities is the single most important set of variables in 
sexual stratification. It consists of six subdivisions: 
1. division of labor by sex, the extent to which 
females contribute to the most highly valued productive 
activities of their societies; 
2. interchangeability of work by both sexes, workers 
who always perform tasks that many others can do tend 
to receive relatively few scarce and valued resources; 
If these two aspects of work organization are combined, 
sex inequality will tend to be greatest where women's work 
is of low skill-level and readily replaceable. 
3. productive roles in society are sex-segregated, the 
extent to which males and females specialize in very 
different forms of work activity; 
4. attention span required for work activity, the 
extent to which women are interrupted by offspring; 
5. control of means, the ownership of land and 
capital; and 
74 Ibid. 
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6. control of the products of production, salary and 
the methods of distribution.75 
Finally, the degree to which the societal environment 
poses a threat to a particular gender is important to sexual 
stratification. Together these elements of sexual 
stratification function to legitimize female subordination 
to males. Change in structure through upheaval or 
legislation or both tends to produce social definitional 
changes supportive of the newly emerging structural 
reality.76 What stands out today in our society is a 
heightened public awareness of these societal sexual 
stratifications, their abuses, how they are related to 
sexual harassment, and a new willingness among victims to go 
public. 
The Clarence Thomas Hearings 
Anita Hill's televised accusations of sexual harassment 
against Clarence Thomas during his Senate Judicial 
Committee's Confirmation Hearings in October of 1991 brought 
the issue of sexual harassment into the public spotlight. 
The extensive publicity over the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill 
controversy and the increasing unwillingness of women to 
tolerate male dominant actions focused the nation on the 
75 Ibid., 13-14. 
76 Ibid., 45. 
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issue of sexual harassment as never before. The drama of 
the Thomas-Hill hearings was enough to enrage the most 
passive women and make even liberated men squirm.77 
Although polls suggested that only 19-2 6 percent of women 
believed Hill, there is some indication that these polls 
didn't begin to reflect the views of all women, least of all 
women who work.78 After all, Thomas appeared during prime 
time Friday and all day Saturday as the Republican's 
launched their attack on Hill's character. Whereas, Hill's 
only appearance came during the day on Friday, while most 
working women were not available to watch. Thus, a 
disproportionate number of polled women who actually saw 
Hill's testimony may have been women who work at home and 
are relatively unaware of sexual harassment in the 
workplace.79 According to Sue Browder, who interviewed 
dozens of women after the hearings, the rage women felt was 
not really about Hill or Thomas or who was telling the 
truth, but rather about women's feelings of powerlessness 
and the fundamental differences in the ways men and women 
Stephen M. Crow and Clifford M. Koen, "Sexual 
Harassment: New Challenge for Labor Arbitrators?" 
Arbitration Journal 47 (June 1992): 6. 
78 Sue Browder, "On Sexual Harassment," New Woman 
Magazine (February 1992): 33. 
79 Ibid. 
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experience the world.80 "When Thomas testified, the panel 
said, 'Oh your Honor, we wouldn't want to offend you. We 
don't mean any disrespect.' But they treated Hill like a 
perjurer-schizophrenic-psycho. "81 The message to women 
was that regardless of the situation, you can expect to be 
treated with less respect than a man. Lynne Kramer, a 
college professor who was harassed by a male student, 
explains four phenomena in the institutional treatment of 
sexual harassment. 
1. Appropriation of the victim's role. The harasser, 
in order to prevent the power shift from male to 
female that accompanies the reporting of an 
harassment incident, will take on the role of the 
victim. Clarence Thomas, for example, claimed he 
was a victim of racism in a high-tech lynching. 
The power base was then reconfigured and the 
female subjectivity erased, denying her 
experience, and the power shift went back to the 
male. 
2. Re-establishing male discourse patterns. Men work 
out the problem, agree upon the solution, and act 
on the resolution. Meanwhile, the female, already 
displaced becomes transparent. In the Thomas 
hearings, this pattern was all too clear as the 
all male congressional panel discussed the 
regretful situation with Thomas. 
3. Validation of the victimizer's plight from the 
institution. 
What body could validate Clarence Thomas more 
conclusively than the Congress of the United States, which 
80 Ibid., 35. 
81 Ibid. 
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has always exempted itself from the laws it passes to 
protect workers? Three incidents of Congressional sexual 
harassment surfaced in 198882 and Senator Bob Packwood of 
Oregon was charged with sexual harassment by ten women in 
1992.83 
4. Erasure of the female subjectivity. Clarence 
Thomas was clearly able to bond with his male 
peers over an issue of power and the actual topic 
of harassment was dismissed.84 
Roughly, two-thirds of women and one-fifth of men claim 
to have been sexually harassed at work.85 The jolt of the 
Thomas-Hill display, to those who could identify with the 
issue, was mostly psychological. Anita Hill made the charge 
of sexual harassment socially respectable and politically 
powerful. The result is that Americans are now reporting 
sexual harassment in record numbers. Complaints filed with 
the Equal Opportunity Commission have jumped from 6,675 in 
1991 to an expected 9,500 in 1992. Inquiries have risen 
even more sharply. The most significant change and the 
82 Clarke, 551. 
83 "Packwood to Have Test for Alcohol Dependency," The 
Daily News (Jacksonville, NC), 28 November 1992, 7A. 
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greatest costs, however, have occurred within companies, as 
many firms scramble to make themselves more sensitive to 
female employees.86 Nowhere is this more noticeable than 
in the United States military. 
The Tailhook Scandal 
Incidents that took place at the Las Vegas Hilton in 
September, 1991 sparked the largest sexual harassment 
investigation in Naval history, ultimately led to the 
resignation of Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett 
III,87 and resulted in a directive from Chief of Naval 
Operations Frank B. Kelso that all Naval personnel undergo a 
comprehensive training course in sexual sensitivity.88 
"The worst scandal in the history of the Pentagon"89 
began when Lieutenant Paula Coughlin, helicopter pilot, 
naval officer, and admiral's aide recounted her experiences 
at Tailhook '91. Lieutenant Coughlin went to the annual 
convention of the Tailhook Association, an organization of 
carrier-trained aviators, on orders as the aide of Admiral 
86 Ibid. 
87 Tom Philpott, "Her Story," Navy Times. 6 July 1992, 
12. 
88 Ray Formanek, Jr., "Navy Begins Classes on Sexual 
Sensitivity," The Daily News (Jacksonville, NC), 12 June 
1992, 1A, 2A. 
89 Charles Kuralt on "CBS Sunday Morning," 27 September 
1992. 
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Jack Snyder. According to the Navy Times, on the last night 
of a three-day conference, Secretary Garrett gave the 
keynote address at a formal banquet. Afterwards, Garrett's 
aide, Lt. Michael Steed introduced Coughlin to Garrett. 
Then Steed, Coughlin, and other aides made plans to go back 
to their hotel rooms, change clothes, and meet back on the 
third floor patio. As planned, Coughlin returned to the 
Hilton, took the elevator to the third floor and walked to 
the patio looking for the other aides. Finding no one she 
knew, Coughlin headed back to the elevator. As she looked 
down the third floor corridor, she saw a group of Navy and 
Marine officers standing in the hall talking and drinking 
beer. "I thought it was just overflow from the suites. So 
I thought, well, I'll go down there, check it out and see 
who's there."90 When she approached the group, she was 
grabbed from behind and lifted off the floor by a an officer 
she had just passed. While dealing with him, two more men 
grabbed her and one of them began yelling, "Admiral's aide, 
Admiral's aide!" This same officer, Coughlin learned later, 
was the designated master of ceremonies and responsible for 
calling "wave offs." The term refers to the decision on an 
aircraft carrier to abort a landing. In this case it was 
used to abort attacks on women.91 This man would call 
90 Philpott, 12. 
91 Ibid. 
49 
"wave off" when the approaching female was a senior 
officer's wife, an older woman, or an unattractive woman. 
The wave off would allow that person to pass with minimal 
harassment. "It was an organized sport, without a 
doubt."92 
When the second man grabbed Coughlin, the first man 
pressed his chest to her back and pushing, forced her down 
the hallway. Then men who lined the hallway started 
grabbing at Coughlin's shirt and skirt. The man pushing her 
then put his hands over her shoulders and down into her 
blouse, into her bra, and grabbed both breasts. To break 
off the attack, Coughlin crouched down, but he followed her 
to the floor and bent over her. Coughlin then bit her 
attacker on the hand until he released her. Nevertheless, 
while she was on the floor, another man reached between her 
legs, under her skirt, and tried to pull her panties off. 
Then many hands began reaching under her skirt. At this 
point, Coughlin said that she began to panic, "I'm in 
serious trouble. I can't get these guys off me."93 
Kicking and screaming, Coughlin finally got to her feet and 
ran to an open door, but two men jumped in front of her with 
their arms crossed and said smiling and giggling, "Uh, uh." 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
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Another man then grabbed her again and Cough1in thought she 
was going to be gang raped.94 
The crowd began to pull on her clothes and as she moved 
up the hallway, she saw a man leaning up against the wall on 
one leg. He took his foot off the wall and turned to leave. 
Coughlin reached for him and pounded on his back saying 
"Please let me get in front of you to get out of here. Help 
me." He turned around and grabbed her breasts.95 
Coughlin finally broke free and ran into an empty hotel 
room. Another officer Coughlin knew found her there and 
said, "Paula, you didn't just go down that hallway, did you? 
You didn't go through the gauntlet?" When Paula asked if he 
knew what those guys were doing, the officer responded, "Oh 
yeah. You shouldn't have gone down that hallway."96 The 
next day, when Coughlin reported the incident to Admiral 
Snyder, he had a similar reaction. "That's what you get when 
you go on the third deck full of drunk aviators."97 
Coughlin tried to talk to Admiral Snyder about what had 
happened to her on three different occasions, only to be 
"shot down." Angered, Coughlin filed a formal complaint. 
On October 10, 1991, the Naval Investigative Service began 
94 Ibid., 13. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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its Tailhook Investigation and on November 4, Admiral Frank 
Kelso removed Snyder from command.9® 
Simultaneously, Mr. Garrett, Secretary of the Navy, 
learned of five additional assaults and initiated a second 
inquiry into Tailhook by the Naval Inspector General." 
The parallel Navy inquiries released on April 30, 1992 
identified only two suspects from about 5,000 convention 
goers. The inquiries blamed the meager results on a wall of 
silence by aviators and their commanders. Mr. Garrett, 
angered by the failure of leadership displayed by the 
commanders at the convention who tacitly condoned the 
attacks, broadened the inquiry on June 2 to implicate about 
70 officers, including many who failed to cooperate in the 
investigation.100 In late June, however, the Naval 
Investigative Service turned up 55 pages of interviews 
indicating that Garrett, himself, had been in one of the 
hotel suites on the third floor during the attacks. Mr. 
Garrett acknowledged that he had been in the area but 
insisted he never saw or heard anything wrong.101 With 
98 Ibid. 
99 Eric Schmitt, "Navy Chief Quits Amid Questions Over 
Role In Sex-Assault Inquiry," The New York Times. 27 June 
1992, 7. 
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his credibility damaged and Lt. Coughlin granting interviews 
to ABC News and The Washington Post. Garrett resigned as 
Secretary of the Navy, accepting full responsibility for the 
handling of the Tailhook incident and the leadership failure 
which allowed such misconduct.102 
In the wake of the Tailhook debacle, senior members of 
the Senate Armed Forces Committee announced that the panel 
would not allow top Navy and Marine Corps promotions until 
junior officers were investigated and cleared of any 
involvement in the Tailhook incident.103 Meanwhile, the 
officer in charge of the Air Force Academy's prestigious 
parachute team was fired for failing to stop sexual 
harassment,104 two Marine Corps drill instructor's each 
face court martial hearings for sexual harassment at the 
Aviation Candidate School in Pensacola, Florida,105 the 
promotions of two admirals were canceled because they were 
linked to sexual harassment incidents unrelated to 
Tailhook,106 and the top men of the United States Armed 
102 Ibid. 
103 "Secretary of Navy Quits," Wilmington Morning Star 
(NC), 27 June 1992, 1. 
104 "Academy Officer Sacked for Laxity on 
Improprieties," The Daily News (Jacksonville, NC), 25 June 
1992, 1. 
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Services tangled with the top women of the House Armed 
Services Committee, notably Representative Pat Schroeder (D-
Colorado), over what they were doing in the aftermath of 
Tailhook to address sexual harassment of and assaults on 
servicewomen. They responded that they have had "a zero-
tolerance policy for years."107 A few weeks later, 
Representative Schroeder received an anonymous pornographic 
message faxed from a machine located within the Marine Corps 
Air Station at New River, North Carolina.108 That Marine 
made Schroeder's case and point. 
During the CBS Sunday Morning program, Charles Kuralt 
asked how the Tailhook officers could possibly have thought 
that they would get away with it. The official answer was 
that they were men with specialized skills, dare-devil 
types, a band of brothers, and isolated from the rest of the 
Navy,109 but to any female who was watching the program, 
the real answer was obvious: they simply always had. The 
message now, however, is that women will no longer tolerate 
sexual harassment, and the Navy, along with the other armed 
services, is finally saying, "Okay, we get it!"110 
107 nWar chiefs: Battleground Not for Gals," The Daily 
News (Jacksonville, NC), 31 July 1992, 2A. 
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On September 8, 1992, four of the women assaulted 
during the Tailhook incident filed law suits against the 
Tailhook Association, the Las Vegas Hilton, and the United 
States Navy for $2.5 million each.111 
In March, 1993 a news brief in Time Magazine reported 
that the Pentagon claimed that the Tailhook Report could not 
be released because there was no Secretary of the Navy in 
place to receive it. However, according to Time, the full 
story was that the Department of Defense had a designated 
candidate for the Navy post but was holding back the public 
announcement in order to justify not releasing the Tailhook 
report. 
On April 23, 1993, the details of the Tailhook report 
were finally released. In a harsh and sweeping indictment 
of the Navy's leadership and attitudes, the Pentagon's top 
investigator recommended that at least 140 officers face 
possible punishment for sexual assault, lewd behavior, or 
conduct unbecoming an officer at the Tailhook 
convention.112 Derek J. Vander Schaaf, the Pentagon's 
acting inspector general, said the conduct was so outrageous 
and had occurred at Tailhook conventions for so many years, 
111 Hugh Downs, "Tailhook," 20-20. aired on CBS, 10 
September 1992. 
112 Mark Thompson, "51 Officers Told Lies In Probe," The 
Daily News. 24 April 1993. 1A, 5A. 
55 
that it raised serious questions about the senior leadership 
of the Navy.113 The report detailed the interviews of 
more than 2900 people and displayed more than 800 photos 
obtained during its eight-month investigation. 
The report painted a picture of a convention far more 
lurid than earlier investigations suggested and detailed 
"Tailhook traditions" such as "the gauntlet (the hallway 
where women were molested), ballwalking (officers walking 
around in their trousers with their testicles exposed), leg 
shaving (male officers publicly shaved women's legs and, in 
some cases, pubic areas), mooning, streaking, and lewd 
sexua1 conduct."114 
Given the enormous task of litigating cases against 117 
Navy and Marine Corps officers who are accused of sexual 
misdeeds and 51 officers who lied during the investigation, 
the disciplinary proceedings stemming from the Tailhook 
incident are expected to take a long time. 
Sexual Harassment and Title VII 
Before 1976, the courts granted little protection to 
plaintiffs who were victims of workplace harassment. The 
courts initially ruled that such cases were simply outside 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
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the scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.115 In order to win their discrimination actions, 
sexually harassed plaintiffs realized that they had to 
convince the courts that harassment involved more than 
"personal" acts. Victory in this effort came when 
plaintiffs confronted the courts with the most flagrant 
examples of harassment.116 In response to the ever-
increasing public concern about sexual harassment in the 
workplace, courts finally began to recognize such action as 
a form of gender-based discrimination which falls within the 
scope of Title VII's prohibition against gender 
discrimination in employment. Such was the case in the 
first district court decision to recognize sexual harassment 
as a Title VII violation, William v. Saxbe.117 
In part, Title VII makes it an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment based on the person's race, 
115 Clifford M. Koen Jr., "Labor Relations: Sexual 
Harassment Claims Stem from a Hostile Work Environment," 
Personnel Journal 69 (August 1990): 88. 
116 Michael D. Vhay, "The Harms of Asking: Towards a 
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment," The 
University of Chicago Law Review (1988): 334. 
117 413 F.Supp 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds as Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.1978). 
57 
color, religion, gender or national origin.118 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission issued guidelines in 1980 
stating that sexual harassment is a Title VII violation. 
Thus, as discussed earlier, two distinct forms of sexual 
harassment have been delineated by the EEOC and followed by 
the courts: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment 
harassment. 
In Meritor Savings Bank. FSB v. Vinson.119 the U.S 
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issues 
involved in a case of sexual harassment under Title VII. 
Any interpretation of the judicial standards applied to 
sexual harassment must begin with this pivotal case.120 
The case arose after Mechelle Vinson quit her job at the 
bank where she had worked for four years. Under the 
supervision of Sidney Taylor, Vinson began as a teller 
trainee and had received promotions up to the position of 
assistant branch manager. All parties agreed that these 
promotions had been based strictly on merit, a fact that 
became key in the analysis of the courts.121 According 
to Vinson, Taylor treated her kindly at first, but later 
suggested a sexual relationship. At first she refused, but 
118 42 U.S.C. 2000e. 
119 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). 
120 Walsh, 2. 
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then acquiesced for fear of losing her job. Vinson alleged 
that she had intercourse with Taylor 4 0-50 times in four 
years, that he fondled her in public, exposed himself to 
her, even forcibly raped her on several occasions. All of 
these allegations were denied by Taylor.122 The 
plaintiff never reported the manager's conduct to any senior 
manager, nor did she attempt to use the bank's complaint 
procedure. 
Focusing on the fact that Vinson's promotions had been 
based on merit, the district court ruled that Vinson had not 
established a case for sexual harassment. Moreover, the 
court found that the relationship, if it existed, was one in 
which Vinson voluntarily participated.123 The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed this 
decision.124 The appeals court stated that a violation 
of Title VII may be predicated on either of two theories: 
harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete 
employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment that 
creates a hostile working environment.125 Furthermore, 
the court held that voluntary participation was 
122 Ibid. 
123 23 FEP Cases 37 (D.D.C. 1980). 
124 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir.1985). 
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irrelevant.126 Finally, the view of the court was that 
an employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment 
practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the 
employer knew or should have known about the 
•  1 9  7  misconduct. ' 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, there were 
three key issues to be resolved: (1) Can a plaintiff 
establish a sexual harassment case in the absence of 
tangible economic loss? Is the creation and toleration of a 
hostile and offensive environment actionable under Title 
VII? (2) Can the complaining party willingly participate in 
a sexual relationship and still prevail in a sexual 
harassment suit? Does the voluntary participation of the 
complaining party provide a defense? (3) Under what 
circumstances is the employer liable for the acts of his 
employee?128 
The Supreme Court ruled squarely in favor of the 
hostile environment theory. Relying on the guidelines 
presented in the regulations of the EEOC, the Court agreed 
with the court of appeals that there are two distinct types 
of sexual harassment suits: quid pro quo and hostile 
environment. Since Vinson suffered no economic loss, she 
126 Id., 146. 
127 Id., 150. 
128 Walsh, 2. 
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was unable to establish a quid pro quo case, but the Court 
held that the individual who has to work in a hostile 
environment has been discriminated against on the basis of 
sex, just as much as the employee who loses a job because 
she refuses to have sex with her boss. Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to the district court to consider whether 
Vinson could prove a violation of Title VII under the 
hostile environment theory.129 
As for the second issue, the Supreme Court opened the 
door to sexual harassment suits even when a woman 
participates willingly. The Court, again focusing on the 
EEOC regulations found that the willing participation of 
both parties is not a defense. 
The fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary" in 
the sense that the complainant was not forced to 
participate against her will is not a defense to a 
sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The 
gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the 
alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome.1,130 
This posture by the Court directed lower courts to 
focus on whether the respondent, by her conduct, indicated 
that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether 
the participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.131 
Accordingly, the Court also held that testimony concerning 
129 Vinson, 447 U.S. 68-69. 
130 Id. 
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the plaintiff's sexually provocative speech or dress is 
"obviously relevant."132 The Court noted that the EEOC 
regulations direct that sexual harassment must be assessed 
in light of the whole record and the totality of 
circumstances.13 3 
Finally, the Court declined to make a definitive ruling 
on the issue of employer liability. The Court rejected the 
strict liability standard of the circuit court, but, at the 
same time, rejected the position of the bank that the mere 
existence of a non-harassment policy and a grievance process 
insulated the employer from liability.134 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court gave considerable 
deference to the guidelines of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, making it clear that under Title 
VII, sexual harassment cases come in two varieties: quid pro 
quo and hostile environment.135 Moreover, the key issue 
is the "unwelcomeness" of the sexually related conduct 
rather than whether the parties participated 
willingly.136 Finally, on the issue of employer 
132 Id., 69. 
133 Id. 
134 Id., 72. 
135 Walsh, 3. 
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liability, the Court declined to rule. However, the Code of 
Federal Regulations137 describes three sets of 
circumstances under which an employer might be held 
responsible for sexual harassment on the job. 
1. An employer is responsible for its acts and those 
of its agents and supervisory employees with 
respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether 
the specific acts complained of were authorized or 
even forbidden by the employer and regardless of 
whether the employer knew or should have known of 
their occurrence. 
2. An employer is responsible for the acts of sexual 
harassment by fellow employees if it knows or 
should have known of the conduct, unless it can 
show that it took immediate and appropriate 
corrective action. 
3. An employer is responsible for the acts of non-
employees if the employer knows or should have 
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate 
and appropriate action.138 
These regulations clearly show the extent to which an 
employer can be held liable for sexual harassment in the 
workplace. To protect themselves, employers should 
affirmatively raise the issue of harassment with employees, 
have a proactive sexual harassment policy, and set clear 
procedural guidelines. Appropriate education of employees 
137 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (1987). 
138 Id. 
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regarding their rights under Title VII and sanctions against 
violators provide the best defense for employers against 
possible harassment claims.139 
The Effects of Sexual Harassment 
Being subjected to sexual harassment can have a 
negative impact on the victim's emotional, social, and 
physical sense of well-being.140 In one study, 
adolescent females who had been sexually harassed reported 
"feelings similar to those identified by rape 
victims."141 "Decreased feelings of competence and 
confidence and increased feelings of anger, frustration, 
depression, and anxiety all can result from 
harassment."142 According to Riger, a sense of self-
blame, especially among women with traditional sex-role 
beliefs, is also common.143 In turn, these emotions can 
140 Linda S. Lumsden, "Combatting Sexual Harassment," 
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Harassment Policies and Procedures," American Psychologist 
46 (May 1991): 497. 
143 Ibid. 
64 
create a decreased ability to concentrate and a sense of 
listlessness.144 
Studies also indicate that absenteeism tends to 
increase among employees who are sexually harassed, work 
attitudes are affected adversely, and productivity 
drops.145 When students are the target, sexual 
harassment can rob them of their right to an equal education 
by interfering with "learning, attendance, course choices, 
grades, and therefore economic potential."146 
Sexual Harassment in Schools 
Like sexual harassment in the workplace, harassment 
within educational institutions is fast becoming an area of 
legal concern.147 Its illegality not withstanding, 
sexual harassment constitutes a persistent and increasing 
problem in many secondary schools, where it ranges from the 
use of sexual humor and innuendos to physical threats and 
144 Kathy Hotelling, "Sexual Harassment: A Problem 
Shielded by Silence," Journal of Counseling and Development 
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sexual assaults.14® All too often, this behavior has 
been condoned with the attitude that "boys will be boys" or 
that "you can't change human nature," misconstrued as a 
normal rite of passage from adolescence to adulthood, or 
excused with the comment, "Can't you take a joke?" However, 
there is nothing innocent, normal, or funny about 
harassment.149 Sexual harassment should not be confused 
with flirting, which is often welcomed and reciprocated and 
which, in any case, the recipient is free to ignore. 
Likewise, it is not seduction, which the recipient can stop 
by not responding. Sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual 
attraction that a victim is powerless to stop, and, as such, 
it may be better conceptualized as an act of 
aggression.150 Sexual harassment may involve 
relationships between students and faculty, students with 
each other, or employees with one another. Whatever the 
nature of the relationship, sexual harassment has an adverse 
effect on both teaching and learning.151 In addition, 
the effects of sexual harassment extend far beyond its 
direct victims. Bystanders and witnesses to incidents of 
harassment express cynicism about education and a loss of 
148 Bogart and Stein, 146. 
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confidence in the effectiveness of school policies.152 
Sexual harassment is maintained by silence: the silence of 
the educational community and the silence of individuals who 
are witnesses to sexual harassment of others or are 
subjected to it themselves. Not reported or addressed, 
sexual harassment emerges as a critical and divisive issue 
in our schools.153 Sexual harassment may involve overt 
actions as extreme as physical threats, sexual assault and 
rape, as well as subtle interactions which communicate 
condescension, hostility, or invisibility. It may be 
expressed in verbal comments, jokes, innuendos of a sexual 
nature, or in nonverbal communications such as suggestive 
looks or unwanted touching. Psychological, as well as, 
physical in its power over others, sexual harassment also 
exerts control through disapproval and rejection.154 
The first survey on peer to peer sexual harassment was 
administered in 1980-81 to approximately 200 male and female 
high school students in Massachusetts.155 This study 
revealed that sexual harassment is a problem for many 
students in high school. Female high school students 
reported: 
152 Ibid. 
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This really huge senior would come up to me at my 
locker and hug me, and start kissing me, and touching 
me. There was no way I could make him stop because he 
was so big. I wasn't the only one he harassed. 
It is a common and recurring problem that certain male 
students make repeated propositions to female students. 
These propositions are often accompanied by obscene 
comments. It makes students very uncomfortable and 
influences attendance. 
A young woman who had been a cheerleader at our school 
received threatening notes and phone calls with sexual 
innuendos, in school and at home. 
In class, a young women was going to the front of the 
classroom and suddenly a group of young men began 
calling her names and making rude and insulting 
comments. She said nothing and her friends said 
nothing because they were used to it. She felt very 
low and disrespected. 
According to a recent study conducted by Seventeen 
Magazine in conjunction with the NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund and the Wellesley College Center for Research 
on Women, this is what happens in schools today: "You are 
walking down the hall and a guy comes up behind you and 
snaps your bra or gropes your breast; a guy leers at you, 
grabs his crotch Marky-Mark style, and says, 'Do me'; a 
counselor who has gained your trust asks whether you've ever 
thought about sex with an older man; your name shows up on a 
list being passed around labeled 'Piece of Ass of the Week'; 
you are cornered by a guy who whispers obscenely about what 
he wants to do to you" and some even reported being 
156 Ibid., 12 
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assaulted or raped.157 More than 4000 teenagers answered 
this questionnaire which was the first national survey ever 
to ask teenage girls about sexual harassment.158 
A classic peer sexual harassment incident was that of 
Katy Lyle. In 1989, Katy was a junior in high school in 
Minnesota when vulgar remarks about her first appeared on 
the walls of the boys' bathroom. The graffiti was a daily 
humiliation for Katy. Despite repeated complaints to the 
administration, this form of sexual harassment went 
unchecked for eighteen months. Katy and her parents finally 
took legal action. Duluth Central High School is believed 
to be the first school in the nation to pay damages to a 
student who was sexually harassed. The litigants reached an 
out of court settlement that clarified sexual harassment 
policies and paid Katy $15,000.159 
More recently, "Street Stories" broadcast a report of 
sexual harassment on school buses. In Eden Prairie, 
Minnesota a first grade girl was being harassed by a boy on 
the bus who was calling her a bitch and telling her to have 
oral sex with her father. The schools handled it as a bus 
157 Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, "Harassment at School: The 
Truth is Out," Seventeen Magazine. May, 1993, 134. 
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discipline problem rather than a sexual harassment situation 
because of the age of the child. The mother of the girl 
contacted a lawyer and was expected to file charges against 
the school.160 In the same broadcast, a similar 
situation in Texas was explored. In this situation a ten-
year-old boy was sexually harassing a female student on the 
school bus by threatening to rape her and fuck her in the 
mouth. Again school officials did not treat it as an 
incident of sexual harassment and the principal of the 
school viewed that notion as "sensationalism." The "boys 
will be boys" attitude prevailed.161 
In Jacksonville, North Carolina, two reported sexual 
attacks took place on a middle school bus within a month. 
The attacks allegedly had been going on for two or three 
weeks prior to the second reported incident on December 9, 
1992.162 
On February 24, 1993 in Fairmont, North Carolina, nine 
and ten-year-old boys dragged a ten-year-old girl from the 
bleachers of the school gymnasium and tried to pull her 
clothes off. The boys tried to take the girl to the boys' 
160 Ed Bradley. "Street Stories" aired on CBS, 21 January 
1993 
161 Ibid. 
162 Carolyn Alford. "Second Girl Attacked On School Bus," 
The Daily News (Jacksonville, NC), 16 December 1992, IB. 
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locker room, but it was locked. Two of the boys then pinned 
the girl to the floor while the others started to pull down 
her pants. When she screamed, another girl tried to help 
her, but the boys pinned her down, too, and began reaching 
under her skirt and fondling her.163 
These are not idiosyncratic, isolated incidents. They 
are compelling repeated events. Every year more and more 
incidents of peer harassment are collected, not only by the 
Massachusetts Department of Education, but also by other 
educational agencies around the country, including 
California, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington Departments of Education.*64 In September of 
1992, the California legislature passed the first sexual 
harassment legislation that targeted schools directly and 
addressed harassment by students as young as nine years 
old.165 
A Massachusetts study also reported on teacher-student 
harassment. Among the allegations were: 
A science teacher measured the craniums of the boys in 
the class and the chests of the girls. This lesson in 
skeletal frame measurements was conducted one by one, 
at the front of the class, by the teacher. 
163 "Boys Attack Girl At School," The Daily News 
(Jacksonville, NC), 6 March 1993, 4B. 
164 Bogart and Stein, 153. 
165 Section 48980 § 212.6 of the California Education 
Code. 
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A classroom teacher asked one junior high girl, in 
front of the whole class, how far she had gone with her 
boyfriend, specifically if she had gone to "second" or 
"third" base with him. 
A teacher from a vocational school was making sexual 
comments to a young lady in class. The comments 
included questions about the kind of underwear the 
young women was wearing.16® 
Dan Wishnietsky conducted a study which reported the 
extent of sexual harassment between North Carolina high 
school students and teachers. Wishnietsky surveyed 140 
North Carolina school superintendents and 300 high school 
seniors. The data revealed a discrepancy between the number 
of faculty that the superintendent's reported as having been 
disciplined for sexual harassment of a student and the 
number of students who believed they had experienced 
sexually harassment. In the study, conducted in 1989, 65 
superintendents responded that 26 teachers had been 
disciplined for sexual harassment while, during the same 
time period, 148 students who responded reported 90 
incidents of sexual harassment. Regardless of the 
discrepancy, Wishnietsky states that "whether the actual 
percentage of educators involved in sexual harassment is 1%, 
5%, or 20% becomes inconsequential. The fact that there are 
166 Ibid., 151. 
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teachers involved in unethical relationships with students, 
indicates a problem that can not be ignored."167 
Historical events indicate that secondary school 
administrators who do not protect students from sexual 
harassment from teachers are vulnerable to legal 
prosecution. In Ingraham v. Wright.168 the Supreme Court 
established the right of students to be free of physical 
abuse by agents of the state. Using Ingraham v. Wright as a 
precedent, the federal court serving Western Pennsylvania 
indicated that a safe environment is free of sexual 
harassment.169 The case involved a male high school 
teacher who had sexual relations with several female 
students. Testimony indicated that several administrators 
knew of the teacher's behavior and did not intervene. While 
this case was still being litigated, the Bradford Area 
School District settled out of court with two other female 
students for $700,000.170 
Susan Strauss states that sexual harassment is 
widespread in the school setting but receives little 
attention from administrators. Many school officials fear 
167 Dan H. Wishnietsky, "Reported and Unreported 
Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment," Journal of Education 
Research 84 (January-February 1991): 164-5. 
168 Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
1 Q . . . 
-LO:7 Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 667 F. 
Supp. 1088 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
170 Wishnietsky, 168. 
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that if students learn of their rights, they will file false 
charges to "get back" at teachers or principals.171 
However, this "what they don't know won't hurt them" 
attitude is dangerous to the student and the district, as 
well.172 Informing teachers and students of their rights 
under Title IX is imperative. "If school districts do not 
have a sexual harassment grievance procedure, they are in 
violation of Title IX."173 
Sexual Harassment and Title IX 
Students who have been sexually harassed may bring suit 
under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 which 
the courts have interpreted by borrowing many of the 
principles developed under Titles VI and VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.174 
Title IX was to have a comprehensive effect on sex 
discrimination in educational institutions.175 It 
emphasized two general objectives: restricting federal funds 
to institutions that support discriminatory practices and 
171 Strauss, 96. 
172 Ibid., 96. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 118 Cong.Rec. 5804-06 (1972). 
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providing individuals protection against such discriminatory 
practices.176 Instead of prohibiting certain conduct 
within the Act, Congress patterned its wording of Title IX 
on that of Title VI177 and expressly emphasized the 
rights of the victim in Section 901: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance.I78 
After the enactment of Title IX, it became the 
responsibility of the Department of Housing, Education and 
Welfare (HEW)179 to issue the procedural and substantive 
regulations under Title IX. The HEW regulations did not 
address the enforcement and the relief problems of the 
victim that appeared to be inherent in the funding 
termination option. The regulation placed primary emphasis 
on the systematic monitoring and subsequent correction of 
discrimination. Less emphasis was placed on investigation 
176 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 
S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed 2d 560 (1979). 
177 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1976). 
178 Id. 
1*79 HEW ^as since become the Department of Health 
and Human Services. The Department of Education has taken 
over jurisdiction of educational matters. Regulations were 
reissued as 34 C.F.R. 106.1-.71 (1981). 
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and correction of individual discrimination.180 However, 
the courts have ruled that Title IX, like Title VII, 
prohibits both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual 
harassment.181 In Lipsett. the court also found that the 
theories of employer liability applicable to Title VII cases 
also apply to educational institutions for violations of 
Title IX. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme 
Court determined that private causes of action could be 
filed under Title IX. In deciding Cannon. the Supreme Court 
relied on the four-pronged test it had previously defined in 
Cort v. Ash.182 The Cort test examines whether: (1) the 
plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the 
statute was enacted; (2) a legislative intent to create or 
deny such a remedy is apparent; (3) a remedy would be 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute; and 
(4) the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state 
law. Cannon left unresolved, however, what remedies would 
be available to a plaintiff on a private action under Title 
IX. 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Cannon, three 
circuits have decided whether compensatory relief should be 
180 Roak J. Parker, "Compensatory Relief Under Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972," West's Education Law 
Reporter. 68 (1991), 563. 
181 Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 
(1st Cir.1988). 
182 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). 
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available under Title IX. Two circuits183 held that 
compensatory relief should not be available, while the 
third184 held that it should be. Because of these 
conflicts, Franklin v. Gwinnett was granted certiorari by 
the Supreme Court. 
In this case, Christine Franklin alleged that she was 
subjected to continual harassment beginning in the autumn of 
her tenth grade year (1986) from Andrew Hill, a coach and 
teacher employed by the district. Franklin said that Hill 
engaged her in sexually-oriented conversations in which he 
asked her about her sexual experiences with her boyfriend 
and whether she would consider having sexual intercourse 
with an older man (these conversations were reported by 
Franklin's boyfriend to the band teacher, Dr. Prescott). In 
addition, Franklin alleged that Hill forcibly kissed her on 
the mouth in the school parking lot, that he called her at 
home and asked whether she would meet him socially, and that 
on three occasions in her junior year, Hill interrupted a 
class, requested that the teacher excuse Franklin, and took 
her to a private office where he subjected her to coercive 
intercourse. The complaints further alleged that although 
183 Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 
(7th Cir.1981), Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, 911 
F.2d 617 (11th Cir.1990) 112 S.Ct 1028 (U.S. 1992). 
184 Pfeiffer v. School Board for Marion Center Area, 
917 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir.1990). 
77 
teachers and administrators became aware of and investigated 
Hill's sexual harassment of Franklin and other female 
students, they took no action to halt it and discouraged 
Franklin from pressing charges against Hill. In April of 
1988, Hill resigned on the condition that all matters 
pending against him be dropped. The school then closed its 
investigation.185 Prior to bringing this lawsuit, 
Franklin filed a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights 
of the U.S. Department of Education (OCR). After 
investigating these charges for several months, OCR 
concluded that the school district had violated Franklin's 
rights and interfered with her right to complain about 
conduct proscribed by Title IX. It then terminated its 
investigation.186 Focusing on the fact that the alleged 
harasser had resigned and the school district had come into 
compliance with Title IX, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint on the ground that Title IX does not authorize an 
award of damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed.187 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, there was only 
one key issue to be resolved: Is a damages remedy available 
for an action brought to enforce Title IX? 
185 911 F.2d at 618. 
186 The United States Law Week 60, (25 February 1992) : 
4168, 
187 Id. 
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The Supreme Court found that the substantive right at 
issue in this case is one that Congress did not expressly 
create, but can be implied. The Civil Rights Remedies 
Equalization Amendment of 1986188 must be read, not only 
as a validation of Cannon's holding, but also as an implicit 
acknowledgement that damages are available.189 
Therefore, the Court ruled that damages are available for an 
action brought under Title IX, thereby reversing the 
judgement of the Court of Appeals and the case was remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.190 
Employer Liability 
Courts have ruled that the right to be free from sexual 
harassment is constitutionally protected through the equal 
protection cause191 and substantive due process.192 
The Supreme Court has ruled that a municipal corporation is 
a "person" for the purposes of section 1983 of the Civil 
188 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7(a). 
189 The United States Law Week. 4172. 
190 Ibid., 4172. 
191 Brenner v. School District 47, No. 86-1343C (E.D. 
Mo. 1987) (West Law AllFed Directory). 
192 Stoneking, 667 F. Supp. 1088. 
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Rights Act of 1964.193 Thus, school districts, as well 
as individual administrators, may be held liable for the 
conduct of a harassing teacher.194 
A school district will not be held responsible on the 
basis of respondeat superior. Rather, liability will occur 
when execution of a government unit's policy or custom 
inflicts the injury.195 It is important to note that the 
custom that causes the injury need not have received formal 
approval through official channels.196 A district court, 
denying summary judgement, has held that evidence of a 
school district's failure to investigate complaints of 
sexual abuse and harassment may evidence a "custom" and lead 
to liability.197 This same court also held that 
individual school administrators have a duty to ensure that 
a school environment is safe for students. Although courts 
must defer to the judgement of professionals executing their 
duties, evidence that administrators have failed to detect 
or investigate harassment complaints may show a "substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgement, practice or 
193 Monell v New York City Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
194 Stoneking, 667 F. Supp. 1088. 
195 Monell, 436 U.S. 658. 
196 Id. 
197 Stoneking, 667 F. Supp. 1088. 
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standards," thus subjecting them to possible 
liability.198 Since more than mere negligence is needed 
to establish liability of state officials,199 the court 
held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether these administrators, if shown to have substantially 
departed from accepted professional judgement, acted 
recklessly in handling sexual harassment complaints.200 
However, the court also held that administrators may not be 
shielded from liability on the basis of qualified immunity 
if their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or 
constitutional right about which a reasonable person would 
have known,201 such as the right to be free from sexual 
harassment. 
In a nutshell, school officials and administrators can 
be held liable for sexual harassment by supervisors, 
employees, students, and even non-employees who harass 
school personnel at the school, unless it can be proven that 
immediate and appropriate action was taken.202 
198 Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) . 
199 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
200 Stoneking, 667 F. Supp. 1088. 
201 Harlowe v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
202 Julie Underwood, "End Sexual Harassment of 
Employees, Or Your Board Could Be Held Liable," American 
School Board Journal 174 (April 1987): 43 
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School board members and superintendents should protect 
employees and students from sexual harassment aggressively 
by establishing a sexual harassment policy, informing 
employees and students of their rights, and making sure 
everyone understands the procedures for dealing with 
complaints of harassment. Training and prevention programs 
need to be established and, if a sexual harassment complaint 
arises, immediate and appropriate action needs to be 
taken.203 
Policies and Procedures 
In its guidelines on sexual harassment, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission directs employers to take 
all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment. Naomi 
Gittins has translated these guidelines into the school 
setting.204 In her article, Gittins outlines seven 
separate responsibilities. 
1. Develop a sexual harassment policy. Any sexual 
harassment policy should include a definition of sexual 
harassment. The policy can refer to the EEOC's 
definition of sexual harassment, but should also 
attempt to explain, in easily understand terms, conduct 
that will and will not be tolerated. The policy should 
then be disseminated to employees. The policy should 
203 Ibid., 44 
204 Naomi E. Gittins, "Practical Advice For Handling 
Sexual Harassment in Schools," Sexual Harassment in the 
Schools: Preventing and Defending Against Claims 
(Alexandria: National School Boards Association, 1990): 31. 
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be given to all employees, posted, and become part of a 
package given to new employees. 
2. Train all employees. Develop a training program and 
tailor it to the educational work force. Use 
hypothetical situations that could arise or have 
already arisen and give guidance concerning the 
difference between welcome, consensual relationships, 
and sexual harassment. Stress that the harassment does 
not only depend on the perpetrators intention, but also 
on how the target perceives the behavior or is affected 
by it. Educate employees to recognize and confront 
harassment. Give additional training to supervisors on 
how to handle sexual harassment. 
3. Adopt a complaint procedure. Describe in specific 
terms the informal and formal complaint process. The 
procedure should make it easy for the victim to come 
forward. Assure complainants that they will be 
protected against retaliation and that the identity of 
both the complaining employee and the alleged harasser 
will remain confidential. Although confidentiality 
does not necessarily mean anonymity, all complaints 
need to be handled discreetly. The procedure also 
needs to address the investigative process, both formal 
and informal, as well as the time frame involved. 
4. Take prompt and effective corrective action. 
Document every aspect of the investigation, make a 
decision quickly and inform the complainant in writing 
of the proposed disposition of the matter including the 
corrective action, if any to be taken. The disposition 
should discuss the facts and the points of law 
supporting the decision, as well as, explain any right 
of appeal. Deal with the offending employee 
immediately and provide appropriate remedy to the 
victim. Periodic follow up is recommended to assure 
that the harassment has stopped and that no retaliation 
has taken place. 
5. Implement preventive policies. Conduct periodic, 
random surveys to determine if sexual harassment is a 
problem in a given area and remind supervisors of the 
inherent risks of their own behavior. Provide feedback 
and workshops for supervisors on their styles and 
tactics of leadership. Two helpful guidelines for 
everyone to remember: Would you engage in the same 
conduct if your spouse or the other person's spouse (or 
significant other) were present? Would you subject 
your mother, sister, or daughter to the same conduct? 
If the answer is "no," stop the behavior. 
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6. Protect students in the same manner. Provide 
policies, information and procedures for students to 
follow and thoroughly investigate all allegations in a 
timely manner. Require teachers, counselors, nurses, 
etc. to notify the administration of any allegations of 
harassment. The superintendent should be informed of 
every allegation and the superintendent should then 
seek specific legal advice from the school attorney. 
Keep the student's parents informed and avoid co-
mingling counseling and investigative functions. 
7. Release information about former employees. With 
the counsel of the school attorney, inform prospective 
employers of a former employee's adjudication of sexual 
impropriety or resignation in the face of accusations 
of sexual misconduct. Do thorough pre-employment 
reference checks for all employees. 05 
These guidelines provide a way for school officials to 
view sexual harassment and consider their legal and moral 
responsibility to stop it. 
Summary 
Sexual harassment is a serious problem and it exists, 
in one of its many forms, in virtually every human setting. 
Recent headlines, including the Judge Clarence Thomas 
hearings and Tailhook, have catapulted sexual harassment 
into the national spotlight, thereby educating the public 
about what it is and how it can be remedied. Legal action 
is on the increase and employers are scrambling to construct 
policies, procedures, and training to educate and sensitize 
their work forces to recognize and eliminate the problem of 
205 Ibid., 31-43. 
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sexual harassment. School systems need to realize that they 
are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment litigation 
because, in addition to the same liability faced by all 
employers, schools have the additional burden of protecting 
students. An effective, proactive, well-publicized sexual 
harassment policy accompanied by procedures which provide 
for an immediate and adequate employer response is the key 
element in curbing sexual harassment and protecting the 
employer from liability. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Introduction 
Meritor Savings Bank. FSB v. Vinson1 is the most 
significant landmark decision in sexual harassment claims 
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 
Therefore, a portion of the focus of this chapter is an 
analysis of legal cases leading up to Meritor, the Meritor 
case itself, and the resulting influence of Meritor on case 
law. The balance of this chapter focuses on significant 
cases of sexual harassment whose claims were brought under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.3 Finally, 
it is important to note that other legislation exists under 
which sexual harassment victims can file successful claims. 
Therefore this chapter touches briefly on sexual harassment 
claims brought under alternative legal theories. 
On the following pages, many court cases are discussed. 
The facts in each case are introduced, the decision of the 
court is presented, and the implications of the court 
decision are included. 
1 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). 
3 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
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Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII 
Pre-Meritor 
Since Meritor, claims of sexual harassment are no 
longer seen as being beyond the intent of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to Meritor. however, cases 
of sexual harassment were dismissed as not contemplated by 
Title VII. For example, in Corne v. Bausch and Lomb. Inc.4 
the court focused on the personal aspects of sexual 
harassment. The court found sexual advances by a supervisor 
to an employee as "nothing more than a personal proclivity 
or mannerism"5 In this case, a supervisor repeatedly made 
verbal and physical advances toward two female employees who 
were allegedly forced to quit because of his behavior. The 
court held that the supervisor's actions arose from the 
supervisor's "personal urge," which was distinct from Bausch 
and Lomb's company policies. Only the latter could provide 
a basis for a Title VII claim. Further, the Corne court 
concluded that allowing suits for sexual harassment under 
Title VII was "ludicrous" for two reasons. First, if the 
activity in question was directed equally to males, Title 
VII would not apply. The court inferred from this that 
Congress had not intended to redress sexual harassment 
4 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
5 Id. 
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through the discrimination laws. Second, the court believed 
that to hold such conduct to be actionable under Title VII, 
would create a potential lawsuit every time an employee made 
amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another.6 
Likewise, in Miller v. Bank of America7 the court writes 
that it would seem wise for the courts to refrain from 
delving into the natural sex phenomenon of personal 
decisions.8 In this case, the court began by characterizing 
the sexual advances of the plaintiff's supervisor as 
"unauthorized isolated sex-related acts" that could not 
constitute the acts of the Bank of America. Only if the 
employer had actively or tacitly approved personnel policies 
requiring sexual favors as a condition of employment would 
there be a Title VII violation. Otherwise, the court 
reasoned, if harassment was discrimination, then every 
firing or failure to promote could be turned into a 
discrimination action. Further, because it felt that sexual 
attraction was pervasive, the Miller court doubted its 
capacity to distinguish actual illegal harassment from 
harmless flirtation.9 
6 Id. 
7 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D.Cal 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
8 Id at 236. 
9 418 F. Supp. at 236. 
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In order to win their discrimination actions, sexually 
harassed plaintiffs began to realize that they had to 
convince the courts that harassment involved more than 
"personal" acts. In the late 1970s, the courts began to 
recognize that quid pro quo sexual harassment violated Title 
VII. 
In a case bearing many names,10 Diane Williams, an 
employee of the Department of Justice, refused her 
supervisor's sexual advances. Her supervisor retaliated 
with annoying comments, unfavorable reviews, and unwarranted 
reprimands. While maintaining that "non-employment related 
personal encounters" were not actionable under Title VII, 
the court held that it was improper for a supervisor, whom 
the court regarded as an agent of the employer, to retaliate 
against an employee for refusing to comply with an 
illegitimate, discriminatory employment condition, in this 
case, a demand for sexual favors.11 This was the first 
case in which a district court recognized sexual harassment 
as a Title VII violation. 
Soon thereafter, courts began holding that plaintiffs 
made a prima facie case of sexual harassment if they proved 
facts similar to those involved in Williams. that is, an 
10 Williams V .  Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), 
rev'd and remanded sub nom.; Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 
(D.C. Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.; Williams v. Civiletti, 487 
F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980). 
11 Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 662. 
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employer or supervisor's demand for sexual favors in return 
for a job, a promotion, or other benefits.12 It made 
sense that Title VII protected victims of this kind of 
conduct because Title VII explicitly forbids discrimination 
in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.13 
In Barnes v. Costle.14 a supervisor repeatedly 
solicited the plaintiff to join him for social activities 
after hours despite her repeated refusals to do so. He made 
continuous sexual remarks, and repeatedly suggested that if 
the plaintiff cooperated in a sexual affair, her employment 
status would be enhanced. The court found sexual harassment 
when, subsequent to the employee's resistance, she was 
stripped of her duties and her job was abolished.15 
The federal appellate court in Tomkins v. Public 
Service Electric and Gas Company16 reversed the ruling of 
a lower court. It found sexual harassment where an employee 
had received advances at lunch from her supervisor who 
stated that sexual relations were necessary for a 
satisfactory working relationship. These advances were 
12 Michael D. Vhay, "The Harms of Asking: Towards a 
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment," The 
University of Chicago Law Review 55 (1988): 334. 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. 
14 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
15 Id. 
16 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976) ("Tomkins I") rev'd. 
568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977) ("Tomkins II"). 
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followed by threats of recrimination and physical force 
which, when resisted, led to the employee's transfer to an 
inferior position, false and adverse employment evaluations, 
disciplinary lay-offs, and finally dismissal. 
• • 17 In a Michigan case, sexual harassment was found 
where a supervisor made repeated verbal sexual suggestions 
and innuendos and left cartoons on an employee's desk, 
demanded that the employee share his motel room on a 
business trip, and discharged her when she refused. In 
Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corporation.18 sexual harassment 
was found where a supervisor placed his arm around an 
employee saying she did not yet really understand the job 
requirements of travel and family sacrifices but would in 
time. This was followed by his explicit sexual invitations 
and an offer of an apartment if the employee would leave her 
husband and consent to an affair. Finally there was a 
demand that she have an affair with him or be fired, which 
she was. 
However, in following the pattern set by Williams. the 
courts did not find sexual harassment in cases where actions 
of supervisors could not be directly tied to the loss of a 
17 Munford v. Barnes & Company, 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. 
Mich. 1977). 
18 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978). 
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tangible job benefit.19 
Quid pro quo harassment by a supervisory employee of a 
subordinate has been found to result in strict liability of 
the employer for the acts of the supervisory employee. This 
agrees with the standard of liability of Title VII, under 
which an employer is liable for the discriminatory acts of 
its supervisors, regardless of whether the employer knew, 
should have known, or approved of the supervisor's 
actions.20 
Bundv v. Jackson21 first articulated the offensive 
environment sexual harassment theory. The court held that 
sexual advances by a supervisor in the workplace could be 
sexual harassment even though the employee did not lose 
tangible employment benefits. Courts have debated and 
refined the theory of offensive or hostile working 
Walter V. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 
1981) (supervisor's bottom patting of employee not sexually 
oriented but intended as a show of support and 
encouragement; alleged incidents of breast touching and an 
inebriated attempt to have an affair on a business trip were 
not sufficient to establish sexual harassment when employee 
continued to carry out her duties and get raises); Bouchet 
v. National Urban League, 730 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(although evidence suggested that the supervisor was 
attracted to the employee and flirted with her on several 
occasions, it did not establish that any sexual advances or 
demands were made, and the employee's subsequent dismissal 
was based on poor performance. 
20 Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2408. 
21 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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environment, however the federal circuit courts of appeal 
have split on several important related issues. 
Before Meritor, the circuits were divided on whether 
the theory of respondeat superior or strict liability was 
the required standard for determining the liability of an 
employer for the acts of supervisory employees in an 
offensive environment cases. Henson v. City of Dundee22 
and Katz v. Dole23 were the leading federal court cases 
which held that the respondeat superior theory applied. 
In Henson. a female dispatcher in the city of Dundee's 
police department alleged that she had received numerous 
demeaning sexual inquiries and advances from her police 
chief, that she had complained about these acts to the city 
manager, but that no action was taken. She brought a Title 
VII sexual harassment action against the city for the 
chief's actions. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the existence of a hostile working environment could 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regardless 
of whether a plaintiff suffered tangible loss. The court 
relied on N. Jav Rogers v. EEOC.24 a hostile environment 
22 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
23 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
24 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). cert denied, 406 U.S. 
957 (1972). The court held that an Hispanic complainant 
could establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that 
her employer created a hostile work environment for 
employees by giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic 
clientele. 
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race discrimination case, as well as, Bundy. for its 
decision. The court acknowledged that an individual's well-
being could be undermined by a series of complex and 
pervasive activities.25 
The court in Henson established five criteria for a 
Title VII claim against an employer for a hostile work 
environment. First, the employee must belong to a group 
which is protected by Title VII. Simply enough, in a sexual 
harassment case, this means that an employee must be either 
male or female. Second, the employee must have experienced 
sexual harassment. The employee must have experienced 
sexual advances, reguests for sexual favors, or other verbal 
or physical sexual conduct which the employee did not 
solicit or incite and found undesirable or offensive. 
Third, the harassment must have been based on gender, in 
other words, the employee would not have been harassed 
except for his or her sex. This criterion included 
conditions which a heterosexual superior places upon a 
subordinate of the opposite gender, or which a homosexual 
superior places upon a subordinate of either gender.26 
25 Rogers, 454 F. 2d at 238. 
26 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir 1977). 
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Fourth, the harassment must have affected a "term, condition 
or privilege" of employment.27 The harassment must have 
been so pervasive that it altered the conditions of 
employment and created an abusive environment. 
Henson then established respondeat superior as the 
fifth criterion. In hostile environment sexual harassment 
cases, the employee must show that the supervisor knew or 
should have known of the sexually hostile environment before 
a court can hold the employer responsible. Therefore, 
Henson distinguished between an employer's liability in an 
offensive environment sexual harassment case and an 
employer's liability in a quid pro quo case. Henson 
recognized that in a quid pro quo case, strict liability 
would apply to the supervisor and the employer for sex 
discrimination.28 This standard is used because, in quid 
pro quo cases, the supervisor relies on the apparent or 
actual authority which the employer confers on him to 
perform the harassment. 
The Fourth Circuit followed Henson in Katz v. Dole.29 
Katz, a former federal air traffic controller, alleged she 
had been subjected to vulgar and offensive epithets by her 
27 The court held that the state of "psychological well 
being" of the employee could be such. Henson, 682 F.2d at 
904. 
28 Id. (Citing Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
29 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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co-workers and her supervisor on the job. Katz successfully 
sued the Secretary of the Department of Transportation for 
sex discrimination under Title VII. In Katz, the court held 
an offensive environment actionable under Title VII and 
adopted Henson's respondeat superior theory. It put upon 
the plaintiff the burden of proving that the employer had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the 
sexually hostile working environment and did not take prompt 
and adequate remedial action. The employer could rebut the 
plaintiff's case in two ways. One, by showing that the 
events did not take place, were isolated, or generally 
trivial, or two, by pointing to prompt remedial action 
reasonably calculated to end the harassment.30 The court 
noted in its opinion that the FAA did have a policy against 
sexual harassment, but that it was not effective and was 
known not to be effective by FAA supervisory personnel. 
This decision issued an early warning that a printed policy 
against sexual harassment alone would not be a sufficient 
defense in an offensive environment harassment case.31 
In the 1980s women continued to utilize the hostile 
work environment theory when charging sexual harassment. 
However, there remained confusion and inconsistency among 
the courts in applying the hostile work environment in 
30 Id. at 256. 
31 Id. 
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sexual harassment claims.32 Some of this confusion was 
settled by the Supreme Court in its 1986 decision in Meritor 
Savings Bank. FSB v. Vinson.33 
Meritor Savings Bank. FSB v. Vinson 
The United States Supreme Court issued its first 
decision regarding sexual harassment in Meritor Savings 
Bank. FSB v. Vinson. The Court upheld the theory of 
offensive environment sexual harassment but left somewhat 
undecided the liability which an employer incurs in such 
cases if the harassing employee is a supervisor. Although 
the opinion did not make every employer automatically liable 
for the harassment of a supervisory employee, it indicated 
that courts must scrutinize the employee's delegation of 
authority in harassment cases. As a result of Meritor. 
32 In Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
rev'd and remanded sub nom., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986), strict employer liability 
was held when the court ruled that the EEOC guidelines 
imposed on an employer liability for a substantially 
discriminatory work environment, and citing Bundy v. 
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) also held that a 
women did not have to prove resistance to sexual overtures 
in a sexual harassment case. The court in Jeppsen v. 
Wunnicke, 611 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Alaska 1985) followed the 
Vinson approach finding it unnecessary for the plaintiff in 
a sexual discrimination case to prove that the employer knew 
that the supervisor had created a hostile working 
environment. 
33 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). 
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courts probably will hold liable an employer who broadly 
delegates responsibility to a supervisory employee.34 
Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in 
which four justices joined, relied on the EEOC Guidelines, 
Rogers. Henson. Katz and Bundv.35 First, the majority 
opinion of the Court recognized that an offensive sexual 
environment constitutes sexual harassment under Title VII. 
Rehnquist rejected the need for an economic effect for a 
sexual harassment claim. However, again citing Rogers and 
Henson. he stated that the harassment must be severe and 
pervasive.36 
Justice Rehnquist then stated that the correct inquiry 
in a sexual harassment case is whether the harassment was 
unwelcome and that evidence of a plaintiff's sexually 
provocative speech and dress would be relevant to the issue 
of "unwelcomeness."37 However, addressing the crucial 
34 Elsa Kircher Cole, "Recent Legal Developments in 
Sexual Harassment," Sexual Harassment on Campus; A Legal 
Compendium (Washington, D.C.: National Association of 
College and University Attorneys, 1990), 9. 
35 Meritor, at 2406. 
36 Id. 
37 Id., at 2407. However, in Priest v. Rotary, 73 
A.L.R. FED. 736 (N.D. Cal 1983), the court held that 
evidence of a plaintiff's sexual history would be 
inadmissable to prove her propensity to act in conformity 
with sexual harassment or to show her habit of sexual 
activities. The court said that the purpose of the 
discovery request was to harass, intimidate and discourage 
the plaintiff in her efforts to prosecute the case and 
therefore denied the discovery request. 
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issue of an employer's liability, Justice Rehnquist provided 
no definitive principle. He stated only that employers are 
not automatically liable for sexual harassment by 
supervisors. Rehnquist wrote that the supervisor must be 
acting as an agent of the employer. Congress used the term 
"agent" in its definition of employer in Title VII. To 
Justice Rehnquist, this usage evidenced an intent to place 
some limits on the extent to which employers should be 
liable for the acts of employees. He discussed the EEOC's 
conclusion that where an employee or supervisor exercises 
authority actually delegated by the employer to make or 
threaten to make employee decisions affecting subordinates, 
the action of the employee may be imputed to the 
employer.38 Therefore, Meritor implies that employers are 
not subject to automatic liability if they have not 
delegated such authority to their employees.39 The 
operative word in this discourse is automatic, thereby 
indicating that liability may still be found on a case by 
case basis. 
Meritor appears to rely on four elements for a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment.40 First, the supervisor 
made sexual advances. Second, the sexual advances were 
38 Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2407-08. 
39 Cole, 11. 
40 Ibid. 
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unwelcome. Third, the advances were sufficiently pervasive 
to constitute a condition of employment. Finally, the 
advances were so pervasive and continuous that the employer 
must be conscious of them or, the harassing employee had 
authority to make decisions affecting the employment status 
of the harassed employee.41 
Justice Rehnquist noted that Vinson's failure to use 
the Bank's grievance procedure did not necessarily insulate 
the bank from liability.42 This conclusion seemed to be 
based on the fact that the bank's policy barred 
discrimination generally but did not necessarily alert 
Vinson of the bank's interest in correcting sexual 
harassment. Further, Justice Rehnquist indicated his 
dislike for the bank's policy because it required Vinson to 
complain first to the very person who was harassing her, her 
supervisor.43 Thus, he implied that the decision might 
have been different if the procedure better informed 
employees that the bank would investigate and resolve sexual 
harassment complaints and if that procedure encouraged 
victims to come forward.44 
41 Id., at 2408. 
42 Id., at 2408-09. 
43 Cole, 11. 
44 Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2408-09. 
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Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion that 
addressed only the issue of employer liability. Justice 
Marshall saw no reason to distinguish an employer's 
liability in an offensive environment sexual harassment 
situation from that in any other case of sex 
discrimination.45 Justice Marshall felt that a failure to 
distinguish such liability would impose no additional 
hardship on an employer. Title VII's requirement that a 
plaintiff file a complaint with the EEOC provides the 
employer an opportunity to correct an unperceived or unknown 
problem before any injunction.46 
Although Meritor did not explicitly determine an 
employer's liability in offensive environment cases, the 
Court did alert employers that their delegation to 
supervisors of an authority affecting the employment status 
of employees may make those employers strictly liable for 
the sexual harassment inflicted by such supervisors. 
Therefore, employers must provide a procedure for receiving 
and addressing complaints, and make this procedure known to 
employees. The procedure must contain sufficient 
flexibility to allow and encourage a harassed employee to 
approach management with a complaint, not only at the 
45 Id., at 2411. 
46 Id. 
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supervisory level, but also at any level chosen by the 
employee.47 
Post-Meritor 
Women have long understood the detrimental nature of a 
hostile work environment. The courts, however, have been 
slow to grasp the concept.48 For example, during the same 
year that Meritor was decided, the court reasoned in Rabidue 
v.Osceola Refining Company49 that 
indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some 
work environments, humor and language are rough hewn 
and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and 
girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant 
to, or can, change this. It must never be forgotten 
that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the 
struggle for equal employment opportunity for the 
female workers of America. But, it is quite different 
to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a 
magical transformation in the social mores of American 
workers.50 
In this case, Henry, Vivienne Rabidue's supervisor, was 
described as an "extremely vulgar and crude individual who 
customarily made obscene comments about women generally, 
47 Cole, 12. 
48 Robert J. Shoop, "The Reasonable Women in a Hostile 
Environment," West's Education Law Reporter. 23 April 1992, 
710. 
49 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). 
50 Id., at 620-21. 
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and, on occasion, directed such obscenities to Rabidue.1,51 
In addition to the vulgarity, Rabidue and other women 
employees were exposed to displayed pictures of nude and 
scantily clad women in offices and other work areas. 
Circuit Judge Krupansky agreed with the district courts 
finding that "Henry's obscenities, although annoying, were 
not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches 
of the plaintiff or other female employees."52 Judge 
Krupansky did not believe that the evidence demonstrated 
that this single employee's vulgarity substantially affected 
the totality of the workplace. He believed the sexually 
oriented poster displays had a "de minimis" effect on the 
plaintiff's work environment.53 Therefore, the Federal 
court affirmed the findings of the district court that 
Rabidue failed to sustain her burden of proof that she was 
the victim of a Title VII sexual harassment violation. 
It is ironic that the "reasonable women" theory was 
first set out in the dissenting opinion in the Rabidue case. 
Writing in dissent, Judge Keith stated that "the court is 
mistaken in affirming the findings that the defendant's 
treatment of the plaintiff evinced no anti-female animus and 
that gender-based discrimination played no role in her 
51 Id., at 622. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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discharge.54 Judge Keith listed some of the vulgarity 
that Judge Krupansky believed had only a minimal effect on 
the work environment. The court record shows that Henry 
routinely referred to women as "whores," "cunt," "pussy," 
and "tits."55 In referring to the plaintiff, Henry 
specifically remarked that "all that bitch needs is a good 
lay."56 
Judge Keith identified misogynous language and 
decorative displays as a "fairly significant" part of the 
job environment, and was unable to accept the standard for 
sexual harassment set forth in the majority opinion. In 
rejecting the continued use of the "reasonable person" 
standard for determining a hostile work environment, he said 
that it failed to account for the wide divergence between 
most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those 
of men.57 Instead he proposed the adoption of the 
"reasonable woman." Judge Keith also disagreed with the 
majority opinion that a woman assumes the risk of working in 
an abusive, anti-female environment. He believed that the 
54 Id., at 623. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id., at 626. 
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precise purpose of Title VII is to prevent such behavior and 
attitudes from poisoning the work environment of classes 
protected under the Act.58 
Ellison v. Brady59 and Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards. Inc.60 are two 1991 decisions that indicate 
that some courts are becoming aware of the gender hierarchy 
that shapes much of the interaction between women and men in 
the workplace.61 
In Ellison, a female revenue agent for the Internal 
Revenue Service received a series of strange love letters 
from a male co-worker. Believing that her grievances had 
not been satisfactorily resolved, Ellison filed a formal 
complaint alleging sexual harassment. Although the IRS 
investigator agreed that Ellison was being sexually 
harassed, the Treasury Department rejected Ellison's 
complaint because it did not describe a pattern or practice 
of sexual harassment covered by EEOC regulations. After an 
appeal, the EEOC affirmed the Treasury Department's decision 
on the ground that the agency took adequate action to 
prevent the repetition of the harassing conduct.62 The 
58 Shoop, 711. 
59 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
60 760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
61 Shoop, 712. 
62 Ellison at 875. 
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trial court granted summary judgement to the Secretary of 
the Treasury. 
However, Circuit Court Judge Beezer believed that if 
the standards set forth in Rabidue were accepted, employees 
would have to endure sexual harassment until their 
psychological well-being was so seriously affected that they 
suffered anxiety and debilitation before they could 
establish a hostile environment.63 Beezer rejected the 
Rabidue standard and accepted, instead, the minority opinion 
of the "reasonable woman" voiced in that case, thereby 
reversing the district court's decision. He felt that the 
offensive behavior in the Ellison case fell somewhere 
between forcible rape and the mere utterance of an epithet. 
"Although an isolated epithet by itself fails to support a 
cause of action for a hostile environment, Title VII's 
protection of employees from sex discrimination comes into 
play long before the point where victims of sexual 
harassment require psychiatric assistance. The required 
showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct 
varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the 
conduct"64 
Beezer reinforced the argument that in the evaluation 
of a hostile work environment the focus should be on the 
63 Id. at 878 
64 Id. 
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perspective of the victim. To use the "reasonable person" 
standard would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing 
level of discrimination.65 Harassers could continue to 
harass simply because a particular discriminatory practice 
was common and victims of harassment would have no remedy. 
Recognizing that there are a wide range of view points among 
women as a group, Beezer believed that many women share 
concerns which men do not necessarily recognize. He 
concluded that a "reasonable person" standard tends to be 
male-biased and, as such, tends to systematically ignore the 
experiences of women. Quoting Henson. Beezer stated, 
"by acknowledging and not trivializing the effects of sexual 
harassment on a 'reasonable women,' courts can work toward 
ensuring that neither men nor women will have to 'run a 
gauntlet of sexual abuse for the privilege of being allowed 
to work and make a living."'67 
Judge Beezer states further that in order to 
shield employers from having to accommodate the 
idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive 
employee, we hold that the female plaintiff states a 
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual 
harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable 
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive 
65 Id. 
66 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
67 Ellison at 880. 
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to alter the conditions of employment and create an 
abusive working environment.6® 
In the case of Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards. 
Inc.. a female employee brought action alleging a hostile 
work environment. The court accepted Robinson's testimony 
that there was "extensive, pervasive posting of pictures 
depicting nude women, partially nude women, or sexual 
conduct and the occurrence of other forms of harassing 
behavior perpetrated by her male coworkers and supervisors 
between 1977 and 1988."69 Robinson's testimony chronicled 
a visual assault of the sensibilities of female workers. In 
the one year period prior to the filing of her EEOC charge, 
Robinson's corroborated testimony reported that she saw 
pictures of a woman, breasts and pubic area exposed; a 
picture of a nude Black woman, pubic area exposed to 
reveal her labia; drawings and graffiti on the walls, 
including a drawing depicting a frontal view of a nude 
female with the words 'USDA Choice' written on it; a 
corsetted nude with her breasts and buttocks area 
exposed; calendars posted which included pictures of 
nude women bending over with their buttocks and 
genitals exposed to view; pictures of nude women 
apparently involved in lesbian sex; a drawing on a 
heater control box of a nude woman with fluid coming 
Id. at 879. Judge Beezer further stated that the 
court realized that the reasonable woman standard would not 
address conduct which some women find offensive. Conduct 
considered harmless today may be considered discriminatory 
in the future. Fortunately, the reasonableness inquiry 
which we adopt is not static. As the views of the 
reasonable woman change, so too does the Title VII standard 
of acceptable behavior. 
69 760 F.Supp. at 1489. 
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from her genital area; and, a dart board with a drawing 
of a woman's breast with the nipple as the bull's 
eye.7 0 
When Robinson complained about the above materials, she 
was either ignored or the pictures were removed only to be 
replaced by more offensive material.71 She was told to 
take cover so the men could exchange dirty jokes,72 stay 
away from the offending materials,73 and to look the other 
way just as she would turn off the television if she were 
offended.74 She was also told that "nautical people 
always had displayed pinups and other images of nude or 
partially nude women, like figureheads on boats, and that 
posting of such pictures was a natural thing in a nautical 
workplace,"75 and that "men had a constitutional right to 
post the pictures."76 
The court found that sexually harassing behavior had 
occurred throughout the working environment with both 
frequency and intensity over an extended period of time. 
The court stated "that the objective standard asks whether 
70 Robinson at 1495-96. 
71 Id. at 1498 
72 Id at 1499. 
73 Id. at 1514. 
74 Id. at 1515. 
75 Id. at 1616. 
76 Id. 
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a...reasonable women would perceive that an abusive working 
environment has been created."77 The court further stated 
that 
the conclusion holds true whether the concept of 
psychological well-being is measured by the impact of 
the work environment on a reasonable woman's work 
performance or more broadly by the impact of the stress 
inflicted on her by the continuing presence of the 
harassing behavior. The fact that some female 
employees did not complain of the work environment or 
find some behaviors objectionable78 does not affect 
this conclusion concerning the objective offensiveness 
of the work environment as a whole.79 
It does not follow that because men and women may 
interpret each other's behaviors differently that 
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environments are 
simply the result of differences in perceptions. In Sparks 
v. Pilot Freight Carriers. Inc..80 the court stated that 
the "whole point of sexual harassment claims is that 
behavior that may be permissible in some settings can be 
abusive in the workplace. "81 
77 Id. at 1524. 
78 Robinson was the first case to use an expert witness 
(K.C. Wagner) to discuss various responses to sexual 
harassment. 
79 Robinson at 1525. 
80 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). 
81 Id. at 1561. 
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Since whatever conduct is alleged to constitute the 
hostile environment must be based on activities that are not 
welcomed by the plaintiff, it is clear that such a 
determination must be gathered from the facts surrounding 
each incident. * 
Perspective, therefore, becomes a very important factor 
for determining whether a defendant's activity was 
offensive. In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico.83 
the court understood that perspective "is particularly 
important because often a determination of sexual harassment 
turns on whether it is found that the plaintiff misconstrued 
or overreacted to what the defendant claims were innocent or 
invited overtures."84 In Lipsett. the plaintiff was 
discharged from a medical residency program because she did 
not react favorably to her professor's requests to go out 
for drinks, his compliments about her hair and legs, or to 
questions about her personal and romantic life. These 
gestures were commonly accompanied by thinly veiled 
statements suggesting that the defendant was in a position 
to make things go favorably for the plaintiff if she 
acquiesced. The plaintiff was also subjected to comments 
from others in the program asserting that she should not be 
82 Bennett-Alexander, 134. 
83 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). 
84 Id. at 898. 
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in the program because she was female. In addition, she was 
shown lewd drawings of her body and called sexual nicknames. 
During the plaintiff's first rotation under this professor, 
she sensed that she had to react favorably by smiling during 
these intrusions. On her second rotation, however, she did 
not do so and gave disapproving looks or turned away.85 
The trial court held that since the plaintiff 
admittedly responded favorably to these flattering comments, 
there was no way anyone could consider them as 
unwelcome.86 The appellate court rejected this view and 
stated that an initial favorable response does not 
constitute a continued welcomeness. 
The man must be sensitive to signals from the woman 
that his comments are unwelcome and the woman must take 
the responsibility for making those signals clear. In 
some situations the woman may have the responsibility 
of telling the man directly that his comments or 
conduct is unwelcome, however, a woman's failure to 
respond to suggestive remarks or gestures may be 
sufficient to indicate that the man's conduct is 
unwelcome.87 
The court realized that the activity directed toward 
the victim and her response to it, carry more weight in 
determining whether the actions complained of are unwelcome. 
85 Id. at 884. 
86 Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F.Supp. 1188 (D.Puerto 
Rico 1987). 
87 Supra note 82. 
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The arguments that defendants could use to prove that a 
plaintiff intimated she would be receptive to sexual 
advances might include testimony regarding her use of foul 
language or her participation in sexual horseplay in the 
workplace, an allegation that she voluntarily came to a 
defendant's hotel room, or that she was engaging in a 
consensual sexual relationship. Generally speaking, each 
case could have circumstances that, in the specific context, 
might generate a finding that the alleged activities were 
welcomed, but the presence of factors, such as the ones 
mentioned above, do not automatically mean that the victim 
welcomed the specific acts in the complaint. 
In Swentek v. USAir. Inc..88 an airline stewardess 
complained that a pilot sexually harassed her by exposing 
himself to her, grabbing her, disparaging her age and 
weight, and by making obscene comments to her about another 
employee's wife. The plaintiff said that she asked the 
defendant to stop the harassing activity, but it continued. 
The pilot countered that the stewardess was a "foulmouthed" 
individual who always talked about sex. There were 
allegations, denied by the plaintiff, that she had placed a 
dildo in her female supervisor's mailbox and that she had 
made frank sexual invitations to another pilot. The trial 
court determined that such activities on the plaintiff's 
88 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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part, even if true, did not necessarily mean that she 
welcomed the defendant's actions specifically. However, 
such activity by the plaintiff would indicate that she was 
the type of person who would not be offended by the 
defendant's actions, and therefore his actions were not 
unwelcomed generally. 
The appellate court disagreed. Finding that the 
defendant was not aware of the plaintiff's past conduct, the 
court determined that such conduct could not have served as 
a basis for him to believe that she would welcome his 
actions, especially since she had asked him to stop those 
actions.89 In addition, the court stated that the 
plaintiff's use of foul language and sexual innuendo in a 
consensual setting did not wave "her legal protection 
against unwelcome sexual harassment."90 This served 
notice that even if the defendant had known beforehand of 
the allegations made against the plaintiff, it would not 
have necessarily defended his conduct. 
In Wverick v. Bavou Steel Corporation.91 an employee 
charged sexual harassment on the basis of a lewd comment 
made by a fellow employee during an electrocardiogram he 
89 Id. at 556. 
90 Id. at 557. 
91 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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performed on her. After the plaintiff reported the comment, 
she experienced a great deal of teasing about it. The 
defendant attempted to defend against the sexual harassment 
claim by asserting that the plaintiff, herself, used 
profanity at work.92 The trial court held in the 
defendant's favor on the basis of the plaintiff's conduct, 
but the appeals court reversed the decision claiming that 
the plaintiff's foul language did not automatically mean 
that she welcomed the sexually harassing activity. 
Closely related to the foul language cases, and 
sometimes overlapping them, were those cases involving 
workplace sexual horseplay in which the victim engaged. 
Although this kind of horseplay may have taken place on a 
daily basis, the courts have found that there is a 
difference between consensual horseplay in which the victim 
participated of her own free will and horseplay that 
involved anti-female animus, which served as the basis for 
sexual harassment. This can be a highly troublesome thin 
line for some employers. 
In Spencer v. General Electric Company.93 horseplay 
included pervasive double entendres, sexual questions, jokes 
and stories, and intimate touching. The supervisor's 
department was known as "Jim's harem" or "the animals." In 
92 Id. at 1273. 
93 697 F.Supp. 204 (DC Va 1988). 
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addition to the pervasive sexual horseplay atmosphere, the 
court found evidence of anti-female sentiment in the 
supervisor's comments. Despite the fact that the victim at 
times had participated in the office horseplay, the court 
found that she had not welcomed the harassing activity and 
found hostile environment sexual harassment. In the court's 
view, participation in some of the milder horseplay did not 
waive her right to be protected from a hostile sexual 
environment and from female animus.94 
In a few cases the harassing employee attempted to 
defend against a finding of unwelcomeness by arguing that 
the victim was voluntarily in the hotel room of the 
defendant when the harassment occurred. The courts have 
found that being in a hotel room is an insufficient basis 
upon which to find welcomeness. 
For example, in Bovd v. James Haves Living Health Care 
Agency. Inc..95 the victim initially refused the 
invitation to the room of her supervisor, but later accepted 
when he asked her to come and discuss the seminar they were 
attending. While in the room, the supervisor gave the 
plaintiff wine and turned on the television to a pay-to-view 
graphic movie. The plaintiff told him she was not 
interested in viewing the movie. When she began to leave 
94 Id. 
95 671 F.Supp. 1155 (DC Tenn 1987). 
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the room, the supervisor touched her in an attempt to make 
her stay and slammed the door when she left. After the 
seminar, on the way home, the supervisor gave the plaintiff 
graphic magazines when she asked if he had anything to read. 
The plaintiff told him she was not interested in his graphic 
magazines. The court found sexual harassment because the 
victim had made her position clear to her supervisor. The 
fact that she was voluntarily in his hotel room and then 
rode home with him from the seminar did not mean that she 
welcomed his harassing activity. The totality of the 
circumstances were weighted for a finding of unwelcomeness. 
The totality of the circumstances brought the court to 
exactly the opposite conclusion in McLean v. Satellite 
Technology Services.96 where the plaintiff was invited to 
her supervisor's room to carry out part of her job 
responsibilities by viewing his upcoming presentation. She 
alleged that while there, the supervisor placed his arm 
around her, touched her leg, and tried to kiss her. 
During the hotel room incident, the defendant wore 
shorts and a shirt, while the plaintiff was in a bathing 
suit and a towel. During the two months in which the 
plaintiff had been employed by the defendant company, she 
had displayed semi-nude photos of herself, lifted her skirt 
to show her supervisor the absence of undergarments, and 
96 673 F.Supp. 1458 (E.D.Mo 1987). 
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made offers of sexual gratification during work hours. She 
made "highly salacious" comments to employees, customers, 
and competitors, even though she had been warned by the 
company not to do so. She was intimate with an employee of 
a customer at least twice in her hotel room during the same 
business trip on which the alleged harassment took place and 
several times during the trip she was not working as 
required and it was not clear where she was or what she was 
doing. Based on these circumstances, the court found that 
if the defendant did engage in questionable behavior toward 
the plaintiff, it was probably welcomed.97 
These two cases taken together indicate that simply 
being in a defendant's hotel room during a business trip 
does not prove that a plaintiff could reasonably be thought 
to welcome sexual advances. However, plaintiffs should be 
aware that other conduct may lead to a finding by the court 
that the alleged activity was welcomed. Similarly, 
potential perpetrators and their employers should be aware 
that an invitation to a hotel room while on a business trip 
could lead to employer liability for sexual harassment. 
Even the presence of a consensual relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant does not necessarily mean 
that the plaintiff welcomed the defendant's harassing 
97 Id. at 1460. 
118 
actions. Once again, the entire context must be considered. 
In Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank. 98 for example, the 
court found no sexual harassment where the defendant had a 
previous consensual relationship with the plaintiff and 
there were simply no facts to support the harassment claim. 
In this classic case of "love gone sour," the plaintiff 
never complained about the defendant until he tried to break 
off their relationship so that it would not interfere with 
his pending divorce action. There was no abusive treatment 
of the plaintiff and no other evidence produced to support a 
finding of sexual harassment." This case illustrates 
that there is more to making a sexual harassment case than 
simply making allegations: the allegations must be proved. 
Although the outcome was different, the same 
conclusions were borne out in Shrout v. Black Clawson 
Company.100 Here, there was a consensual relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant for three years. 
However, for the four years after the relationship ended, 
the defendant made sexual advances and remarks, attempted to 
force the advances by not giving the plaintiff pay raises 
and performance evaluations, left sexual materials on her 
desk, and looked down her blouse and up her skirt. The 
98 687 F.Supp. 848 (DC NY 1988). 
99 Id. 
100 689 F.Supp. 744 (DC Ohio 1988). 
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plaintiff rejected the defendant's advances, leaving the 
court little alternative except to find that, even though 
the relationship began on a consensual basis, the 
defendant's activity was not welcomed by the plaintiff and 
the relationship had passed into the realm of sexual 
harassment.101 
It should be clear that when an employee brings a 
sexual harassment action, her entire workplace reputation 
and activities may be opened up for public scrutiny. The 
courts have shown themselves willing to entertain those 
matters they deem relevant, but will not draw unwarranted 
conclusions based on the plaintiff's private life. The more 
work related the activities are, the more relevant they 
become.102 
Anti-female animus is consistently seen as a basis for 
finding hostile environment sexual harassment even when the 
activity directed toward the employee is not sexual in 
nature. Anti-female sentiment can be indicated by virtually 
any remark or gesture indicating a lack of respect for 
female employees simply because of their gender. In other 
words, if it wasn't for her sex, the employee would not be 
subjected to the same actions.103 
102 Bennett-Alexander, 139. 
103 Ibid. 
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In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia.104 anti-female 
animus was held to be present when female police officers 
were subjected to touching, sexual propositions, 
pornography, obscene language, and name calling. In 
addition, the work files of the female employees disappeared 
and their personal property was tampered with. In one 
incident, someone put acid on one of the female officer's 
civilian clothing hanging in her locker, causing burns on 
her back when she put them on. The defendant argued that a 
"police station need not be run like a day care 
center."10^ Nevertheless, the court found the presence 
of a hostile environment. 
Likewise, the court found in Hall v. Gus Construction 
Company106 that a hostile work environment existed where 
female construction workers were subjected to sexual 
propositions, name calling, crude pranks, displays of 
pornography, and unwanted touching. Moreover, anti-female 
animus was demonstrated by such actions as refusing to let 
the women have a truck to go into town for bathroom breaks 
and refusing to repair a truck exhaust leak for women but 
doing so immediately when men began to drive the truck. The 
women complained to their supervisor, but the supervisor 
104 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990) 
105 Id. at 1486. 
106 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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disciplined no one and only talked to the men about their 
activity once. 
Although many of the courts have found hostile work 
environments when the harassment was continuous over a 
substantial period of time, one incident alone is sufficient 
to create a hostile environment if it is flagrant. One such 
decision involved a plant foreman who forced the plaintiff's 
face against his crotch in the presence of other male co­
workers, forcing her to leave crying as they laughed.107 
Two days of sexual harassment were found to be 
sufficiently severe and pervasive in another case. Within 
the first hour on the job, the plaintiff was asked if she 
"fooled around." Within the first day, the plaintiff's 
supervisor reguested that she pull up her dress so he could 
take her picture, and another co-worker actually did take a 
picture under her dress.108 
Defendants have attempted to argue that there should be 
no finding of sexual harassment where the actions in 
question were not sexual in nature, but the courts have 
rejected this defense. While most cases have involved a 
combination of sexual and non-sexual actions, courts have 
uniformly held that the harassment need not be sexual in 
107 Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 913 F.2d 463 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
108 Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F.Supp. 261 (DC 
Tex 1987). 
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nature to constitute hostile environment sexual harassment. 
This position can be traced directly to the Meritor 
decision: "Title VII affords employees the right to work in 
an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult."109 
Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title IX 
Background 
In 1970, Representative Edith Green of Oregon was the 
Chairperson of the House Special Subcommittee on Education, 
proposed an education bill110 designed to expand 
financial assistance to educational institutions and their 
students. The bill also was designed to prohibit sex 
discrimination in educational institutions. Section 805 of 
the Act would have amended Title VI of the Civil Rights of 
1964111 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of 
sex in all federally assisted programs. The bill never 
passed through the House. However, in the next legislative 
session, Representative Green sponsored a new sex 
discrimination bill112 at the same time that Senator 
109 Meritor, at 65. 
110 H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Session (1970). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 
112 H.R. 7248, Title IX, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. 117 Cong. 
Rec. 39364-65 (1971). 
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Birch Bayh from Indiana sponsored the Senate version.113 
Unlike the bill from the previous year, the new bill 
specifically incorporated a provision disallowing sex 
discrimination rather than proposing such a provision as an 
amendment to Title VI. The data presented in support of the 
bill made the need for the bill apparent, however, to gain 
support for the bill, the Senate excluded military schools 
and certain single sex institutions. Initially introduced 
as an amendment to Title VI, Title IX today reflects a broad 
ban on sex discrimination in educational institutions.114 
The Title IX regulatory scheme115 provides for a 
system of institutional self-regulation as well as federal 
government enforcement. The regulations require every 
institution receiving federal funds to establish a 
publicized policy, a grievance procedure, and to appoint an 
employee responsible for investigating complaints and 
coordinating compliance efforts.116 The U.S. Department 
of Education is the agency of the United States government 
113 S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 Cong. Rec. 30399-
400 (1971). 
114 Today Title IX excludes certain organizations 
entirely and excludes admissions policies of other 
organizations, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Some of these 
exclusions are religious schools where the application of 
Title IX would be inconsistent with religious beliefs, 
military schools, sororities, fraternities, boy scouts, and 
girl scouts. 
115 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). 
116 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (1986). 
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that administers federal funds for educational programs, 
enforces federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in 
activities receiving federal funds, and ensures equal access 
to education for every individual. 
Unlike Title VII which depends upon the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission for enforcement, Title IX 
is enforced by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR). Although 
the OCR is responsible for the enforcing the federal civil 
rights statutes that prohibit discrimination based on race, 
color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age in Department 
of Education programs and activities,117 the EEOC 
guidelines for sexual harassment apply to educational 
programs, too. This covers approximately 16,000 school 
districts, 3,600 post secondary institutions, and 6,800 
proprietary institutions.118 
The principal enforcement activity of the OCR is the 
investigation and resolution of complaints. Anyone who 
believes that an educational institution that receives 
federal financial assistance has discriminated against 
someone on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, 
handicap, or age may file a complaint. The person or 
organization filing the complaint need not be a victim of 
117 Department of Education, Information About the 
Office of Civil Rights. (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1991), 1. 
118 Ibid. 
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the alleged discrimination, but may complain on behalf of 
another person or group. A complaint must be filed within 
180 calendar days of the date of the alleged discrimination, 
or within 60 days after the last act of the institutional 
grievance process, unless the time for filing is extended by 
OCR for good cause.119 
The Title VII sexual harassment cases opened the door 
for harassment actions under other discrimination statutes, 
including Title IX. Two basic issues needed to be decided: 
1) what are the boundaries of a sexual harassment claim 
under Title IX and, 2) are compensatory damages available? 
In deciding Cannon v. University of Chicago.120 The 
Supreme Court relied on the four-prong test it had 
previously defined in Cort v. Ash.121 The Cort test 
examines whether: (1) the plaintiff is one of the class for 
whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) a 
legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy is 
apparent; (3) a remedy would be consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the statute; and (4) the cause of 
action is traditionally relegated to state law.122 
119 Department of Education, How to File a 
Discrimination Complaint With the Office of Civil Rights. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 1. 
120 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 
(1979). 
121 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). 
122 Id. 
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In Cannon, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory 
language that satisfied the first part of the Cort test was 
most often found in the civil rights statutes such as Title 
IX. In examining the second prong of the Cort test, 
the Court noted that Congress had explicitly patterned Title 
IX after Title VI. Because Title VI was understood to infer 
an implied right of action at the time of the passing of 
Title IX, and because Congress made repeated references to 
Title VI during discussions of Title IX, the Court inferred 
that the previous interpretation of Title VI reflected the 
Congressional intent with regard to Title IX.124 In 
determining the third prong of the Cort test, the Court 
defined two general purposes of Title IX: "to avoid the use 
of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" 
and "to provide individual citizens effective protection 
against those practices."125 Finally, the Court 
determined that the final prong of the Cort test was 
satisfied because the subject matter of the Title IX suit is 
not relegated to state law. 
The Supreme Court found that both an interpretation of 
Title IX as parallel statute to Title VI and an 
123 441 U.S. at 689, 99 S. Ct. at 1953. 
124 441 U.S. at 696, 99 S. Ct. at 1957. 
125 441 U.S. at 704, 99 S.Ct. at 1961. 
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interpretation of Title IX under the Cort analysis created a 
private right of action under Title IX.126 Although 
private causes of action would support declaratory and 
injunctive relief, it was less clear whether compensatory 
damages could be supported under Title IX. 
Sexual Harassment Defined Under Title IX 
In Alexander v. Yale University.127 the federal 
district court determined that an educational 
institutional's failure to respond to complaints of sexual 
harassment constituted grounds for a Title IX action. The 
court held that a student plaintiff who complained to 
university officials that she received an undeserved low 
grade because she refused to submit to the sexual demands of 
her professor presented a "justifiable" claim.128 
Allegation of educational harm distinguished her claim from 
those student plaintiffs who alleged harm as a result of the 
"contamination" of the educational environment.129 The 
court dismissed the co-plaintiff's claim that even though 
she had not personally been a direct victim of sexual 
126 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 
(1979) . 
127 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), 631 F.2d 178 (2d 
Cir. 1980) . 
128 459 F. Supp. at 4. 
129 Id. at 3. 
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harassment, she had suffered emotional distress, was fearful 
of associating with male faculty, and was deprived of "the 
tranquil atmosphere necessary to her pursuit of a liberal 
education.11130 The trial court held that such vicarious 
and environmental claims were "imponderables" not recognized 
under Title IX.131 The plaintiffs in Alexander asserted 
that the absence of any grievance procedures to process and 
resolve complaints of sexual harassment by professors 
contributed to the creation of an offensive, harassing 
environment. The court's refusal to recognize maintenance of 
an offensive educational environment as sexual harassment 
under Title IX ignored a critical element of learning, that 
of the creation and fostering of an environment conducive to 
intellectual growth.132 
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgement of the lower 
court.133 However, it did not address the issue of 
environmental harm because several issues decided by the 
130 631 F.2d at 182. 
131 459 F. Supp. at 3. 
1 "lO # 
Ronna Greff Schneider, "Sexual Harassment and 
Higher Education," Sexual Harassment on Campus; A Legal 
Compendium (Wash. D.C.: National Association of College and 
University Attorneys, 1990), 36. 
133 Alexander v. Yale University, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
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district court had become moot.134 Therefore, the 
circuit court's disposition of the case made it impossible 
to discern the boundaries of a sexual harassment claim under 
Title IX beyond academic extortion, that is, "academic 
advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual 
demands."135 Thus, the Second Circuit recognized only 
quid pro quo sexual harassment as violating Title IX. 
In Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine.136 
a female medical student who failed her third year 
psychiatric clerkship at a private clinic sued the 
university and her supervisor. She alleged that the 
defendants conspired to give her a failing grade because of 
her sex. Specifically, Moire alleged that her supervisor 
created an offensive work environment by sexually harassing 
her and that the clinic staff and the university faculty 
members joined the conspiracy in an effort to protect the 
supervisor. Although the district court found no merit in 
this particular claim, it permitted a claim of sexual 
134 Id. at 184. The student complainants had since 
graduated and, by the time the suit reached the court of 
appeals, Yale had complied with its duty to implement a 
grievance procedure. 
135 Id. at 182. 
136 613 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), 800 F.2d 1136 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
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harassment based solely on environmental harm.137 For 
the first time, a court intimated that the EEOC guidelines 
on sexual harassment are "equally applicable to Title 
IX."138 
Compensatory Damages Under Title IX 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Cannon. three 
circuits have decided whether compensatory relief should be 
available under Title IX. The first two circuits held that 
it should not be and the third court held that it should. 
In Lieberman v. University of Chicago.139 the first 
case claiming damages that was heard by a court of appeals 
after the Cannon decision, the Seventh Circuit considered 
whether compensatory damages are available under Title IX. 
The Lieberman court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis 
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman140 in 
deciding that no damages were available under Title IX. 
First, it was found that both Title IX and the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and the Bill of Rights 
Act, which was the issue in Pennhurst. were enacted by 
137 613 F.Supp. at 1366-67. The court specifically 
identified the Title IX issue as being "whether plaintiff 
because of her sex was in a harassing or abusive 
environment..." 
138 Id. at 1366. 
139 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981). 
140 451 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). 
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Congress pursuant to its spending clause powers and that 
remedies are limited under Spending Clause statutes. 
Second, like the court in Pennhurst. the court in Lieberman 
was concerned with the financial effects that money damages 
could have.141 The court in Lieberman reasoned that 
available remedies needed to be outlined clearly so that 
educational institutions could choose whether or not to 
accept federal assistance.142 Even though the Supreme 
Court in Cannon had found that Title IX creates implied 
right of action, the Lieberman court found that this right 
was distinct from the damage remedy issue. 
Nine years after Lieberman. the Eleventh District heard 
a case arising out of Georgia, Franklin v. Gwinnett Public 
Schools.143 Although the court in Franklin recognized 
that a private right of action existed under Cannon. the 
court made it clear that "whether a litigant has a cause 
action is analytically distinct and prior to the question of 
what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to 
receive."144 Like the court in Lieberman. the court in 
Franklin determined that compensatory damages were not an 
available remedy under Title IX. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), 111 S. Ct. 2795 
(1992). 
144 911 F.2d at 619. 
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The court in Franklin relied on the post-Lieberman 
Supreme Court ruling in Guardians Association v. Civil 
Service Commission.145 In Guardians. Black and Hispanic 
police officers of the City of New York brought a class 
action suit against the Civil Service Commission under Title 
VI. The district court awarded relief, but the court of 
appeals reversed on the issue of damages, holding that 
intentional discrimination, which the trial court had not 
found, was required for compensatory relief. At the Supreme 
Court, a 5-4 judgement affirming the court of appeals was 
split into four groups.146 
Given the split in Guardians. the court in Franklin 
found that although "the judgement of Guardians Association 
precludes a cause of action for compensatory damages for 
unintentional discrimination, we believe the various 
opinions of the majority of the Justices simply leaves open 
145 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983). 
146 For the majority, Justice White, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist, put aside the issue of relief involving 
intentional discrimination, as unnecessary for determining 
the case. Justice White wrote, however, that "it may be 
that the victim of intentional discrimination should be 
entitled to a compensatory reward..." (103 S. Ct. at 3230). 
Justice Powell joined by Chief Justice Burger concurred, 
finding no implied cause of action exists under Title VI. 
Justice O'Connor concurred in the decision concluding that 
no relief was available without intentional discrimination. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun, determined that relief was available. In a 
separate dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated that 
compensatory relief was available without a showing of 
intent. 
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the question of whether compensatory damages for intentional 
discrimination may be sought."147 Because the Franklin 
court interpreted Guardians in a restrictive manner, it did 
not find Guardians to be controlling. Instead, it turned to 
a precedent within its own district and relied upon a Title 
VI case, Dravden v. Needville Independent School District, 
to decide the case. Although the court in Franklin 
recognized Lieberman. it did not rely upon the same contract 
analysis, but rather adopted a Title VI case to the Title IX 
claim. Later, to lend definition and direction on the issue 
of Title IX compensatory damages, the Franklin case was 
granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court. The 
findings of the Court in the Franklin case will be discussed 
in detail after an analysis of Pfeiffer v. School Board For 
Marion Center Area.148 whose decision in favor of 
compensatory damages in a Title IX claim, set the stage for 
the landmark Franklin ruling. 
The court in Pfeiffer was the first court of appeals to 
acknowledge compensatory damages under Title IX.149 
Plaintiff Arlene Pfeiffer was an excellent student and 
participated in a variety of extracurricular activities, 
147 911 F.2d at 621. 
148 917 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
149 In Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F.Supp. 931 (1986), the 
district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held 
that compensatory relief was available under Title IX. This 
court's analysis was similar to the analysis of Pfeiffer. 
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including serving as president of the student council. 
Because of her record, she was elected to the National Honor 
Society (NHS) at the Marion Center Area High School. 
Guidelines for membership in the National Honor Society 
required that students be selected on the basis of four 
qualities: scholarship, service, leadership and character. 
Under the heading of Leadership, one of the qualities to be 
assessed was whether the student demonstrated the type of 
leadership that influenced others for good conduct. Under 
the heading of Character, one quality was whether the 
student upheld principles of morality and ethics. 
During the spring of her junior year (1983), Pfeiffer 
discovered she was pregnant. She notified her school 
guidance counselor and the school principal, telling them 
that although she was unmarried, she wanted to have the 
child and finish high school. Upon learning of Pfeiffer's 
pregnancy, Judith Skubis, a teacher at the high school, 
brought the matter to the attention of the National Honor 
Society faculty council members. The following fall, the 
council scheduled a meeting on November 4, to which Pfeiffer 
was invited. At the meeting, the council notified Pfeiffer 
that her status in the National Honor Society was in 
question because of her premarital sexual involvement. The 
faculty then asked Pfeiffer whether the sexual activity that 
led to her pregnancy was voluntary, to which Pfeiffer 
replied in the affirmative. 
135 
On November 8, Pfeiffer's father telephoned the school 
principal requesting a prompt decision because a NHS 
induction ceremony was scheduled for the next day and Arlene 
wanted to attend. The council met on the morning of 
November 9, and by secret ballot, unanimously voted to 
dismiss her from the NHS chapter. The council told Pfeiffer 
by letter that she had been dismissed for "failure to uphold 
the high standards of leadership and character required for 
admission and maintenance of membership."150 
On November 30, the council met with her parents, who 
requested that the subject be placed on the agenda of the 
school board meeting scheduled for December 12. Pfeiffer 
and her parents appeared at the meeting with counsel. The 
board requested that the matter be discussed privately, but 
Pfeiffer and her parents insisted that the issue be 
discussed publicly. The board was asked to review the 
decision of the faculty council. 
On December 19, the board and the council met to 
consider the matter further and on January 16, 1984, the 
school board adopted a resolution unanimously affirming the 
action of the faculty council. 
Arlene Pfeiffer filed suit, via her parents, alleging 
discrimination in her dismissal from the NHS. She sought 
150 917 F.2d at 782. 
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an injunction that she be reinstated in the 
chapter,that the records of the school district be 
corrected to show that she remains in good standing in 
the society, that a procedure for dismissal be ordered 
that is not discriminatory, that the NHS be prohibited 
from disseminating information about her dismissal and 
that she be awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
Pfeiffer sought relief under Title IX and state law under 
the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PHRA),152 and the 
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment.153 
Initially, the district court of the Third Circuit 
denied Pfeiffer her Title IX claim based on the Supreme 
Court holding in Grove City College v. Bell.154 However, 
while the case was pending, Congress amended Title IX to 
circumvent Grove City College by passing the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987. The district court then ruled that 
the Restoration Act made the school district subject to the 
Title IX claim.155 
151 Id. at 783. 
152 43 P.S. § 955(i)(1) (Purdon's Supp. 1988). 
153 Commonwealth Constitution art. 1, § 28. 
154 465 U.S. 555, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 
(1984). This ruling allowed Title IX claims only if the 
claim was directed at a department within the institution 
that received federal funding. Pfeiffer's claim stated 
although the NHS received no federal funding, the school 
received federal funding through various programs, such as 
the lunch program. 
155 917 F.2d at 783. 
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Under regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX, no 
person shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
pregnancy, parental status, or marital status.156 The 
district court examined considerable evidence, including 
that no male member of the chapter had ever been dismissed 
for premarital sexual activity.157 Pfeiffer had offered 
to introduce testimony by a former student who was a male 
member of the chapter who, two years after Pfeiffer's 
dismissal, impregnated his girlfriend and was not dismissed 
from the chapter. The district court excluded the evidence. 
The argument of the court settled on whether Pfeiffer 
was dismissed from the NHS because she was pregnant, a clear 
violation of Title IX, or if she was dismissed because she 
failed to uphold the standards of the National Honor 
Society. 
The Third Circuit Court found that the lower court had 
made an error in excluding pertinent evidence. The circuit 
court then determined that Pfeiffer's claim for injunctive 
relief was moot because the National Honor Society had been 
156 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); § 1681(b)(1) states "A 
recipient shall not discriminate against any student or 
exclude any student from its educational program or 
activity, including any class or extracurricular activity, 
on the basis of such student's pregnancy, childbirth, false 
pregnancy, termination of pregnancy or recovery therefrom 
unless the student requests voluntarily to participate in a 
separate portion of the program or activity of the 
recipient. 
157 917 F.2d at 783. 
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disbanded at the high school and no records were kept as to 
who was in the society or who had been dismissed. The court 
then turned to the issue of compensatory relief. If no 
compensatory relief was available under Title IX, it would 
be pointless to remand the case to the district court to 
reconsider the excluded evidence. Determining what monetary 
damages, if any, could be available to Pfeiffer became an 
important issue. She had not lost any tangible benefit. 
Her status as a student was not affected; she did not apply 
for or lose any college scholarships, and the fact that her 
dismissal became public was the result of her own 
actions.158 
Ultimately two theories of statutory construction 
opposed each other in this inquiry. On one side existed the 
principle that when a statute expressly provides a 
particular remedy, it is improper to imply the existence of 
other remedies.159 On the other side was the precept 
that the existence of a statutory right implied the 
existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies.160 
158 Id. at 786. 
159 Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1187. 
160 Bell V .  Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 
939 (1946) ("where federally protected rights have been 
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts 
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the 
necessary relief"); Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F.Supp. 931 (M.D. 
Pa. 1986). 
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In Cannon. the Supreme Court indicated that Congress 
intended to create remedies in Title IX comparable to those 
available under Title VI. Therefore, the Pfeiffer court 
looked to guidance from the Supreme Court in cases involving 
Title IX and its statutory predecessor, Title VI.161 In 
Guardians. a majority of the Court found that compensatory 
relief based on past violations of conditions regulating use 
of federal funds is available for Title VI violations when 
intentional discrimination is present.162 Tracking this 
analysis to a Title IX claim, the Pfeiffer court concluded 
that compensatory relief is available for Title IX 
violations. However, the court did not decide specifically 
whether intent is a necessary element of a Title IX claim. 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools 
Because of the split of opinion between the 11th and 
the Third Circuits on the matter of whether compensatory 
damages are allowed under Title IX, the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear the Franklin case. 
The plaintiff in the Franklin case was a young women 
who had allegedly been sexually harassed by a teacher while 
attending a public high school in Gwinnett County, Georgia. 
Before filing the lawsuit, she made formal complaint to the 
161 917 F.2d at 787. 
162 463 U.S. at 602, 103 S. Ct. at 3234. 
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U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR), 
which investigated the allegations. The inquiry uncovered a 
pattern of circumstances that can best be described as every 
school executive's worst nightmare.*63 
On February 26, 1992, the Court issued its opinion, 
overturning the 11th Circuit decision and remanding the 
matter for trial.164 The ruling that Title IX does 
support claims for monetary damages was unanimous, but the 
Court divided into a six-member majority opinion and a 
three-member concurring opinion. 
Writing for the majority, Justice White went all the 
way back to the 1803 case of Marburv v. Madison165 for 
the judicial tradition that, if a cause of action exists to 
enforce a federal right and Congress is silent on the 
question of remedies, a federal court may order any 
appropriate relief. This ruling effectively rebuffed the 
arguments of the friend-of-the-court brief filed by the Bush 
Administration. 
Next, the majority relied on legislative history since 
the Cannon decision, during which period Congress amended 
Title IX, and related civil rights, to abrogate the 
constitutional immunity of states and to eliminate the 
163 David A. Splitt, "Sexual Harassment Can Cost You 
Money," The Executive Educator 14 (May 1992): 12. 
164 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). 
165 i cranch 137 (1803). 
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program-specific requirement. Finally the majority rejected 
the defendants' argument that other remedies were available 
as completely inadequate in this case. 
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion, 
subscribed to by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 
Although he agreed with the decision of the Court, Scalia 
accused the majority of begging the question in relying on 
the implication in the Cannon decision of a right of action 
in Title IX, rather than on a congressional specification. 
Referring to the former Court as an ancient regime, Scalia 
warned, "We have abandoned the expansive rights-creating 
approach exemplified by Cannon...and perhaps ought to 
abandon the notion of implied causes of action 
entirely."166 Nevertheless, Scalia concurred because, 
considering the legislation enacted subsequent to Cannon, 
"it is too late in the day to address whether a judicially 
implied exclusion of damages under Title IX would be 
appropriate."167 
The Franklin decision provided another weapon for 
victims of intentional sex discrimination in schools, 
whether they are students or employees. Franklin's 
attorney, Michael Weinstock, read the message of the 
Franklin Court as loud and clear: "Schools have to take 
166 112 S. Ct. at 1034. 
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sufficient steps to ensure a central figure is readily 
available to receive complaints in confidence and to act on 
them effectively with a protective, supportive 
process."168 
Alternatives in Sexual Harassment Cases 
On the state level, noncompensatory remedies include 
criminal statutes and administrative discipline while 
compensatory remedies include civil suits for assault and 
battery or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.169 Now that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
allows for monetary damages up to $3 00,000 for claims 
brought under Title VII, plaintiffs who would have chosen to 
seek remedy under state laws providing monetary damages may 
now choose to bring suit under Title VII. 
An example of a sexual harassment case brought under 
statutes other than Titles VII and IX was Howard University 
v. Best.170 In Howard. the court held that the creation 
of a hostile working environment was sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case of intentional infliction of 
168 Perry A. Zirkel, "Damages for Sexual Harassment," 
Phi Delta Kappan 73 (June 1992): 812. 
169 Zirkel, 813. 
170 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. App. 1984). 
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emotional distress.171 The court held that a jury could 
find that the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
arose out of and in the course of employment. The court 
stressed that the sexually hostile acts of the dean toward 
the faculty member occurred during faculty, administrative, 
or other professional meetings which both attended in their 
professional capacities. Thus the court held the university 
liable for the tort of outrage.172 The court in Best 
rejected the Henson and Katz respondeat superior approach 
and adopted the strict liability approach of Miller v. Bank 
of America. In fact, the court stated that upon the 
plaintiff's establishing a case of sexual harassment at a 
new trial, the jury was to be instructed that the university 
was to be held liable for sexual harassment.173 The 
court based its decision on the fact that the Vice-President 
for Health Affairs at Howard did not conduct an independent 
review of the dean's non-renewal of Best's appointment and 
that his adoption of the non-renewal constituted full 
knowledge and acceptance of the dean's actions. 
171 Id. at 986. The court held that the standard for 
showing emotional damages as a result of sexual harassment 
should be lower than that which is required by a plaintiff 
to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because the higher standard of proof would not serve the 
broad purpose of antidiscrimination acts. 
172 Id. at 987. 
173 Id. at 983. 
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In Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific.174 female employees 
brought suit against their employer and others for sex 
discrimination and outrage, alleging that a co-worker 
fondled them and used abusive language. They said they 
informed the plant manager who allegedly did nothing. The 
court held that in a hostile environment case the employee 
must show that the employer authorized, knew, or should have 
known of the harassment and failed to take reasonably prompt 
and adequate corrective action to be held liable. The court 
stated that an employer may ordinarily avoid liability by 
taking prompt and adequate corrective action when it learns 
that an employee is being sexually harassed. 
The court in Estate of Scott bv Scott v. deLeon175 
approved an alternate theory of damages: denial of equal 
protection under the fourteenth amendment by allowing 
harassing incidents to occur. In Scott. the personal 
representative of a pharmaceutical assistant at the 
University of Michigan alleged that the assistant's 
supervisor violated the equal protection clause by sexually 
harassing the assistant through letters, notes, and threats 
aimed at coercing her into sexual relations. The assistant 
allegedly complained to three university administrators 
about these incidents but nothing was done because she did 
174 103 Wash.2d 401, 693 P.2d 708 (1985). 
175 603 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
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not file a formal complaint with university personnel. The 
assistant died of a drug overdose, allegedly related to the 
harassment. The court found that sexual harassment could 
violate rights protected by the equal protection clause 
because harassment was "the sort of invidious gender 
discrimination that the equal protection clause 
forbade."176 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Bohen 
v. Citv of East Chicago177 approved the use of the equal 
protection clause to support a claim of sexual harassment. 
In Bohen. a female fire dispatcher alleged that she had 
suffered numerous incidents of harassment by supervisory 
personnel and that these incidents represented the accepted 
practice of the department. In fact, the employee had been 
warned of sexually oppressive working conditions in her 
hiring interview. The court held that under the equal 
protection clause the employee had only to establish 
intentional discrimination, not that the harassment had 
altered the conditions of employment. The court held in 
favor of the fire dispatcher.178 
176 Id. at 1332. 
177 799 F.2d 1180 (1986). 
178 Id. 
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Although there are several states that have sexual 
harassment statutes,179 most states depend upon state 
fair employment practice statutes to enforce sexual 
harassment claims. These and other alternative state 
statutes vary from state to state. Although many state fair 
employment practices statutes are often interpreted by the 
courts in conformity with Title VII and EEOC guidelines when 
determining the merits of a sexual harassment claim, state 
courts considering harassment under state law are not bound 
by federal court decisions interpreting Title VII. The more 
closely the wording of the state fair employment practices 
law follows Title VII or the EEOC guidelines, the more 
likely it is that state courts will use Title VII precedent 
in interpreting the state law.180 Given these 
discrepancies and variances, it may be useful to provide a 
chart (Figure 1) outlining legal avenues that have been used 
successfully by victims of sexual harassment to remedy their 
situations.181 
179 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 45 Am Jur 2d § 779, 703. 
180 45 A Am Jur 2d § 779, 702-3. 
181 Adapted from "Section 4- Legal Issues,'• Who's Hurt 
and Who's Liable: Sexual Harassment in Massachusetts 
Schools. A Curriculum Guide for School Personnel. 1986, 17-
2 2 .  
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Table 1. Description of Legal Remedies Used 
in Sexual Harassment Cases 
Legal Brief Types of Length of Problems/ 
Remedy Descript'n Benefits Time Limits 
Title VII Federal Monetary Six months Applies 
legislat'n compensa­ to one to 
prohibit'g tion for year on workplace 
sex back pay, the state with at 
discrimin­ lost level; 2-3 least 15 
ation in benefits, years employees 
employm't; & punitive federally 
file with damages; 
state and possible 
appeal via job rein­
EEOC statement 
Title IX Federal Cut-off of Varies Right to 
legislat'n federal regionally private 
prohibit'g funds to could be action; 
sex ed. 1-2 years employm't 
discrimin­ institut'n covered. 
ation in and Sexual 
education; compensa­ harassm't 
file with tory a form of 
ED-OCR; damages sex 
also a are discrimin 
private available at ion 
right of 
action 
Criminal Varies Conviction Approxi­ Victim 
Child state by and/or mately one compensa­
Abuse state; imprison­ year tion 
Statutes usually ment of varies by 
includes abuser state. 
abuse, Convicted 
neglect, adults 
assault of could 
minors by possibly 
adults retain 
their 
employm't 
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Criminal Varies Conviction Approxi­ A women's 
Rape state by and/or mately one sexual 
Statutes state; imprison­ year history 
some ment of can be 
include harasser admitted; 
degrees of rapist Often 
sexual sentences 
assault suspended 
Other Assault, Conviction Approxi­ Similar 
Criminal battery of mately one to rape 
Sanctions and other 
criminal 
charges; 
varies 
state by 
state 
harasser; 
fines or 
imprison­
ment 
year charges 
Civil Breach of Punitive Approxi­ Must hire 
Lawsuit contract; damages; mately 2-3 a private 
various compensa­ years attorney. 
tort tion for However 
lawsuits employment legal 
based on losses, fees may 
common physical/ be 
laws emotional 
injury 
awarded 
by the 
court 
Worker Offers Weekly Depends on Usually 
Compensa­ benefits wage & locale; awarded 
tion Act for injury benefits nearer for 
sustained based on urban area physical 
on job. percent of 3-6 months injury; 
Operates income for with woman 
via State period of appeal must get 
Division disability taking 6 medical 
of and/or months to or 
Industrial medical one year psychia­
Accidents benefits longer tric 
evaluat'n 
Occupa­ Federal Employer Greatly Applies 
tional Act which fined for varies to 
Safety guarantees violations workplace 
and a "safe with at 
Health and least 15 
Act healthful 
workplace" 
employees 
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Summary 
The courts have made great strides over the last 
several years interpreting sexual harassment claims under 
both federal and state statutes. They have evolved from an 
attitude of sexual harassment being a "personal problem" to 
defining two distinct types of sexual harassment. They are 
holding employers responsible for sexual harassment in the 
workplace and providing monetary damages when employers are 
found to be liable. In addition, students also now have a 
way to seek compensatory relief under Title IX. Sexual 
harassment is a problem that educational administrators 
should not take lightly. 
Sexual harassment is illegal. Employers need to comply 
with procedural requirements and provide prompt and adequate 
responses after complaints are received. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES 
FROM MERITOR1 TO FRANKLIN2 
Introduction 
Information about what influences the outcomes of 
sexual harassment cases would be of practical use to both 
potential complainants and potential defendants. It would 
allow potential complainants to review their cases and 
decide whether to file formal charges, but more importantly, 
for potential defendants like school administrators, it 
would aid organizations in deciding whether to contest the 
charges or settle out of court.3 Therefore this chapter 
details the outcomes of 34 federal appellate court cases 
between 1986 and 1992 with respect to seven specific 
variables. 
David Terpstra and Douglas Baker conducted a study that 
examined the influence of nine characteristics on the 
outcomes of 81 sexual harassment charges filed with the 
Illinois State Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
1 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 
(1986). 
2 Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, 112 S. Ct 1028 
(1992) . 
3 David E. Terpstra and Douglas D. Baker, "Outcomes of 
Federal Court Decisions on Sexual Harassment," Academy of 
Management Journal 35 (March 1992): 181. 
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Agency over a two year period. Case characteristics that 
were related to the courts decisions were: (1) the severity 
of the behavior involved; (2) the frequency of the 
harassment; (3) the status of the harasser; (4) the severity 
of the job related consequences; (5) the presence of 
witnesses; (6) the existence of documentation; (7) whether 
complainants had notified their organizations of the 
harassment before filing charges; (8) managements reasons 
for adverse employment consequences; and, (9) whether the 
organization had taken investigative or remedial action when 
notified of a problem.4 
Later, Terpstra and Baker conducted another study that 
examined the influence of these nine characteristics on the 
outcomes of federal court cases involving sexual harassment. 
The purpose of their second study was to assess the 
generalizability of their earlier findings. Of the nine 
characteristics studied, five were found to be significant. 
Complainants were more likely to win their cases if the 
harassment was severe, witnesses and documentation supported 
their cases, they had given notice to management before 
filing their complaints, and their organizations took no 
action.5 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 185. 
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Since the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor. courts 
have decided numerous cases involving sexual harassment. 
Most of these cases involve allegations of hostile 
environment rather than quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
Quid pro quo sexual harassment cases often present such 
egregious factual situations that the employer frequently 
resolves the situation before it reaches a court. 
Therefore, the case law tends to focus on whether the 
plaintiff has established sexual harassment under the 
criteria set forth in Meritor and, if so, whether the 
employer should be held liable. Following the Supreme 
Court's advice on the liability issue, the courts have 
applied agency principles in making their determination.6 
Since many very strong or very weak cases either never 
reach the courtroom or are settled satisfactorily in the 
district courts, the appellate courts often must decide 
those cases which involve complex convoluted issues and are 
less clear cut. Therefore, the federal courts of appeals 
seemed like the likely place to examine the principles of 
agency. 
Six of the elements found by Terpstra and Baker to be 
influential in their studies were used in this analysis to 
determine if these characteristics also apply to the 
6 Naomi Gittins, "Developments in Case Law Since 
Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson," Sexual Harassment in the 
Schools; Preventing and Defending Against Claims 
(Alexandria: National School Boards Association, 1990): 13. 
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outcomes of federal appellate cases from Meritor in 1986 to 
Franklin in 1992. These characteristics included: (1) the 
severity of the alleged harassing conduct, which was judged 
to be severe if it included sexual assault, unwanted 
physical contact of a sexual nature, or sexual propositions 
linked to threats or promises of a change in the 
individual's conditions of employment; (2) the freguency or 
continuity of the harassing actions, which was judged to be 
frequent if the number of occasions on which the sexual 
harassment occurred was three or more; (3) the existence of 
corroborating witnesses, and (4) the existence of supporting 
documentation were combined into one category called simply 
corroborating support; (5) the notification to the 
organization of the problem; (6) the response of management 
to the report of sexual harassment. A seventh 
characteristic, the circuit in which the appeal was heard, 
was also included to determine whether a balance of findings 
existed across the nation. 
Following are short summaries of sexual harassment 
decisions issued by the federal courts of appeals from 
Meritor to Franklin. They are categorized according to the 
prevailing party and by circuit. The plan of organization 
is centered around three major areas: the facts, the 
decision, and the rationale.7 
7 H. C. Hudgins and Richard S. Vacca. Law and Education 
(Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1985), 51. 
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The facts. Who are the parties to the case? Who is 
suing whom? What factual situation occurred that 
precipitated a suit? On what does the plaintiff base 
(her) case? What is the defendant's response? 
The decision. What is the court's actual decision? 
The rationale. What are the reasons for the 
decision?8 
Each case is discussed with these major areas in mind 
in order to provide examples of the types of actions which 
may be considered by the courts to constitute sexual 
harassment, and the rationale for determining the liability 
of the employer. A map9 of the federal circuit 
jurisdictions is provided in addition to Table 2 which 
depicts a crosswalk of the seven characteristics examined in 
each case. 
Figure 1. Map of the Federal Circuit Jurisdictions 
• MKM< 
FEDERAL 
8 Ibid 
9 H.C. Hudgins and Richard S. Vacca. Law and Education 
(Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1985), 13. 
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Table 2. Crosswalk of Important Variables Used to 
Determine Federal Appellate Case Outcomes 
and to Predict Future Case Outcomes 
Case Cir Dec Fre Sev Corr Rep Rsp 
Liosett 1 P V >/ V 
Morcran 1 D y V V 
Moire 2 D V 
Andrews 3 D V 
Pfeiffer 3 P V J y 
Paroline 4 P y J 
Swentek 4 D V V V 4 
Dwver 4 D V V 
Wverick 5 P V V V 
Waltman 5 P y V V V 
Jones 5 D y V 
Bennett 5 D V V •J 
Dornhecker 5 D V y V 
Yates 6 P y V V 
Hicrhlander 6 D V J 
Rabidue 6 D V v' V V 
Bohen 7 P V V V V 
Gilardi 7 P V V V 
Volk 7 P V V V V 
Brooms 7 P V V V 
Scott 7 D V 
Swanson 7 D V 
Dockter 7 D 
Guess 7 D V >/ 
Hall 8 P V V V V 
Jones 8 P V V 
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Movlan 8 D >/ 
Ellison 9 P V 
EEOC 9 P V J 
Jordan 9 D V V 
Hicks 10 D V V 
Ebert 10 D V V 
Sparks 11 P V V V 
Steele 11 D 
The name of the appellate court case 
The circuit in which the appellate court resides 
The winning decision 
P = Plaintiff 
D = Defendant 
The sexual harassment was frequent 
The sexual harassment was severe 
Corroborating witness or documentation was available 
The incident was reported to management 
Management responded promptly and adequately 
Decisions for the Plaintiff 
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico10 
In Lipsett. the plaintiff was discharged from a medical 
residency program because she did not react favorably to her 
professor's requests to go out for drinks, his compliments 
about her hair and legs, or to questions about her personal 
and romantic life. These gestures were commonly accompanied 
by thinly veiled statements suggesting that the defendant 
was in a position to make things go favorably for the 
plaintiff if she acquiesced. The plaintiff was also 
subjected to comments from others in the program asserting 
Key: 
Case = 
Cir = 
Dec = 
Fre = 
Sev = 
Corr = 
Rep = 
Rsp = 
10 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). 
157 
that she should not be in the program because she was 
female. Since the University of Puerto Rico knew of the 
harassment, they were held responsible. The lower court had 
held that since the plaintiff admittedly responded favorably 
to these flattering comments, there was no way anyone could 
consider them as unwelcome. However, the First Circuit 
Court disagreed saying that an initial favorable response 
does not constitute a continued welcomeness. The appellate 
court stated that the man must be sensitive to signals from 
the woman that his conduct is unwelcome. 
Pfeiffer v. School Board for Marion Center Area^ 
The Pfeiffer case, discussed at length in Chapter III, 
involved a female high school student who became pregnant 
and was dismissed from the National Honor Society. In this 
case, the school contended that Pfeiffer had been dismissed 
because she had engaged in pre-marital sex, not because she 
was pregnant, which would have been a clear violation of 
Title IX. However, the school had never dismissed a male 
from the Society for engaging in pre-marital sex. 
The Third Circuit Court ruled that the lower court had 
made an error in excluding pertinent evidence, which was the 
testimony of a male member of the National Honor Society who 
had impregnated his girlfriend and was not dismissed. The 
11 917 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
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appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court and 
remanded the case for consideration of compensatory relief 
which it ruled was available under Title IX. This case set 
the stage for the 1992 Supreme Court ruling in Franklin. 
Paroline v. Unisys Corp12 
Paroline was hired as a word processor at Unisys in the 
fall of 1986. During her job interview, Moore, the 
defendant supervisor, asked her what she would do if 
subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. Soon after 
Paroline started work, Moore began to make sexually 
suggestive remarks to her that she considered offensive. 
In January 1987, Paroline accepted a ride home with Moore 
during a severe snowstorm. During the car ride, he made 
remarks, kissed her and repeatedly tried to hold her hand. 
When they reached the plaintiff's apartment, Moore insisted 
on coming in despite Paroline's objections. In the 
apartment, Moore grabbed Paroline and began kissing her and 
rubbing his hands up and down her back, ignoring her demands 
that he stop. Eventually she persuaded him to leave. When 
Paroline informed the head of her office of the incident, he 
told her that he knew of previous complaints about sexual 
harassment in the office and assured her that it would not 
happen again. Unisys launched an official investigation of 
12 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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Moore's behavior after which Moore was disciplined. The 
company issued a written notice to Moore that any 
recurrences of his behavior or any retaliatory conduct would 
be grounds for immediate termination. He was instructed to 
seek counseling and to limit contact with female employees 
to official company business. Unisys also terminated his 
access to the company's intelligence facility. Unisys 
notified the plaintiff of the actions taken against Moore at 
the end of January, but she considered those actions 
inadequate since Moore had allegedly sexually harassed other 
female workers and the company's previous warnings had 
failed to deter him. In addition, revoking Moore's access 
to the intelligence area left Moore in Paroline's work area 
even more than before the complaint. Paroline resigned two 
weeks later. 
In reversing the district court's grant of summary 
judgement for the supervisor, the Fourth Circuit Court found 
that Paroline had produced enough evidence to establish that 
Moore exercised sufficient supervisory authority over her to 
qualify as an employer under Title VII. The supervisory 
employee need not have the ultimate power to hire and fire 
as long as he has significant input into such personnel 
decisions. Even if the employee is not the plaintiff's 
designated supervisor, as long as the company's management 
approves or acquiesces in the employee's exercise of 
supervisory control over the plaintiff, that employee will 
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hold "employer" status for Title VII purposes. The court 
noted that the power to determine work assignments often 
represents a key element of supervisory authority. 
The Fourth Circuit in Paroline adopted a dual standard 
to determine whether the harassment was sufficiently severe 
or pervasive. The plaintiff must first demonstrate that the 
harassment interfered with her ability to perform her work 
or significantly affected her psychological well-being, and 
second, that the harassment would interfere with the work 
performance or significantly affect the psychological well-
being of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. 
The court found that both standards had been met. 
On the question of the company's liability for Moore's 
activities, the Fourth Circuit noted that in a hostile 
environment claim, an employer is liable for one employee's 
sexual harassment of another worker if the employer had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a 
sexually hostile working environment and took no prompt and 
adequate remedial action. The court also accepted the 
theory that liability can be imputed to the employer on the 
ground that where it has notice of the harasser's prior 
conduct toward other female employees, the employer should 
know of the likelihood of the individual harassing other 
female employees, and therefore, it has a duty to take 
adequate steps to try to prevent future harassment. 
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In this case there was evidence that prior warnings had not 
deterred Moore and that the head of the office had openly 
joked about the complaints of harassment after ostensibly 
having warned male employees not to engage in the harassment 
of women.13 
Wverick v. Bayou Steel Corporation14 
In Wverick. the plaintiff, a female crane operator, 
brought a sexual harassment suit under Louisiana state law. 
The court noted that the Louisiana courts have determined 
that the state statute is similar in scope to Title VII, and 
therefore, the court looks to the criteria under the federal 
statute to determine whether a plaintiff has asserted a 
cause of action for sexual discrimination. 
Wyerick claimed that she was subjected to a hostile 
working environment when she became the target of numerous 
sexual comments by coworkers and supervisors after she 
complained about the quality of emergency care she received 
when she had experienced chest pain and shortness of breath 
while working. Her treatment had included an examination by 
a male emergency medical technician and an 
electrocardiogram, during which it was necessary for her to 
remove her blouse. The plaintiff made four reports to 
13 Gittins, 13-15. 
14 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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company management about the sexual comments. The company 
acknowledged that it was aware of the comments and that 
immediate action would be taken to halt them. The company 
monitored the radio for sexually harassing comments and 
asked the plaintiff to report any future comments made to 
her by male employees. There was, however, no evidence that 
the employees who made the remarks were contacted by Bayou 
Steel or that management took any affirmative steps to 
remedy the situation. 
The Fifth Circuit Court reversed the district court's 
judgement for the employer on several grounds. The appeals 
court ruled that the district court made a mistake in 
finding that the sexual conduct was as offensive to men as 
it was to women workers and therefore, the conduct was not 
based on sex. The appeals court pointed out that the 
conduct complained of consisted of highly personalized, lewd 
statements and gestures regarding the plaintiff's breasts 
and the physical examination that she underwent. Therefore, 
by its nature, the remarks could not be said to be equally 
offensive to both men and women. The Fifth Circuit also 
held that summary judgement should not have been granted 
since the question of welcomeness should have been committed 
to the trier of fact in this case. The district court also 
held that the plaintiff was barred as a matter of law from 
maintaining a claim for hostile environment because her work 
atmosphere as a whole was heavily charged with sexual 
163 
comments and gestures. The appeals court said that such 
environments are the very core of the hostile environment 
theory.15 
Waltman v. International Paper16 
In Waltman. the plaintiff worked in the powerhouse of 
the mill on the "B" shift. The first instance of sexual 
harassment occurred in the Spring of 1982 when another 
employee broadcast obscenities over the loudspeaker that 
were directed at Waltman. In response, other employees 
began making suggestive remarks to Waltman. Waltman 
complained to her supervisor who said he would take care of 
it. A foreman told the broadcaster to stop, but the 
employee was not punished and no note of the incident was 
placed in his employment file. 
In September, Waltman was moved to the "A" shift. 
While there, Waltman's supervisor and his assistant urged 
Waltman to have sex with a co-worker. On several occasions 
her supervisor touched her in an offensive manner and made 
sexually suggestive remarks to Waltman. During her tenure 
on the "A" shift, Waltman received over thirty pornographic 
notes in her locker. There were explicit drawings of women 
15 Gittins, 15-16 
16 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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in the restrooms, on the walls of the powerhouse, and in the 
elevators. Employees displayed sexually oriented calendars 
on their lockers, as well as hung used tampons from them. 
In October of 1983, Waltman reported these incidents to 
one of the managers. The manager did not discipline anyone 
nor did he investigate Waltman's claims. Rather, he 
transferred Waltman to another shift. 
Waltman was warned to keep her mouth shut and one 
employee told Waltman he would cut off her breast and shove 
it down her throat. Eventually, as a result of the constant 
harassment, Waltman became ill. Although many meetings took 
place to discuss Waltman's allegations, no substantial 
changes were made. Waltman finally resigned and filed 
charges with the EEOC. 
The Fifth Circuit Court overturned the district court's 
judgement for the employer finding that there was a 
continuing violation of the law at the mill and held the 
employer responsible. 
Yates v. Avco17 
In Yates v. Avco. two secretaries charged that their 
supervisor had sexually harassed them by creating a hostile 
working environment. The supervisor's harassment included 
such acts as closing the door whenever one of the 
17 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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plaintiff's entered his office, discussion of personal 
matters with them, numerous invitations for drinks or meals, 
inviting himself to one of the plaintiff's home, comments on 
the plaintiffs' appearance, lewd references to parts of 
their bodies, dirty jokes, frequent sexually suggestive 
comments, mentioning sleeping together, telling one 
plaintiff that she was on his mistress list, and calling one 
of the plaintiff's into his office for the purpose of 
watching her walk out at which time he would make groaning 
sounds. 
When the plaintiffs complained about the supervisor's 
conduct, their employer asked that they not file a complaint 
with the EEOC. The employer conducted an investigation that 
ultimately found that the supervisor had harassed the 
plaintiffs. He was demoted and given a salary cut. 
However, the company refused to give the secretaries copies 
of tapes that contained statements they had made in 
connection with the company's investigation, declined to 
give the complainants written assurance of job protection 
and refused to correct the plaintiffs' personnel files to 
explain their long absences during the course of the 
investigation. During the investigation, the employer had 
allowed the accused supervisor to take administrative leave 
but forced the two secretaries to use their sick leave. 
The Sixth Circuit Court found that there was no 
question that the supervisor had harassed the two 
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secretaries and that the sexual advances were unwelcome. 
The court focused instead on the question of whether the 
company should be held responsible for the supervisor's 
acts. The court cited the Supreme Court decision in Meritor 
which held that an employer cannot be held strictly liable 
for harassment by a supervisor and that agency principles 
should be applied. The Sixth Circuit found in this case 
that the employer should be held liable given that its 
sexual harassment policy was vague and ineffective. The 
policy provided for that an employee should report 
harassment to the immediate supervisor who then would be 
responsible for reporting and correcting the harassment. 
However, the policy failed to provide an alternative for 
those instances where the supervisor is the harasser. The 
court also implied that any sexual harassment is 
foreseeable; otherwise, employers would not have policies 
against it.18 
Bohen v. City of East Chicago19 
In Bohen. an Hispanic female fire department dispatcher 
brought suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging violation of 
her equal protection rights based on the harassment to which 
she was subjected by her immediate supervisor and other fire 
18 Gittins, 16. 
19 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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fighters. The plaintiff's supervisor committed such acts as 
touching the plaintiff's crotch, talking to her constantly 
about sex, including his preferred positions, plaintiff's 
participation, and his expectations for her behavior, 
rubbing his pelvis against the plaintiff's buttocks, 
touching her with his leg while she was sitting, and forcing 
her to leave the bathroom door open. The other fire 
fighters harassed the plaintiff by making obscene comments, 
describing sexual fantasies about the plaintiff, constantly 
inviting the plaintiff to engage in deviate sexual conduct 
and implying that the plaintiff was a lesbian because she 
did not respond to them. Her captain told her that being 
forcibly raped in the bushes would improve her disposition. 
When the plaintiff complained, no action was taken. 
The fire department did not have a written policy against 
sexual harassment even though fire officials knew of the 
sexually oppressive working conditions. There was evidence 
that the department considered the abusive environment to be 
the problem of women employees. 
In ruling in the plaintiff's favor, the Seventh Circuit 
Court held that sexual harassment by a state employer 
constitutes sex discrimination in violation of the equal 
protection clause and is actionable under § 1983. Creating 
abusive conditions for female employees but not for male 
employees is discriminatory and the type of conduct 
prohibited by the equal protection clause. 
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The court held that the city is liable even for 
informal actions if they reflect a general policy, custom or 
pattern of official conduct which even tacitly encourages 
conduct depriving citizens of their constitutional rights. 
In this case, the management officials knew of a pattern of 
sexual harassment in the fire department and chose not to 
address the issue. The case was remanded for determination 
of damages.20 
Gilardi v. Schroeder21 
In Gilardi, the Seventh Circuit Court ruled that the 
owner of a trucking company discriminated against a female 
office clerk on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII 
when he drugged and raped her at his home and then fired her 
at the insistence of his wife. There was also evidence that 
he often boasted that he would have sex with any woman, used 
a note pad with a sexual drawing to instruct female 
employees, talked about sexual intercourse and group sex 
with female employees, patted female employees on the 
buttocks and asked them if they wore bras. He repeatedly 
brought up sexual topics with the plaintiff, made comments 
about her breasts, patted her on the buttocks and placed his 
hand between her thighs. 
20 Gittins, 16-17. 
21 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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The court found the defendant in violation of Title VII 
since his sexual advances were not only unwelcome, but he 
also had sex with the plaintiff without her consent. In 
addition, the court also upheld damage awards for the 
plaintiff's state law claims of battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.22 
Volk v. Coler23 
In Volk. the plaintiff was a child abuse outreach 
worker. She alleged that she was sexually harassed by her 
immediate supervisor. The harassment consisted of such acts 
as persistent social invitations, overtly offensive sexual 
touching, explicit sexual gestures, calling the plaintiff 
such names as "honey" or "babe," several sexually offensive 
advances and questioning plaintiff about personal issues 
during a promotion interview. When the plaintiff rebuffed 
her supervisor's suggestions and advances, he treated her 
abruptly and ignored his responsibilities with respect to 
her cases. He also complained that the plaintiff and a 
female co-worker spent too much time together and suggested 
that they were "queer." The plaintiff was also denied a 
promotion in favor of a male candidate who scored lower on a 
written test and had less experience than the plaintiff. 
22 Gittins, 17-18. 
23 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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The plaintiff also alleged that the supervisor's 
harassment extended to three other female employees who were 
subjected to offensive touching and sexual gestures and were 
called inappropriate names. The supervisor also made 
numerous degrading remarks about other female employees. 
After the plaintiff filed a grievance, the labor 
relations administrator concluded that the supervisor's 
actions were improper, and if true, would be hard to defend. 
However, the grievance was ultimately denied. After the 
plaintiff was transferred against her wishes to another 
office, she filed a second grievance that also failed. 
In her suit the plaintiff asserted violations of her 
rights under the egual protection clause and under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Seventh Circuit Court 
held that the equal protection clause prohibits the employer 
from creating working conditions abusive toward women and 
that liability for sexual harassment amounting to sexual 
discrimination under the equal protection clause has been 
found where a female employee was subjected to "repeated 
crude sexual advances and suggestive comments" despite her 
explicit rejection. Under the equal protection clause, the 
plaintiff need not prove that all women were discriminated 
against; it is enough to show that the plaintiff alone was 
harasses because of her sex.2^ 
24 Gittins, 18. 
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Brooms v. Reaal Tube Company25 
In Brooms. The plaintiff, a black female industrial 
nurse, sued her employer, its parent company and her 
supervisor for subjecting her to racial and sexual 
harassment. Brooms brought a Title VII sexual harassment 
claim when she alleged that during her sixteen months of 
employment, her supervisor made numerous explicit sexual 
remarks. Although she protested or attempted to ignore his 
advances and sexual commentary, he persisted. 
After Brooms wrote a letter to the company's vice 
president and to the parent company's vice president of 
human resources, an independent investigator was hired who 
determined that Brooms had been straightforward and honest 
about the incidents. The vice president then made the 
supervisor apologize to Brooms, postponed his merit salary 
increase and warned him that he would be fired if the 
conduct occurred again. 
After this meeting, the supervisor informed the 
plaintiff that he was not afraid of the vice president and 
after several weeks resumed his offensive comments. This 
time his conduct also included showing Brooms a pornographic 
photograph depicting an interracial act of sodomy and told 
her that the photo showed the "talent" of a black woman and 
that she had been hired for the purpose indicated in the 
25 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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photo. Brooms then filed a charge of discrimination with 
the state department of human rights and the EEOC. A few 
months later, the supervisor again showed Brooms another 
racist pornographic picture involving bestiality and told 
her that the picture showed how she "was going to end up." 
As she tried to grab the photo, the supervisor grabbed her 
arm and threatened to kill her if she moved. She threw 
coffee on him and ran away, screaming and falling down a 
flight of stairs as she fled. She did not return to work 
after this incident but remained on the company's payroll 
for two months. 
In upholding the district court's ruling for the 
plaintiff on her Title VII sexual harassment claim, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed the standard set 
forth in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, that a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that she has experienced "unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature which was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's 
employment and create an abusive working environment."26 
In determining the company's liability for the 
supervisor's actions, the appellate court did not address 
the district court's grounds that the supervisor was a 
manager of the company and his acts were the acts of the 
26 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
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corporation, but instead upheld the lower court's other 
basis for liability that the company knew of the problem but 
failed to take appropriate action. 
Although the plaintiff did not allege constructive 
discharge in connection with her Title VII claim, the 
appeals court nevertheless approved the lower court's 
finding that Brooms had in fact proved that she had been 
constructively discharged and therefore was entitled to back 
2 7  pay.* ' 
Hall v. Gus Construction Company28 
Hall involved a claim under Title VII brought by three 
female traffic flaggers who alleged that they were subjected 
to a sexually hostile environment at the road construction 
site where they worked. The harassment committed by some of 
the male crew members included such things as referring to 
women as "fucking flag girls," calling one of the flaggers 
"herpes" and writing offensive names such as "cavern cunt" 
and "blond bitch" on the plaintiff's cars. The male crew 
members also repeatedly asked that the plaintiffs engage in 
sexual intercourse and oral sex. The men also physically 
harassed the plaintiffs by rubbing the women's thighs and 
grabbing their breasts. Some of the crew members exposed 
27 Gittins, 18-19. 
28 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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their buttocks or genitals to the plaintiffs and flashed 
obscene pictures at them. Someone also urinated in one of 
the plaintiff's water bottle and gas tank. The mechanic 
refused to fix the plaintiff's pilot truck when it leaked 
carbon monoxide fumes. The plaintiff's were denied use of a 
vehicle to make trips to town for bathroom breaks, thus 
forcing them to relieve themselves in a ditch in view of the 
male crew members. 
When the plaintiff's complained to the job foreman, he 
talked to the crew members, but the harassment soon resumed. 
The foreman also observed some of the incidents but did 
nothing. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that 
plaintiffs may establish sexual harassment in violation of 
Title VII by showing that sexual conduct has the purpose or 
effect of unreasonably interfering with work performance or 
creating an intimidating hostile environment. However, the 
predicate acts underlying a sexual harassment claim need not 
be clearly sexual in nature. A court may correctly consider 
incidents of harassment and unequal treatment that would not 
have occurred but for the fact that the plaintiffs are 
women. 
On the issue of employer liability, the court held that 
an employer may be held liable for the conduct of a 
plaintiff's fellow workers, if management knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known about a 
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barrage of offensive conduct and did nothing about it. In 
this case, the job foreman as an agent of the company had 
both actual and constructive notice of the harassment. The 
court found that the incidents were so numerous that the 
foreman and the company were liable for failing to take 
remedial steps to end it.29 
Jones v. Wesco Investment. Inc.30 
In Jones, the plaintiff was a receptionist who was 
promoted to the position of office manager. She alleged 
that her employer, the president of the company, sexually 
harassed her in violation of Title VII. The president made 
repeated sexual advances toward her, requested sexual favors 
and engaged in verbal and physical conduct of a sexual 
nature with her. His conduct included such acts as rubbing 
his hands up and down the sides of her body, touching her 
breasts, pinching her, patting her buttocks, kissing the top 
of her head, putting his hand up her dress on the outside of 
her thigh, telling the plaintiff that one day her breasts 
would be his, telling the plaintiff to spend more time in 
the kitchen because he could see her nipples better in cool 
temperature, asking the plaintiff to accompany him to 
unoccupied apartment buildings ostensibly for advice on 
29 Gittins, 19-20. 
30 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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decorating the apartments, putting his arm around the 
plaintiff and once kissing her on the lips. 
The Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's 
judgement in favor of the plaintiff.31 
E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel32 
The EEOC brought this employment discrimination action 
on behalf of several Hispanic maids employed by Hacienda 
Hotel. The suit charged Hacienda with sexual harassment, 
terminations based on pregnancy, failure to accommodate 
religious beliefs, and retaliation for opposing 
discriminatory practices. With respect to the sexual 
harassment claim the EEOC alleged that the Hacienda Hotel 
had created a hostile working environment by the conduct of 
the chief of engineering and the executive housekeeper who 
was female. The chief of engineering made numerous crude 
and disparaging remarks regarding the pregnancy of three of 
the maids and subjected them to sexually offensive remarks 
in the presence of the executive housekeeper who merely 
laughed. The head housekeeper also made disparaging remarks 
about the pregnancies of several of the maids referring to 
them a "dogs," "whores," or "sluts." The engineering chief 
also threatened one of the maids that he would have her 
31 Gittins, 20. 
32 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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fired if she did not submit to his sexual advances. He 
regularly offered another maid money and an apartment, if 
she would give him her body and assured her that she would 
never be fired if she had sex with him. At least one of the 
maids complained to the hotel's general manager and her 
union representative about the sexually offensive comments, 
but the situation did not improve. Each of the maids 
eventually filed a complaint with the EEOC. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court's determination that the harassment was sufficiently 
severe and pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions 
of employment and to create a sexually hostile work 
environment. As to employer liability, the court ruled that 
employers may be held liable for failing to remedy or 
prevent a hostile or offensive work environment known to the 
management level employee. In this case the hotel manager 
had direct knowledge and failed to take prompt and adequate 
action. The court rejected the employer's argument that the 
complainants' failure to pursue internal remedies insulated 
the employer from liability.33 
33 Gittins, 20-21. 
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Ellison v. Bradv34 
In Ellison, a female revenue agent for the Internal 
Revenue Service received a series of strange love letters 
from a male co-worker. Believing that her grievances had 
not been satisfactorily resolved, Ellison filed a formal 
complaint alleging sexual harassment. Although the IRS 
investigator agreed that Ellison was being sexually 
harassed, the Treasury Department rejected Ellison's 
complaint because it did not describe a pattern of sexual 
harassment covered by EEOC regulations. 
The Ninth Circuit Court reversed the lower court's 
decision of summary judgement to the Secretary of the 
Treasury by setting forth the "reasonable woman" theory 
which enforces the acknowledgement of the effects of sexual 
harassment on a female victim. The female employee states a 
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment 
when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would 
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of employment. 
Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers. Inc.35 
In Sparks the plaintiff was a billing clerk and general 
secretary. She alleged that her supervisor, the terminal 
34 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
35 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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manager, created a sexually hostile working environment in 
violation of Title VII and that she had been discharges on 
the basis of sex as a result of quid pro quo harassment. 
The supervisor had engaged in such behavior as rubbing the 
plaintiff's shoulders, touching and smelling her hair, 
making repeated sexual remarks to her, making repeated 
inquiries about the plaintiff's personal life, making 
threatening remarks, and making at least one remark the 
district court characterized as "too sexually explicit" to 
repeat. When the plaintiff called in sick and did not 
report to work, she was fired the next day while a male 
employee who also did not report to work the same day 
because of illness was not discharged. 
There was no evidence that the plaintiff had notified 
any superior about the harassment, but there was also no 
evidence that the employer had a policy against sexual 
harassment or an effective grievance procedure. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court reversed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgement to the defendant. The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the trial court had erroneously applied 
the respondeat superior doctrine to determine the employer's 
liability. The appeals court stated that respondeat 
superior does not apply where the supervisor is the 
employer's agent. The EEOC has determined that a supervisor 
is an agent of the employer for Title VII purposes, if the 
supervisor exercises authority actually delegated to him by 
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his employer by making or threatening to make decisions 
affecting the employment status of a subordinate. This 
usually applies in a quid pro quo case, but the court 
applied it here, since the evidence showed that the 
supervisor used his delegated authority to assist him in 
harassing the plaintiff. 
The court also found that the harassment was 
sufficiently persistent and severe to satisfy the Meritor 
requirement that the conduct must seriously affect the 
plaintiff's psychological well-being.36 
Decisions for the Employer 
Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hospital37 
A black male who was a former hospital employee brought 
a civil rights action against the hospital asserting claims 
for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliatory 
discharge. 
The conduct that was the subject of the male hospital 
employee's claims of harassment involved another male, 
purportedly homosexual co-worker. The court ruled that the 
harassment was neither sufficiently severe nor adequately 
pervasive to be actionable under Title VII. 
36 Gittins, 21. 
37 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990). 
181 
The employee alleged only that the co-worker stood 
behind him and bumped him, that the co-worker looked at his 
"privates" in the restroom, and the co-worker "hung around 
him a lot." The only other event complained of was that the 
co-worker asked the plaintiff to dance at hospital Christmas 
party. 
The First Circuit Court found that the allegations 
concerning homosexual advances by a co-worker did not 
involve the type of conduct that could serve as basis for 
Title VII claim since the situation was not sufficiently 
severe "to alter the conditions of the victim's employment 
and create an abusive working environment." 
• O O 
Moire v. Temple-10 
In Moire, a female physician brought a civil rights 
action against the medical school and the supervisor of her 
psychiatric clerkship program at a private clinic alleging 
that the defendants illegally conspired against her and gave 
her a failing grade because of her sex, necessitating that 
she repeat her third year of medical school. The Second 
Circuit Court upheld the trial court's decision that the 
medical student failed to establish that the supervisor at 
the private clinic sexually harassed her or sanctioned a 
38 800 F.2d 1136 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
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harassing environment at the clinic. Therefore, the student 
failed to establish her claims against both the supervisor 
and the medical school under the fourteenth Amendment and 
Title IX. 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia-*J 
Female police officers claiming sexual discrimination 
and harassment filed action against their employer and 
supervisors for violations of federal employment 
discrimination and civil rights laws and for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The district court 
entered a judgement for the plaintiffs as to their Civil 
Rights Act § 1983 claim against supervisors and found for 
the defendant employer on the Title VII claims. 
The Third Circuit Court held that the supervisors 
either acquiesced in discrimination or directly participated 
in such discrimination but that the employer could not be 
held liable under § 1983 because there was no proof that the 
employer directed or had actual knowledge and acquiesced in 
the harassment. 
39 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
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Swentek v. USAir. Inc40 
In Swentek. The plaintiff, a flight attendant, alleged 
that she was sexually harassed by a 2 0-year pilot who was 
not the plaintiff's supervisor. She claimed that the pilot 
made obscene comments, embarrassed her in front of an FFA 
official with a nonsexual prank, disparaged her age and 
weight, jumped in front of her at a hotel to "check out" the 
legs of a registration clerk, exposed himself to her, 
reached under the plaintiff's skirt and grabbed the 
plaintiff's genital area, threatened to delay the 
plaintiff's by withholding her name from the flight logbook, 
dropped to his knees and sniffed her when they were 
introduced, made taunting remarks about the plaintiff's off 
duty attire, attempted to block the plaintiff's way through 
doors at the airport and made obscene phone calls to her. 
She also alleged that another pilot grabbed her breasts and 
told her it was a greeting from the first pilot. The 
defendant denied all of these acts and presented evidence 
that the plaintiff was vindictive, that she threatened 
lawsuits against coworkers for real or imagined slights, 
that she used foul language, frequently talked about sex, 
placed a sexual object in her supervisor's mailbox, urinated 
in a cup and passed it to someone as a drink, grabbed the 
40 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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genitals of another pilot and invited him to have sex. The 
plaintiff denied all of these acts. 
When the plaintiff complained, her employer 
investigated the allegations and issued a letter of 
reprimand to the pilot and informed him that he would be 
suspended if another complaint was made against him. The 
employer claimed that it notified the plaintiff of the 
action but the plaintiff denied receiving any notice that 
the pilot had been disciplined. When the plaintiff filed an 
EEOC claim, an attorney at USAir investigated the charges 
and determined that they lacked merit because the pilot had 
stopped using foul language and no new complaints had been 
made. 
In reviewing the conflicting evidence, the Fourth 
Circuit Court found only that the pilot had used foul 
language and had sung lewd limericks in front of the 
plaintiff. 
Although the appeals court noted that the district 
court had made a mistake in finding that the plaintiff's 
past use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual 
setting indicated that she would not be offended by the 
pilot's conduct and comments, it did rule that the employer 
was not liable because the pilot was not the plaintiff's 
supervisor and, therefore, the employer would be liable only 
if it had actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile 
work environment and did nothing to remedy the situation. 
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In this case the response of USAir was prompt and 
adequate.41 
Dwver v. Smith42 
In Dwver. A female police officer alleged that other 
male police officers created a sexually hostile environment 
by subjecting her to innuendo, disparagement, humiliation, 
and insinuation. She claimed that she received pornographic 
materials through the department's mail system and that she 
was accused of having sex with other officers. The 
plaintiff also charged that she was present during graphic 
conversations about victims of sex crimes, that women were 
referred to in degrading terms, that other employees drove 
by her home to see if she had male visitors and that on one 
occasion she was exposed to graphic descriptions of sexual 
behavior. 
Other officers who testified presented a vastly 
different picture of what took place on the job and 
indicated that the plaintiff often engaged in "dirty talk" 
or used profanity. Other evidence showed that while the 
plaintiff had previously received above average evaluations, 
her record was marred by several incidents of misconduct 
41 Gittins, 21-22. 
42 867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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that questioned her truthfulness and for which she was 
eventually dismissed. 
The Fourth Circuit Court found that only one 
pornographic mailing of undetermined origin occurred and 
that there was only occasional inappropriate language or 
references to sex. The court also pointed out that the 
plaintiff had made very few complaints and gave no testimony 
about the alleged incidents prior to the suit, and for 
several years while she was on the police force, she made no 
complaints at all. Based on its factual findings, the court 
ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove sexual 
harassment that altered the conditions of her employment and 
created an abusive working environment.43 
Jones v. Flagship International44 
Jones was decided very shortly after Meritor. The 
plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to both quid pro 
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. The 
plaintiff, an attorney hired as an equal employment 
opportunity manager, claimed that her supervisor, the vice 
president of personnel harassed her by inviting her to go to 
a hotel with him because she needed the "comfort of a man," 
propositioning her on business trips, and making numerous 
43 Gittins, 22. 
44 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1986). 
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other advances. She also complained about the use of bare 
breasted mermaid sculptures as table decorations at an 
office party and alleged discrimination in pay and 
promotion. 
At first the plaintiff's grievances were ignored, but 
when she filed a complaint with the EEOC, she was suspended 
with pay the next day. The plaintiff was terminated when 
the employer learned that she had solicited two other female 
employees to file charges and had taken home material from 
her supervisor's personnel file. 
The Fifth Circuit Court ruled that the plaintiff had 
not been subjected to hostile work environment harassment. 
Although the plaintiff does not need to show a tangible job 
loss or adverse employment effect to establish a prima facie 
case of sexual harassment under Title VII, the absence of 
such detriment then requires a much greater proof that the 
sexually harassing conduct was pervasive and destructive of 
the work environment. 
The appellate court also held that the plaintiff failed 
to establish quid pro quo sexual harassment because she 
failed to show tangible job detriment, that is that she was 
required to accept sexual harassment as a condition of 
employment.4 5 
45 Gittins, 23. 
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Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corporation46 
In Dornhecker. the plaintiff was a corporate staff 
employee who resigned after four days on the job because of 
alleged sexual harassment by a marketing consultant to the 
company. Claiming a violation of Title VII for hostile 
environment harassment, the plaintiff asserted that on a 
business trip, the consultant had put his hands on her hips, 
had dropped his pants in front of her at the airport, 
touched her breasts, and "playfully" choked her when she 
complained of him putting his feet on the table. When the 
plaintiff became hysterical after the choking incident, her 
immediate supervisor agreed to speak to the company 
president about the behavior of the consultant. The 
president assured the plaintiff that she would not have to 
work with the consultant after the current trip which was to 
last one and a half more days. After she received the 
assurance, the plaintiff resigned the same day. The 
harasser did not attend the rest of the business meetings on 
the trip and his contract was not renewed. 
The Fifth Circuit Court found in favor of the employer 
because it responded promptly to the plaintiff's complaint 
of harassment. The court also noted that the offending 
conduct had spanned only two days and had not been 
aggressive or coercive. The court believed that the action 
46 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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of the employer had been decisive and that the plaintiff had 
not been constructively discharged.47 
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corporation48 
In Bennett. cartoons depicting the plaintiff engaged in 
crude and deviant sexual activities were posted in the men's 
room. When the plaintiff learned of the presence of the 
cartoons, she left work and did not return. The chief 
executive officer of the company had seen the cartoons but 
did nothing to have them removed until the next day when he 
learned of the plaintiff's reaction to them. The company 
removed the CEO in part because of this incident. It also 
assured the plaintiff of its good opinion of her and 
requested on numerous occasions that she return to work. In 
addition, the plaintiff received her full salary until she 
found new employment. 
The Fifth Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the 
district court in this case only because at this time (prior 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991) the only relief the 
plaintiff could receive under Title VII was reinstatement 
and back pay which the employer had already paid her. 
Because the employer changed management and continued to pay 
47 Gittins, 23. 
48 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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the plaintiff, no other equitable relief would be 
appropriate. 
However, the appellate court specifically noted that 
the district court's finding that the employer had responded 
promptly was in error in view of the fact that the CEO had 
seen the cartoons and allowed them to remain posted.49 
Highlander v. KFC National Management Company50 
In Highlander, the plaintiff, an assistant manager in a 
restaurant, alleged that the district training manager and 
her immediate supervisor sexually harassed her. The 
plaintiff claimed that the training manager made comments 
about her uniform, touched her legs and buttocks, and 
touched her name tag which was pinned over her breast. She 
charged that her immediate supervisor put his arm around her 
and suggested that she go with him to a motel if she wanted 
a promotion. The plaintiff was subsequently dismissed. 
After the plaintiff complained, the company conducted an 
investigation which led to the demotion of the training 
manager but which revealed insufficient evidence to 
discipline the plaintiff's immediate supervisor. 
The Sixth Circuit Court found in favor of the employer 
with respect to the guid pro guo and hostile environment 
49 Gittins, 23-24. 
50 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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harassment. With respect quid pro quo harassment, the court 
said that the employee bears the burden of proving that 
submission to the unwelcome sexual advances of supervisory 
personnel was an express or implied condition of receiving 
job benefits or that tangible job detriment would result 
from the employee's failure to submit to the sexual demands 
of supervisory employees. In this case the court found no 
quid pro quo harassment because there was evidence that the 
plaintiff and her husband had indicated that they did not 
place any serious implications upon the supervisor's 
conduct, and that there was no indication that the plaintiff 
was denied a job benefit or suffered detriment as a result 
of her refusal to engage in the activities suggested by the 
supervisor. The supervisor did not participate in the 
decision to terminate the plaintiff who was dismissed for 
poor performance.51 
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company52 
The plaintiff in Rabidue was an executive secretary. 
She alleged that the supervisor of the company's key punch 
and computer section made obscene comments about women 
generally and about the plaintiff, in particular. The 
company knew of the supervisor's crude and vulgar but had 
51 Gittins, 24. 
52 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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not been successful in curbing his behavior. The plaintiff 
also complained that other employees displayed pictures of 
nude or scantily clad women in their offices or work area. 
Ruling in favor of the employer, the Sixth Circuit 
Court said that the plaintiff must demonstrate that she 
would not have been the object of her harassment but for her 
sex. According to this court, sexual conduct that proves 
equally offensive to men and to women would not support a 
Title VII sexual harassment charge. It is important to note 
that it was the minority opinion written in the Rabidue case 
that first set forth the "reasonable woman" theory rather 
than the reasonable person. The court held that one 
employee's vulgar language coupled with sexually oriented 
posters did not result in a hostile or offensive 
environment.53 
Scott v. Sears Roebuck54 
In Scott. a case decided a few months after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Meritor, the plaintiff, a female auto 
mechanic, brought a hostile environment claim alleging that 
a senior auto mechanic and other mechanics sexually harassed 
her. The harassment included making repeated propositions 
to plaintiff, winking at her, offering to give plaintiff a 
53 Gittins, 24-25. 
54 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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rub down, the senior mechanic asking plaintiff what he would 
get if he helped her after she requested assistance, 
slapping the plaintiff on the buttocks and one mechanic 
telling the plaintiff that he knew that she moaned and 
groaned while having sex. The plaintiff never complained to 
any supervisory personnel about this conduct before bringing 
suit. 
The Seventh Circuit Court ruled that even if all of the 
plaintiff's allegations were true, they fell short of what 
is necessary to maintain a hostile environment claim under 
Title VII. The court held that the plaintiff must allege 
instances of harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive so 
as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 
create an abusive working environment. The conduct and 
sexual stereotyping must cause such anxiety and debilitation 
to the plaintiff so that her working conditions are 
"poisoned." The court found that the conduct of the other 
mechanics was too isolated and lacking in repetitive and 
injurious effect to sustain a hostile working environment 
claim. There was also no sign that the senior mechanic 
retaliated for plaintiff's refusal to entertain his 
advances; he gave her a favorable performance review.55 
55 Gittins, 25-26. 
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Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrvsler-Plvmouth56 
The plaintiff in Swanson. was an assistant to the 
finance manager of a car dealership, claimed that she was 
discharged for refusing to submit to sexual harassment. She 
claimed that the general manager subjected her to sexually 
suggestive remarks, humiliating comments in front of other 
people and physical contact. Some of the other employees 
testified that the work atmosphere was relaxed and friendly 
and dismissed the manager's conduct as harmless teasing. 
The general manager claimed that the plaintiff was 
discharged for excessive absences. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court's ruling that the plaintiff had been 
subjected to sexual harassment but that her discharge was 
for reasons unrelated to any sex discrimination. However, 
the Seventh Circuit rejected the lower court's award of 
nominal damages of one dollar and attorney's fees to 
plaintiff. The court held instead that only equitable 
relief was available under Title VII and that any award of 
damages is necessarily legal relief. The plaintiff, 
however, although she had been subjected to sexual 
56 882 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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harassment could not receive equitable relief given that her 
discharge was unrelated to the harassment. Therefore, the 
award of attorney's fees was also reversed by the court.57 
Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation58 
Juanita Guess sued her employer, Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation, charging sexual harassment in violation of 
Title VII. Although the particulars of the actual 
harassment are not discussed, the employers reaction to the 
harassment is. The Seventh Circuit Court affirmed the 
finding of the lower court that the employer, when learning 
of the sexual harassment, took prompt, appropriate, and 
effective corrective action. 
Dockter v. Rudolff Wolff Futures. Inc.59 
In Dockter, a discharged female employee brought action 
against her former employer for sexual harassment and common 
law battery. 
The Seventh Circuit Court held that (1) even if the 
employee's initial two weeks of work were "hostile" such as 
to be actionable as sexual harassment under the Civil Rights 
Act, the employee could not obtain relief under the Act in 
57 Gittins, 26. 
58 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990). 
59 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990). 
196 
the absence of any continuing harassment or discharge bases 
on that harassment, and (2) the district court was not 
erroneous in determining termination was the result of the 
employee's inability to become proficient as an operator of 
a personal computer, and thus, that discharge was not a 
result of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
Movlan v. Maries County60 
In this case, a female ambulance dispatcher, alleged 
that the county sheriff created a hostile working 
environment by making numerous unsolicited sexual advances 
and on one occasion by raping her. After an investigation, 
the county prosecutor determined that no criminal charges 
should be filed against the sheriff. The defendant 
presented evidence that the plaintiff often flirted with 
other officers and hugged and kissed them. The plaintiff 
also had pled guilty to falsifying her employment 
application to obtain CETA benefits. 
While the Eighth Circuit Court ruled that a sexually 
hostile environment can constitute a violation of Title VII, 
it held that the plaintiff had failed to make such a case 
because she did not prove that the harassment was unwelcome. 
The court also believed that the alleged harassment did not 
impact on the plaintiff's employment since the plaintiff 
60 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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worked regular shifts for ten days after the alleged rape, 
and she produced no testimony that she was distressed or 
unable to perform her duties.61 
Jordan v. Clark62 
In Jordan, the plaintiff, an administrative assistant 
at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service alleged that her 
immediate supervisor engaged in quid pro quo and hostile 
environment sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. 
The plaintiff charged that her supervisor made harassing 
phone calls to her at home, improperly touched her, made 
sexist comments, and requested that she sleep with him in 
order to get a promotion. However, the court did not credit 
her allegations, finding that there was insufficient 
evidence of the harassing phone calls and that the touching 
did not occur or was insignificant. The court based this 
finding on the plaintiff's failure to mention this conduct 
throughout lengthy administrative hearings. The court also 
noted that many people at the office made off-color jokes 
and that the supervisor had flirted the plaintiff, rather 
than making a sexual advance. 
When the plaintiff complained about the alleged 
harassment, the Service conducted an investigation and found 
61 Gittins, 26. 
62 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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that no discrimination had occurred, but that the supervisor 
had retaliated against the plaintiff for filing a complaint. 
Finding in favor of the employer, the Ninth Circuit 
Court ruled that the plaintiff had not been subjected to a 
hostile working environment within the meaning of Meritor. 
It held that the harassment was not sufficiently pervasive 
to alter the terms of the plaintiff's employment and did not 
create an abusive environment. 
The court also held that the plaintiff had not been 
subjected to retaliation for engaging in an activity 
protected by Title VII. Alleged resistance to a 
supervisor's advances is protected activity only if the 
advances occurred and were unlawful. The court viewed the 
case not as one of retaliation, but a problem of conflicting 
personalities.63 
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Company64 
The plaintiff in Hicks was a black female security 
guard. She alleged that she was the victim of racial and 
sexual harassment from her supervisors and other security 
guards who subjected her to racial slurs and jokes, 
referring to blacks as "niggers," "coon," and "lazy 
niggers;" calling the plaintiff "buffalo butt;" disparate 
63 Gittins, 26-27. 
64 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). 
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treatment such as not permitting her to sit while inspecting 
the plant; not allowing her to take lunch at the usual time 
and making her ride in a car on a wet passenger seat. The 
plaintiff alleged that a supervisor rubbed her thigh, 
touched her on the buttocks, grabbed her breasts, and got on 
top of her. The plaintiff did not report these incidents to 
her employer but did file a complaint with the EEOC. 
The employer claimed that the plaintiff's work 
performance was deficient, that she accidently dropped her 
gun and challenged another employee to a fight. 
The Tenth Circuit Court found that the trial court had 
correctly ruled that no racial harassment or quid pro quo 
sexual harassment occurred, be remanded the case to the 
district court for consideration of the hostile environment 
claim. In so ruling, the court stated that the predicate 
acts underlying a sexual harassment claim do not have to be 
clearly sexual in nature. Any harassment or other treatment 
of an employee or group of employees that would not have 
occurred but for the sex of the employee may, if 
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal 
condition of employment under Title VII. In determining the 
pervasiveness of harassment against the plaintiff, a trial 
court may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with 
evidence of sexual hostility.65 
65 Gittins, 27. 
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Ebert v. Lamar Trucking Plaza66 
Reviewing the district court's finding under a "clearly 
erroneous" standard, the Tenth Circuit Court acknowledged 
that Title VII does cover harassment based on sex which 
creates an offensive and abusive environment, but pointed 
out that under the Supreme Court's ruling in Meritor the 
harassment must still be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 
create an abusive working environment." However, where the 
harassment consisted of the use of rough language which was 
used by supervisors and employees alike, both male and 
female, and occasional unwelcome touching, the conduct did 
not rise to the level of a Title VII violation. The court 
of appeals also noted that the management of the truck stop 
took prompt and appropriate corrective action when it 
received complaints.67 
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding. Inc.68 
In Steele, the plaintiffs, an executive secretary and 
an emergency medical technician, charged their employer with 
a violation through Title VII through the creation of a 
66 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989). 
67 Gittins, 27-28. 
68 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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sexually hostile working environment. They alleged that one 
of the employer's vice presidents, who acted as a general 
manager, harassed them by making sexually oriented jokes, 
requesting sexual favors from the plaintiffs, making 
suggestive comments about their attire and requesting that 
they visit him on his office couch. 
When the plaintiffs reported the harassment, the 
company's EEOC officer interviewed the plaintiffs and told 
them that remedial action would be taken. The vice 
president who had harassed the women was summoned from an 
overseas assignment and given a verbal reprimand and 
instructions to stop the offensive conduct immediately. The 
company then assured the plaintiffs that their positions 
with the company were secure. The harassment did in fact 
stop. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court found for the employer 
because when the employer was made aware of the harassment, 
prompt and appropriate action was taken to stop it. The 
court distinguished its decision in this case from its 
earlier decision in Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers.69 
The court pointed out that Sparks involved quid pro quo 
harassment where the supervisor used his authority to compel 
69 Supra note 28. 
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submission to sexual advances. Here the supervisor's 
harassment did not relate to his authority.70 
Summary 
Individuals who are considering legal action on sexual 
harassment charges in the federal courts would be well-
advised to review the strengths and weaknesses of their 
potential cases before proceeding. Overlaying the selected 
Terpstra and Baker categories on the thirty-four cases 
outlined above, finds several patterns and dimensions that 
influence case outcomes. If an individual has been the 
victim of sexual harassment, has witnesses or documentation 
to support the allegation, has notified management of the 
harassment, and management has taken no action or inadequate 
action upon notification, the individual is nearly 100 
percent likely to win the case. 
No differences were found relative to the circuit in 
which the cases were tried so no advantage to either the 
defendant or the plaintiff is dependent upon the area of the 
country in which the case is tried. The Seventh Circuit had 
the most cases with eight but the decisions were split down 
the middle, four for the plaintiff and four for the 
70 Gittins, 28. 
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defendant. Each district that tried three or more cases had 
an even or almost even number of decisions for both the 
plaintiff and the defendant. 
The cases discussed above suggest several tactics that 
an individual might employ in dealing with future incidents 
of sexual harassment. A potential victim might arrange for 
witnesses to be present in situations where previous sexual 
harassment has taken place. If harassment takes place, the 
victim should gather as much documentation of the incident 
and surrounding circumstances, as possible. Next, the 
victim should notify management of the sexual harassment 
through any existing grievance procedure. Finally, if 
management fails to take prompt and appropriate action, the 
victim should proceed with formal charges. 
Steps that organizations might take to decrease the 
likelihood of sexual harassment lawsuits and unfavorable 
settlements are also distinguishable. The first step for 
organizations is to lessen the possibility of sexual 
harassment happening by providing a formal, forceful, and 
proactive sexual harassment policy complete with penalties 
and a simple reporting procedure. Organizations need to use 
orientation and training films for new and existing 
employees as a means of eliminating such behaviors. Second, 
the response of the organization to a report of sexual 
harassment must be prompt. Immediate investigative action 
is imperative. If the investigation finds merit in the 
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sexual harassment complaint, swift remedial action should be 
taken to penalize the perpetrator. 
Finally, if an organization has been threatened with a 
sexual harassment lawsuit, management needs to review the 
strength of the potential case against them with regard to 
the influential variables discussed here and make an 
informed decision as to the odds of successfully rebutting 
the charges. If odds of success are low, the organization 
might opt to reach an out-of-court settlement to avoid the 
time, expense, and negative publicity associated with losing 
a court battle. 
205 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
History did not record the name of the first boss who 
told a subordinate, "Have sex with me or you are fired." 
However, it is safe to assume that the employee did not file 
a formal complaint with her employer. For decades, many 
victims felt the only way to cope with sexual harassment at 
work was to quit their job or suffer in silence. Not any 
more. 
Women, who now make up nearly half of the nation's work 
force, are demanding that employers take steps to prevent 
harassment and punish offenders. Victims of sexual 
harassment are also showing an increased willingness to take 
their cases to court. Sexual harassment has become a 
prominent issue in American politics and American life, and 
it will not soon go away. 
Educational institutions and their students also have 
begun to realize that sexual harassment occurs at school and 
can be subject to legal action. It seems inevitable that 
the publicity accorded the problem of sexual harassment in 
the workplace, combined with clearer standards of proof and 
liability resulting from these cases, will ultimately lead 
to increased litigation. 
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The introductory material in Chapter I delineated the 
concerns regarding sexual harassment and framed the issues 
which have been addressed within this study. Throughout 
this study, the researcher has sought to clarify the legal 
issues surrounding sexual harassment and, therefore, provide 
guidelines for school leaders to facilitate compliance with 
the laws regarding sexual harassment. In Chapter I, the 
researcher identified several key questions which were 
answered within Chapters II, III, and IV. The answers to 
these questions, when summarized, serve as a basis for the 
development of administrative guidelines. 
The first question listed in Chapter I was: What is 
sexual harassment as defined by the judicial process? 
Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination based on sex. 
The most frequently cited definition of sexual harassment 
was established in 1980 by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) as a violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Title VII makes such discrimination an 
unlawful employment practice and Title IX of the 1972 
Education Acts makes sexual harassment an unlawful 
educational practice. Accordingly, unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when 1) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual's employment (or education); 2) submission to or 
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rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the 
basis for employment (or educational) decisions affecting 
such individual; or 3) such conduct has the purpose or 
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working (or educational) environment. The 
activity directed toward the victim and her response to it 
carry the greatest weight in determining whether sexual 
harassment has taken place. 
The second question was: How does the literature 
analyze sexual harassment? Power is the underlying dynamic 
of sexual harassment; the power to impose unwelcome sexual 
demands or conditions on another with impunity. The 
literature speaks to the patriarchal nature of our society 
and the effect of sexual stratification within our culture. 
Historically, it wasn't until the early 1960s that 
women began entering the work force in numbers large enough 
to create the societal situation which would formalize 
sexual harassment as a problem. The 1970s ushered in an era 
of legislative efforts to curb discrimination and in 1980, 
the EEOC first issued its first influential guidelines on 
sexual harassment. In 1986, the Supreme Court issued its 
first major ruling on sexual harassment in Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson making it illegal not only when the 
harassment results in a loss of a job or a promotion, but 
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also when it creates an offensive or hostile work 
environment. 
Several surveys established sexual harassment as a 
pervasive problem and discovered that men and women view 
sexual harassment quite differently. This was the premise 
upon which the 'reasonable woman theory' was established. 
In addition to a great deal of sexual harassment 
legislation, the 1990s have brought much sexual harassment 
publicity. First, the Judge Clarence Thomas confirmation 
hearings in which Anita Hill accused Judge Thomas of years 
of sexual harassment played on national television and then 
the humiliating United States Navy's Tailhook scandal 
covered the media. 
Finally, the literature has pointed to schools as the 
newest locus of sexual harassment as California became the 
first state to pass legislation addressing sexual harassment 
as an educational issue. 
The third question posed in Chapter I was: What does an 
analysis of federal and state statutes reveal regarding 
sexual harassment? Before Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 
the court found sexual advances by a supervisor toward an 
employee to be nothing more than a personal problem in which 
the court should not become involved. Therefore, it became 
apparent to sexually harassed plaintiffs that they had to 
convince the court that harassment involved more than just 
personal acts. 
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In the late 1970s, the courts began to recognize that 
quid pro quo sexual harassment violated Title VII. While 
maintaining that non-employment related personal encounters 
were not actionable under Title VII, the courts held that it 
was improper for a supervisor, whom the court regarded as an 
agent of the employer, to use compliance to a demand for 
sexual favors as a basis for altering an employee's working 
conditions. Soon thereafter, courts began to hold that 
plaintiffs made a prima facie case of sexual harassment if 
they proved that an employer or supervisor had made demands 
for sexual favors in return for a job, a promotion, or other 
benefits. However, the courts did not find sexual 
harassment in cases where actions of supervisors could not 
be directly tied to the loss of a tangible job benefit. 
In Meritor. the Supreme Court recognized a second type 
of sexual harassment, hostile environment, as well as the 
liability of employers for sexual harassment in the 
workplace. Meritor relied on four elements for a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment. First, sexual advances 
took place. Second, these advances were unwelcome. Third, 
the advances were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a 
condition of employment. Fourth, the advances were so 
pervasive and continuous that the employer either knew or 
should have known of them. 
Since Meritor, the courts have found that the 
plaintiff's participation in sexual innuendo or foul 
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language in a consensual setting does not wave her legal 
protection against unwelcome sexual harassment. Even the 
presence of a consensual relationship between the plaintiff 
and the defendant does not necessarily mean that the 
plaintiff welcomed the defendant's harassing actions. In 
addition, the 'reasonable woman' theory has been adopted as 
the standard for determining a hostile working environment. 
Who is the reasonable woman? The reasonable woman is seen 
as the average American female, the one you see everyday. 
It could be the woman who lives down the street from you, 
the woman who waits on you at your favorite restaurant, 
delivers your mail, teaches your children, or the woman who 
has become your best customer. It could be your mother, 
your sister, your daughter, your wife, or your girl friend. 
The rationale behind the reasonable women theory is that men 
and women perceive sexual harassment differently and the 
courts have declared that in order to fairly judge the 
impact of sexual harassment, cases must be seen from the 
point of view of a 'reasonable women.' When trying to sort 
out the appropriateness of their own actions, men might do 
well to remember the MS DaWG theory. That is, they need to 
consider whether they would be doing or saying the same 
things if their mother, sister, daughter, wife, or 
girlfiend was present. Or, if they would appreciate similar 
speech or action directed toward their mother, sister, 
daughter, wife, or girlfriend. 
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Finally, anti-female animus has been consistently 
seen as a basis for finding sexual harassment even when the 
activity is not of a sexual nature. The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 provided additional relief for victims of intentional 
employment discrimination in the form of compensatory and 
punitive damages and in Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools, 
the Supreme Court ruled that compensatory damages were also 
an available remedy under Title IX. On the state level, 
state tort law claims were the only avenue for monetary 
recovery for emotional distress and punitive damages before 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and often plaintiffs were 
successful in combining Title VII sexual harassment claims 
with state tort claims. Finally, in 1992, California became 
the first state to address the increasing problem of sexual 
harassment in schools by passing legislation that speaks to 
students involved in sexual harassment upwards from grade 
four. 
The fourth question asked in Chapter I was: What are 
the discernible patterns and trends regarding judicial 
decisions in sexual harassment cases? If an individual has 
been the victim of sexual harassment, has witnesses or 
documentation to support the allegation, has notified 
management of the harassment, and management has taken 
inadequate action, the individual has a very good chance of 
prevailing in court. On the other hand, an organization 
needs to have a formal, forceful, proactive sexual 
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harassment policy complete with penalties and a simple 
reporting procedure. Then, when a report is received, 
immediate investigative action is imperative. If the 
investigation finds merit in the sexual harassment 
allegation, swift remedial action should be taken to 
penalize the perpetrator. Regardless of the situation, 
organizations that can prove that they took prompt and 
appropriate action when a report of sexual harassment was 
received, have an excellent chance of prevailing in court. 
The final question asked in Chapter I was: What legal 
guidelines can be established as a result of this research 
to aid school administrators and board members in 
administrative decisions and policy making? The basis for 
determining liability depends on the actions and reactions 
of the organization. School board members and 
administrators must affirmatively raise the subject of 
sexual harassment, express strong disapproval, develop 
appropriate policies and procedures, inform employees and 
students of their rights and methods by which they can 
report undesirable conduct, and develop methods to sensitize 
all concerned. Schools need a written policy for both 
employees and students specifically prohibiting sexual 
harassment and should communicate this policy to them at 
regular intervals. The policy should include appropriate 
definitions of both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
sexual harassment and should explicitly state that any 
213 
employee or student who engages in sexual harassment will be 
subject to discipline, including discharge or expulsion. In 
addition, schools should periodically conduct training 
sessions to inform employees and students of the policy. 
Examples of various types of behavior that are prohibited 
should be given and discussed to help everyone recognize 
sexual harassment when it occurs. Schools need an easy 
highly publicized report procedure for both employees and 
students. This report procedure needs to designate several 
possible contacts in order to insure objectivity and 
fairness with a guarantee of confidentiality and no 
retaliation. Then a procedure for an internal investigation 
needs to be identified and followed to determine the merits 
of the allegation, complete with interviews of both the 
alleged victim and the alleged harasser, as well as any 
possible witnesses. Once a determination has been made as 
to the validity of the complaint, both parties need to be 
informed and prompt disciplinary action taken, if necessary. 
Based upon the answers provided to these research 
questions, there are several conclusions which can be drawn 
regarding the legal aspects of sexual harassment and the 
implications for educational leaders. 
Conclusions 
Even when legal issues appear to be similar, different 
circumstances can produce entirely different decisions. 
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Therefore, drawing conclusions based upon legal research can 
be difficult. However, based upon an analysis of judicial 
decisions, the following general conclusions can be made 
regarding the legal aspects of sexual harassment. 
1. Sexual harassment is clearly illegal and protected 
under both Title VII and Title IX. 
2. A written proactive policy for both employees and 
students is necessary to protect school systems and 
officials from liability. 
3. Clear proactive communication of the written policy 
with appropriate training should be repeated at set 
intervals is essential for both employees and students. 
4. Men and women see sexual harassment differently. 
Men need to understand that his behavior is unacceptable 
when a woman finds his behavior toward her to be 
undesirable. 
5. Simple procedures for reporting sexual harassment 
need to be outlined for both students and employees. 
6. After a report of sexual harassment is received, a 
prompt, adequate, and confidential investigation of the 
report must take be undertaken. 
7. When the investigation is finished, the 
organization must make an adequate response to its findings. 
Continuous and complete documentation is important. 
215 
8. If sued, the organization should look at facts 
surrounding each case to determine if it would be 
advantageous to settle out of court. 
9. School officials who have a proactive, publicized 
policy in place, complete with clear reporting procedures, 
and prompt and adequate responses to complaints make their 
chances of avoiding or successfully defending a sexual 
harassment suit much better. 
10. School officials should refuse to give any 
recommendations to employees who have been found to be 
guilty of sexual harassment and removed from employment. 
Recommendations 
Based upon an analysis of the legal research 
accomplished through the study, the following 
recommendations are made for school board members and school 
administrators. These recommendations should serve as 
guidelines for school officials faced with sexual harassment 
proceedings. 
1. Know all state and federal statutory details 
regarding what constitutes sexual harassment. 
2. Define policies and precise procedures to be 
followed during sexual harassment complaints. 
3. Understand the property rights and liberty 
interests of each employee as they relate to that particular 
employee's contract status. 
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4. Keep employees continuously informed concerning 
sexual harassment issues through training and written 
communication. 
5. Maintain sufficient documentation so that if there 
is an appeal to the courts, all steps can be verified. 
6. Document with specificity, including time, date, 
and place any reported acts of sexual harassment and the 
school system's response to them. 
7. Avoid any situation in which the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of either the employees or the students 
are usurped. Such situations may taint an entire case and 
result in the reversal of an action of the school board or 
official. 
8. Notify both parties of the final outcome of the 
school's investigation of sexual harassment complaints. 
9. Never mislead an employee or a student by implying 
that sexual harassment is acceptable behavior. Employees 
and students should always be aware of what behavior is 
expected and what steps will be taken if sexual harassment 
is reported. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
This study has focused upon the legal aspects of sexual 
harassment. Continued research is suggested on the legal 
aspects of sexual harassment as the courts continue to 
define and clarify sexual harassment issues. This study 
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might focus on research of sure to be forthcoming state 
sexual harassment legislation as it relates specifically to 
schools. 
In addition, studies that focused on ethnographic 
research conducted within the schools to determine the 
pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the halls and behind 
the walls would add tremendously to this body of research. 
Studies focused on the development of appropriate sexual 
harassment curriculum materials for various grade levels 
would also be of interest, as well as studies which would 
utilize personal interviews to shed light on the actual 
effects of sexual harassment on individual students. 
Finally, while this study was developed as a use 
document for administrators, a similar study would be 
helpful for both the teacher and the student. 
All of these recommended areas of further study serve 
the important purpose of focusing on the positive goal of 
eradicating sexual harassment in the educational setting. 
Only through education on the issues will the issues facing 
education be successfully addressed and dissolved. 
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